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AN INHERENT ROLE FOR COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 
IN JUDICIAL REVIEW OF AGENCY DECISIONS: 
A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON OSHA RULEMAKING 
Paul M. Bangser* 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The proper role of cost-benefit analysis in health and environmen-
tal decisionmaking has been the source of a growing controversy 
during the past decade.! The debate has centered largely around the 
regulation of workplace health and safety hazards by the Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Administration (OSHA).2 Since its 
establishment under the 1970 Occupational Safety and Health Act 
(the Act),3 OSHA has promulgated numerous regulations designed 
* Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW. The author wishes 
to thank Prof. Zygmunt J. B. Plater of Boston College Law School for the invaluable advice 
and insight he provided during the preparation of this article. 
1. See, e.g., MacCarthy, A Review of Some Normative and Conceptual Issues in Occupa-
tional Safety and Health, 9 B.C. ENVT'L AFF. L. REV. 773 (1982); Rodgers, Benefits, Costs & 
Risks: Oversight of Health and Environmental Decisionmaking, 4 HARV. ENV. L. REV. 191 
(1980); Baram, Cost-Benefit Analysis: An Inadequate Basis for Health, Safety and En-
vironmental Regulation Decisionmaking, 8 ECOLOGY L.Q. 473 (1980); J. Kasper, Cost-Benefit 
Analysis in Environmental Decisionmaking, 45 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1013 (1977); Williams, 
Benefit-Cost Analysis in Natural Resources Decisionmaking: An Economic and Legal Over-
view, 11 NAT. RESOURCES J. 761 (1976). 
2. The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (the Act), 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1976 & 
Supp. III 1979), authorizes the Secretary of Labor to establish workplace health and safety 
standards. Id. § 655. The Secretary of Labor established the Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration (OSHA) within the Department of Labor to promulgate and administer the 
standards. 36 Fed. Reg. 8754 (1971). The Secretary of Labor delegated his authority to pro-
mulgate standards to the Assistant Secretary of Labor for Occupational Safety and Health 
(the Secretary) who is the head of OSHA. 29 U.S.C. § 553. This article will refer to "OSHA," 
"the agency," and "the Secretary" interchangeably. 
3. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1976 & Supp. III 1979). 
365 
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to reduce worker exposure to toxic substances.4 Industries faced 
with the large costs5 of complying with OSHA's toxic substance 
standards have repeatedly attacked the standards on the grounds 
that they are too expensive.6 These industries have contended that, 
before promulgating toxic substance standards, OSHA must take in-
to account the economic efficiency of the proposed regulations under 
the criterion of cost-benefit analysis. 
The controversy over whether particular economic considerations 
are proper under OSHA has revolved around a determination of con-
gressional intent. Neither the Act nor its legislative history provides 
a clear understanding of that intent. Moreover, attempts by the 
judiciary to assess that intent have been hampered by a number of 
uncertainties. For example, OSHA is delegated broad policymaking 
authority under the Act to determine safe, though not necessarily 
risk-free, workplace exposure levels to hazardous substances.7 Yet, 
like many agencies regulating in the area of health and the environ-
ment, OSHA is forced to make policy determinations in the face of 
both scientifically and economically incomplete information. In 
OSHA's case, these gaps in knowledge concern the medical effects 
of toxic substances8 and the economic capability of industries to 
achieve limited exposure levels to such substances. These informa-
4. For a listing of the 24 new permanent health standards promulgated by OSHA during the 
1970's, see Hollander, Injunctions Against Occupational Hazards: Toward a Safe Workplace 
Environment, 9 B.C. ENVT'L AFF. L. REV. 133, 138 n.33 (1980). In addition, this past year 
OSHA has issued several Advance Notices of Proposed Rulemaking: one concerning ethylene 
dibromide, 46 Fed. Reg. 61,671 (1981); one concerning a reevaluation of the current standards 
for ethylene oxide, 47 Fed. Reg. 3566 (1982) (the present standard can be found at 29 C.F.R. § 
1910.1000, Table Z-l (1981»; and one concerning a reevaluation of OSHA's generic policy for 
the regulation of carcinogens, 47 Fed. Reg. 187 (1982). OSHA also recently issued a request 
for comments and information, and notice of informal public meetings, concerning the possible 
regulation of occupational exposure to pesticides during the manufacturing and formulating 
process. 45 Fed. Reg. 80,078 (1980). 
5. For example, estimates of the total annual cost to the steel industry of OSHA's standard 
for coke oven emissions ranged from $240 million to $1.28 billion including capital, operating, 
and maintenance costs. Am. Iron & Steel Inst. v. OSHA, 577 F.2d 825,836 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. 
dismissed, 448 U.S. 917 (1980). OSHA's benzene standard, as originally promulgated, would 
have cost that segment of the petroleum refining industry producing benzene $24 million in 
capital costs and $600,000 in first-year operating expenses. 43 Fed. Reg. 5936 (1978). The 
capital expense broke down to $80,000 for each of the 300 covered employees. 
6. For a listing of the outcome in the courts of the attacks on OSHA's toxic substance stand-
ards, see Note, OSHA's Rulemaking Authority Und{3r the Occupational Safety and Health Act: 
Marshall V. American Petroleum Institute, 12 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 229, 230 n.5 (1981). OSHA's 
standard for airborne lead recently was upheld in United Steelworkers of Am. V. Marshall, 647 
F.2d 1189 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 913 (1981). 
7. See Indus. Union Dep't, AFL-CIO V. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 641 (1980); Cur-
rie, OSHA, 1976 AM. B. FND. RESEARCH J. 1107, 1134. 
8. See infra text and notes at notes 255-60. 
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tion gaps complicate OSHA's determinations of "safe" exposure 
levels to toxic substances and, therefore, complicate in turn a court's 
review of whether OSHA's determinations are based on a proper 
consideration of available economic and scientific data. 
OSHA's regulatory posture has been obscured further by confu-
sion surrounding the proper scope of judicial review of the agency's 
health and safety regulations. In section 6(f) of the Act, the substan-
tial evidence test is set out as the standard for judicial review of 
OSHA's determinations.9 While courts normally use the substantial 
evidence test to review an agency's factual determinations, the Act 
directs courts to apply this test to a review of OSHA's legislative-like 
policy determinations.10 The courts therefore have had to strike an 
"uneasy partnership"ll with OSHA: on one hand, the courts have 
expressed the need to provide effective review; on the other, the 
courts have recognized that judicial review under the substantial 
evidence test must be somewhat limited where OSHA's decisions are 
backed by the agency's broad authority to make policy. 12 In addition, 
courts have felt bound to defer to OSHA's superior expertise in com-
plex scientific matters13 and to allow room for the agency's 
necessarily speculative predictions of technological development in 
the area of workplace health and safety controls.14 
An additional factor which has complicated judicial assessment of 
whether cost-benefit analysis is an appropriate criterion under the 
Act is confusion over the meaning of the term "cost-benefit 
analysis" itself. The term has been used to encompass a range of ex-
ercises from a formal, highly quantified economic analysis to a broad, 
common sense balancing that is simply indicative of any rational 
utility-based decisionmaking .15 The uncertainty about cost-benefit 
analysis under OSHA is, therefore, threefold: to what extent must 
economic considerations enter into the agency's regulatory deci-
sions; what standard of review should the courts use to evaluate 
9. 29 U.S.C. § 655(f) (1976). 
10. See infra text at notes 239-49. 
11. See Assoc. Ind. of N.Y. v. United States Dep't of Labor, 487 F.2d 342, 354 (2d Cir. 
1973); Indus. Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467,469 (D.C. Cir. 1974). See also 
Leventhal, Environmental Decisionmaking and the Role of the Courts, 122 U. P A. L. REV. 509 
(1974). 
12. Hodgson, 499 F.2d at 475. See infra text and notes at notes 250-54. 
13. Soc. of Plastics Ind. v. OSHA, 509 F.2d 1301, 1308 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 992 
(1975). 
14. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Marshall, 647 F.2d 1189, 1206 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
15. See infra text and notes at notes 42-51. 
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OSHA's economic considerations; and what type of cost-benefit 
analysis, if any, is appropriate. 
Amid this confusion, industries attacking the validity of OSHA's 
toxic substance standards have pointed to section 6(b)(5) of the Act 
as mandating cost-benefit analysis. Section 6(b)(5) requires OSHA's 
toxic substance standards to be "feasible."l6 The industry forces 
have argued that a determination of feasibility is impossible without 
cost-benefit analysis. During the past decade reviewing courts, 
mindful of the complex subject matter, the difficult nature of their 
role, and the overriding concern for worker health and safety man-
dated by the Act, generally upheld OSHA's standards against the in-
dustries' challenges. l7 
The extensive litigation over cost-benefit analysis was recently 
resolved in part by the United States Supreme Court. In American 
Textile Manufacturers Institute v. Donovan (ATMI),l8 the Supreme 
Court held that, for the limited category of toxic substances, OSHA 
is neither required nor permitted to use cost-benefit analysis as a 
criterion for determining worker exposure limits to those hazards. 
ATMI involved a textile industry challenge to the cotton dust stand-
ardl9 promulgated by OSHA in 1978. The Court upheld the standard, 
even though OSHA had not made a showing that the regulations 
were justified on a cost-benefit basis.20 
The ATMI holding constitutes the second element of a two-part 
test which now governs OSHA's ability to regulate toxic substances. 
In Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum 
Institute (Industrial Union),2l decided the previous term, the 
Supreme Court held that, as a threshold matter, OSHA must show 
that a "significant risk" of health impairment exists before it may 
regulate a workplace hazard at all.22 Once the significant risk 
threshold is satisfied, the ATMI decision then governs OSHA's abili-
ty to regulate toxic substances. While ATMI precludes the use of 
cost-benefit analysis to determine if a toxic substance standard is 
feasible, it does place limits, though minimal ones, on OSHA's ability 
to regulate by declaring infeasible those standards which are either 
16. 29 U.S.C. § 655(bX5) (1976). 
17. See supra note 6. 
18. 452 U.S. 490 (1981). This case is commonly referred to as the Cotton Dust Case. 
19. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1043 (1981). OSHA's cotton dust standard was designed to reduce the 
incidence of byssinosis, a disease caused primarily by the inhalation of cotton dust. Byssinosis 
is prevalent among workers in the cotton industry. See infra text and notes at notes 99-125. 
20. 452 U.S. 490, 541. 
21. 448 U.S. 607 (1980). This case is commonly referred to as the Benzene Case. 
22. [d. at 641-42. See infra text and notes at notes 85-97. 
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economically or technologically unachievable by the regulated in-
dustry.23 
In prohibiting OSHA's use of cost-benefit analysis for toxic 
substance regulation, the Supreme Court was troubled by the dif-
ferent meanings assigned by the parties to the term "cost-benefit 
analysis." The Court failed to distinguish between these meanings 
while deciding that cost-benefit analysis is prohibited under section 
6(b)(5).24 In doing so, the Court overlooked what this article suggests 
has been an inherent role for the broad, nonmonetized form of cost-
benefit analysis in judicial review of agency decisions. The purpose 
of this article is to examine this apparently inherent role in the con-
text of the Supreme Court's recent pair of decisions affecting OSHA 
rulemaking. 
To provide background to the controversy concerning cost-benefit 
analysis under OSHA, Part II of this article describes the Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Act and then describes the confusion over 
the various meanings given to the term "cost-benefit analysis." The 
section then summarizes circuit court opinions, prior to Industrial 
Union, construing the decisionmaking methods required by the Act. 
Part III briefly reviews the Supreme Court's opinion in Industrial 
Union and then turns to a detailed look at the ATMI decision. This 
section describes the ATMI Court's construction of the interaction 
between sections 6(b)(5) and 3(8) of the Act, the two provisions which 
combine to limit OSHA's authority to regulate toxic substances. In 
addition, because the narrow holding of ATMI applies only to 
OSHA's toxic substance standards, this section describes the im-
plications of that decision for other types of OSHA regulations, such 
as those governing general workplace safety. Part IV of this article 
turns to a discussion of the inherent role for cost-benefit analysis in 
judicial review of agency decisions. This section examines a series of 
representative cases which reveals that, regardless of the lack of any 
express congressional mandate, a broad form of cost-benefit analysis 
has been invoked quite often by courts when reviewing the policy 
decisions of OSHA and other policymaking agencies. This section 
then reexamines the Industrial Union and ATMI decisions in light of 
this observation to determine what form of cost-benefit analysis, if 
any, remains valid under the Occupational Safety and Health Act. 
The article concludes, first, that the ATMI Court properly construed 
the Act to prohibit OSHA from using a strictly monetized form of 
23. See infra text and notes at notes 139-58. 
24. See infra note 212. 
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cost-benefit analysis in the setting of toxic substance exposure 
levels. Second, the article concludes that despite this prohibition, 
there appears to be a need for at least some consideration by OSHA 
of the financial costs of health and safety standards; this should oc-
cur as part of a broad, nonmonetized cost-benefit analysis to be used 
by OSHA in its promulgation of health and safety regulations. 
II. HISTORY OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS UNDER OSHA 
A. The Occupational Safety and Health Act: Background 
The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 197025 was enacted to 
relieve the "ever-increasing human misery and economic loss" 
caused by work-related injuries and illnesses.26 Congress recognized 
that technological advances in American industrial processes were 
causing workplace health and safety problems of unprecedented 
volume and complexity.27 The mandate of the Act is to "assure so far 
as possible ... safe and healthful working conditions" for every 
American worker.28 To achieve this goal, the Act authorizes OSHA29 
to adopt or modify existing health and safety standards30 and to pro-
25. 29 u.s.c. §§ 651-678 (1976 & Supp. III 1979). 
26. s. REP. No. 1282, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in [1970] U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. 
NEWS at 5177 [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 1282]. 
27. [d. at 5178. 
[T]echnological advances and new processes in American industry have brought 
numerous new hazards to the workplace. Carcinogenic chemicals, lasers, ultrasonic 
energy, beryllium metal, epoxy resins, pesticides, among others, all present incipient 
threats to the health of workers. Indeed, new materials and processes are being in-
troduced into industry at a much faster rate than the present meager resources of oc-
cupational health can keep up with. It is estimated that every 20 minutes a new and 
potentially toxic chemical is introduced into industry. New processes and new sources 
of energy present occupational and health problems of unprecedented complexity. 
S. REP. No. 1282, supra note 26, U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS at 5178. 
28. 29 U.S.C. § 651(b) (1976). Worker health is "the overriding concern of OSHA." Indus. 
Union Dep't v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 475 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
29. See supra note 2. 
30. The federal and state governments had established relatively few occupational safety 
and health standards prior to 1970. See The Job Safety and Health Act of 1970, (BNA) OPERA-
TIONS MANUAL 13-20, 24-32 (1971) [hereinafter JOB ACT MANUAL]. Most states did have some 
kind of occupational safety and health law by 1970, and most regulated mining; yet, no com-
prehensive national scheme existed. [d. at 15. The federal government first got significantly 
involved in this field in 1936 when Congress passed the Walsh-Healy Act, Pub. L. No. 74-846, 
881, 49 Stat. 2036 (1936). This Act set safety and health standards only for workers engaged 
in government contract work and regulated such workplace hazards as radiation exposure, 
noise, gas, vapors, dusts, and hazardous chemicals. JOB ACT MANUAL, supra this note, at 25. 
The Walsh-Healy Act plus several other narrowly drawn federal statutes combined to protect 
at least 25 million workers prior to the passage of the Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 
U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1976). JOB ACT MANUAL, supra this note, at 24. Despite this limited federal 
presence, a need for comprehensive legislation became well documented by the late 1960's. [d. 
at 13. For example, a 1967 Surgeon General's report concluded that 65 percent ofthe workers 
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mulgate new standards in areas where none exist.31 
Congress intended this legislation to be a comprehensive scheme 
designed to protect as many workers as possible. The Act requires all 
employers engaged in interstate commerce32 to comply with OSHA's 
in 1700 industrial plants were exposed to harmful physical agents, yet only 25 percent of these 
workers were adequately protected. [d. at 13. Not only were known dangers such as lead and 
mercury poisoning going unchecked, id. at 13-14, but also new dangers were being introduced 
into the workplace at an alarming rate. See supra note 27. 
Section 4(b)(2) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 653(b)(2) (1976), required all standards promulgated 
for specific industries under the then existing amalgam of federal laws to be adopted 
automatically by the Secretary as occupational safety and health standards. In addition, sec-
tion 6(a), 29 U.S.C. § 655(a), required the Secretary to adopt, within a two year period after 
the Act became effective, both national consensus standards and established federal stand-
ards. Section 3(9), 29 U.S.C. § 652(9), defines a national consensus standard as any standard 
adopted by a nationally recognized standards-producing organization. Section 3(10), 29 U.S.C. 
§ 652(10), defines an established federal standard as any occupational safety and health stand-
ard in existence after the date of the Act's passage which had been established by a federal 
agency. 
31. In addition to adopting the pre-1970 standards, the Act authorizes the Secretary to pro-
mulgate new permanent standards through an informal "notice and comment" rulemaking 
procedure. [d. § 6(b), 29 U.S.C. § 655(b) (1976). The procedure is initiated when the Secretary 
determines that a rule should be promulgated in order to ensure a safe and healthful 
workplace. [d. § 6(b)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(1). The Secretary's determination must be made on 
the basis of information submitted to him in writing by interested persons, employers or 
employees, nationally recognized standards-producing organizations, the Department of 
Health and Human Services, the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health 
(NIOSH), a state or political subdivision, or on his own information. [d. NIOSH, housed in the 
Department of Health and Human Services, was established under § 671 of the Act as a 
research arm serving OSHA. Pub. L. 91-596 § 22, 84 Stat. 1612 (1970) (codified at 29 U.S.C. 
§ 671 (1976». 
After preliminarily determining the proper level for the OSHA standard, the Secretary then 
publishes the proposed rule in the Federal Register. [d. § 6(b)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(2). In-
terested persons are given thirty days after publication to submit written comments, or objec-
tions, id. at § (b)(3), and to request a hearing. [d. Within 60 days after publication the 
Secretary must publish in the Federal Register a notice which both specifies the standards 
which have been objected to, and sets a time and place for a hearing on these objections. Id. 
Within 60 days after the hearing, the Secretary must set the level for the final OSHA stand-
ard. Id. at § (b)(4). 
Section 6(c), 29 U.S.C. § 655(c), allows the Secretary also to promulgate emergency tem-
porary standards, which take immediate effect upon publication in the Federal Register of the 
following determinations: 
(a) that employees are exposed to grave danger from exposure to substances or 
agents determined to be toxic or physically harmful or from new hazards, and 
(b) that such emergency standard is necessary to protect employees from such 
danger. 
Id. This procedure allows the Secretary to forego the lengthy rulemaking procedure involved 
in establishing permanent standards. On publication of the section 6(c) emergency temporary 
standard, however, the Secretary must also commence proceedings to establish the standard 
as a permanent one under section 6(b). 
32. 29 U.S.C. § 652(5) (1976). The term "employer" does not include the federal or state 
governments. Id. 
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standards.33 Where hazards are not covered by a specific standard, 
OSHA may enforce workplace safety through a provision in the Act 
imposing on employers a general duty to provide workplaces free 
from material and foreseeable health hazards.34 The combined effect 
of these provisions is to provide a measure of health and safety pro-
tection to virtually all American workers.35 
While OSHA's authority to set exposure levels for workplace 
health hazards is discretionary, there are two provisions in the Act 
which arguably limit OSHA's ability to make those levels as 
stringent as it wishes. The first limitation is contained in section 3(8), 
which is part of the definitional section of the Act. Section 3(8) 
defines an occupational safety and health standard as "a standard 
which requires conditions, or the adoption or use of one or more 
practices, means, methods, operations, or processes, reasonably 
necessary or appropriate to provide safe or healthful employment 
and places of employment."36 Regulated industries have asserted 
that stringent OSHA standards are not "reasonably necessary or ap-
propriate" to protect employee health or safety, and therefore are 
not sanctioned by the Act.37 
The second limitation is contained in section 6(bX5)38 of the Act, 
which defines OSHA's power to regulate toxic substances:39 
The Secretary, in promulgating standards dealing with toxic 
materials or harmful physical agents under this subsection, shall 
set the standard which most adequately assures, to the extent 
feasible, on the basis of the best available evidence, that no 
employee will suffer material impairment of health or functional 
capacity even if such employee has regular exposure to the 
hazard dealt with by such standard for the period of his working 
33. Id. § 654(a)(2). 
34. Id. § 654(a)(I). This provision requires each employer to "furnish to each of his 
employees employment and a place of employment which are free from recognized hazards 
that are causing or are likely to cause death or serious physical harm to his employees." Id. 
35. The present Assistant Secretary of Labor for Occupational Safety and Health, Thorne 
Auchter, estimates that OSHA's coverage extends to roughly 5 million workplaces and 70 
million employees. Interview with Thorne Auchter, O.S.H. REP. (BNA) 1444, 1445 (April 16, 
1981). 
36. 29 U.S.C. S 652(8) (1976) (emphasis added). This article sometimes will refer to this pro-
vision of this section as the "reasonably necessary" requirement. 
37. See, e.g., Am. Petroleum Inst. v. OSHA, 581 F.2d 493 (5th Cir. 1978), affd on other 
grnds sub nom., Indus. Union Dep't v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980). 
38. 29 U.S.C. S 655(b)(5) (1976). 
39. Section 6(b)(5), which concerns the regulation of toxic substances or harmful physical 
agents, is a sub-section of section 6(b), which establishes the procedures for promulgation, 
modification, or revocation of all permanent OSHA standards. Section 6(b)(5) is the only sub-
section in section 6(b) to set special rules for a particular category of health or safety hazard. 
See 29 U.S.C. S 655(b) (1976). 
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life .... In addition to the attainment of the highest degree of 
health and safety protection for the employee, other considera-
tions shall be . . . the feasibility of the standards. 40 
373 
Regulated industries have contended that stringent OSHA toxic 
substance standards violate section 6(bX5) as well as section 3(8) 
because the standards are not "feasible" with respect to the 
economic costs and technological requirements they impose.41 
The term "cost-benefit analysis" does not appear in either of these 
sections or anywhere else in the Act. Despite this omission, a broad 
reading of these two sections by OSHA's challengers has led to the 
assertion that cost-benefit analysis may be inferred as a limitation on 
OSHA's power to regulate toxic substances. During the 1970's, a 
number of federal courts of appeals were called on to construe sec-
tions 6(b)(5) and 3(8) and to determine whether those provisions re-
quire some form of cost-benefit analysis by the Secretary of OSHA in 
promulgating toxic substance standards. Before this article details 
the circuit courts' and the Supreme Court's interpretations of the 
relationship between section 6(b)(5), section 3(8), and cost-benefit 
analysis, the following section will first highlight the confusion over 
how the term "cost-benefit analysis" is defined. 
B. Cost-Benefit Analysis 
Compounding the courts' problem over the role of cost-benefit 
analysis under OSHA has been a disagreement among policy 
analysts over the exact meaning of the term "cost-benefit analysis." 
In general, cost-benefit analysis involves "[a]n attempt to delineate 
and compare in terms of society as a whole the significant effects, 
both positive and negative, of a specific action."42 Some commen-
tators argue that the term applies only to a formal economic exercise 
in which all costs and benefits of alternative policies are quantified in 
40. Id. § 655(b)(5) (emphasis added). This article sometimes will refer to the section 6(b)(5) 
language as the "feasibility" requirement. Also, this article will refer to "health" and "toxic 
substance" standards interchangeably as any standards promulgated by OSHA under section 
6(b )(5). The legislative history of the Act indicates that Congress was concerned in this section 
with the special problems of toxic substances. These problems chiefly are (1) the latency period 
between exposure and appearance of symptoms, and (2) the general uncertainty of medical 
knowledge concerning the full danger associated with exposure. 
41. See, e.g., Indus. Union Dep't v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
42. W. RoWE. AN ANATOMY OF RISK 457 (1977). "Generally a number of alternative actions 
are analyzed, resulting in the selection of the alternative that provides either the largest 
benefit·cost ratio (total benefit/total cost) or one with a positive ratio at least. If an alternative 
results in a net benefit less than zero or a benefit·cost ratio less than 1, it is deemed socially in-
efficient and is not carried out." Id. 
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a single unit of measurement, usually dollars.43 Under this approach, 
analysts may easily compare costs and benefits and select the alter-
native that produces the greatest net economic benefit.44 The 
underlying rationale of this form of cost-benefit analysis is economic 
efficiency, or the utility-based notion of maximizing the value to be 
derived from a finite amount of resources.45 
Others have defined cost-benefit analysis more broadly as a 
method for comparing the costs and benefits of alternative actions 
even where they may not all be readily quantifiable in dollars.46 
Because this balancing process involves a consideration of both 
monetizable and nonmonetizable values such as human health or 
ecological damage, this article will use the term "integrative" cost-
benefit analysis to describe this second approach. Unlike monetized 
cost-benefit analysis, integrative cost-benefit analysis does not at-
tempt to reduce a decision to a simple formula by converting all costs 
and benefits to identical units. Instead, integrative analysis requires 
costs and benefits to be identified and quantified only to the extent 
possible before being balanced against each other.47 Such an analysis 
relies on a theory that the concept of balancing costs and benefits ap-
plies with equal validity to all policy decisions, not just those encom-
passing solely economic values assigned by the marketplace. 48 
Integrative cost-benefit analysis necessitates a balancing pro-
cedure which is at least partially subjective and, therefore, less 
43. See, e.g., Baram, supra note 1, at 477-78; A. HINRICHS, GoVERNMENT DECISION MAKING 
AND THE THEORY OF BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS: A PRIMER IN PROGRAM BUDGETING AND BENEFIT-
COST ANALYSIS 9 (1969). 
44. While examination of which alternative produces the largest benefit/cost ratio !'!lay 
sometimes lead to the same choice, often it will be misleading. In E. STOKEY & R. ZECKHAUSER, 
A PRIMER FOR POLICY ANALYSIS 146 (1978), the following example is offered: 
Project Benefits Costs 
Net 
Benefits 
Benefit/ 
Cost 
Ratio 
I $10,000 $1,000 $9,000 10.0 
II $100,000 $25,000 $75,000 4.0 
Id. While Project I offers the largest benefit/cost ratio, the economically correct choice is Pro-
ject II, which maximizes net benefits. 
45. Id. at 134. "Benefit-cost analysis is ex ante; it attempts to evaluate a project before it is 
undertaken to decide in what form and at what scale it should be undertaken, and indeed 
whether it should be undertaken at all." Id. 
46. See generally Kasper, supra note 1, at 1014; Green, Cost-Risk Benefit Assessment and 
the Law: Introduction and Perspective, 45 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 901 (1977). 
47. Comment, The Significant Risk Requirement in OSHA Regulation of Carcinogens: In-
dustrial Union Department: AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Institute, 33 STAN. L. REV. 551, 
555 n.25 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Significant Risk Requirement]. 
48. One type of integrative cost-benefit analysis that is familiar to most lawyers is the 
qualitative balancing, introduced by Judge Learned Hahd, that has emerged as the test for 
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precise than a strictly monetized cost-benefit analysis. An in-
tegrative cost-benefit analysis does, however, attempt to account for 
the range of noneconomic social values which do not fit into a fully 
monetized cost-benefit analysis and, consequently, are often ig-
nored. In the area of health and environmental decisionmaking, 
some commentators have argued that cost-benefit analysis should 
not be relied upon because of the impossibility of objectively monetiz-
ing human health49 and environmental values. In contrast, others 
have argued that, while this may be true of monetized cost-benefit 
analysis, integrative cost-benefit analysis nevertheless may be a 
useful method to improve decisionmaking.50 They contend that, 
although detailed quantification of costs and benefits may be im-
possible, integrative cost-benefit analysis might nevertheless be a 
useful tool to force policy makers "to think hard about categories of 
benefits and costs, to define their expectations about outputs, and to 
pay attention to the tradeoffs that are implicit in their decision."51 
Integrative cost-benefit analysis, then, is more useful as a foundation 
for organized decisionmaking than as a final determinative calcula-
tion. 
Against this background of disagreement over the definition of 
cost-benefit analysis, the courts considered the proper role for 
reasonableness under tort law. This reasonableness test involves a balancing of the expected 
benefits of an action against the gravity of the possible harm multiplied by the probability of 
the harm's occurrence. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283 comment e (1965); W. PROS-
SER, THE LAW OF TORTS S 31 (4th ed. 1971). The Hand Formula has also been recognized in 
legislation. See infra text and note at note 149. 
49. Putting a dollar value on human life is a concept most people find repugnant. See Zim-
merman, Risk-Benefit Analysis: The Cop-Out of Government Regulation, 14 TRIAL 43, 45 (Feb. 
1978). Many commentators have noted the inherent difficulties of valuing human life; see 
Baram, supra note 1, at 483-86; Kelman, Cost-Benefit Analysis: An Ethical Critique, REGULA-
TION 33 (Jan.lFeb. 1981); Green, The Risk-Benefit Calculus in Safety Determinations, 43 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 791, 798 n.26 (1975); Berger & Riskin, Economic and Technological Feasibility 
in Regulating Toxic Substances Under the Occupational Safety and Health Act, 7 ECOLOGY 
L.Q. 285, 287 (1978); Note, Cost-Bep.efit Analysis for Standards Regulating Toxic Substances 
Under the Occupational Safety and Health Act: American Petroleum Institute v. OSHA, 60 
B.U.L. REV. 115, 140 n.142 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Regulating Toxic Substances]. See also 
AFL-CIO v. Marshall, 617 F.2d 636,665 n.170-71 (D.C. Cir. 1979). As noted by Baram, 
however, several agencies today do in fact assign a dollar value to human life; among them are 
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the Environmental Protection Agency, and the Con-
sumer Product Safety Commission. Baram, supra note 1, at 485. 
50. See, e.g., NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES. DECISION MAKING FOR REGULATING CHEM-
ICALS IN THE ENVIRONMENT 40 (1975), cited in Baram, supra note 1, at 475 n.2 [hereinafter 
cited as NAS REPORT]. 
51. STOKEY & ZECKHAUSER, supra note 44, at 135. The National Academy of Sciences has 
also endorsed the use of integrative cost-benefit analysis as a decisionmaking tool, stating that 
cost-benefit analysis "is not a rule or formula which would make the decision or predetermine 
the choice for the decisionmaker. Rather, it ... is a framework and a set of procedures to help 
------------------
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economic considerations in OSHA's toxic substance regulations. 
This issue ultimately required Supreme Court resolution because of a 
split of opinions that it generated in the circuit courts during the 
1970's. This article now turns to a discussion of the lower courts' in-
terpretations during that period of the Act's requirements. 
C. Circuit Court Treatment of Cost-Benefit Analysis 
and OSHA Regulations 
1. Application Under the Section 6(b)(5) Feasibility Test 
The term "feasible" as used in section 6(b )(5) has generally been 
construed to encompass both economic feasibility and technological 
feasibility. 52 The standard for economic feasibility was first set out in 
1974 by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals on review of 
OSHA's standard for asbestos dust. In Industrial Union Depart-
ment, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson,53 the court held that a toxic substance 
standard should be deemed economically feasible as long as the com-
pliance costs it imposes upon an industry are not so great as to 
threaten the very existence of the industry. Noting that under the 
Act's mandate OSHA must give primary consideration to employee 
health,54 the court determined that OSHA is allowed essentially free 
reign to impose costly regulations. To limit this power, the court 
found, Congress inserted the feasibility requirement, but only to pre-
vent OSHA from effectively causing the financial destruction of an 
entire industry. The Hodgson court concluded that "Congress does 
not appear to have intended to protect employees by putting their 
employers out of business ... by making financial viability impossi-
ble."55 Furthermore, the court emphasized that this threshold level 
for financial costs applies to an industry as a whole rather than to in-
dividual employers; that is, a standard entailing compliance costs 
organize the available information, display trade-offs, and point out uncertainties .... " NAS 
REPORT, supra note 50, at 39, quoted in Baram, supra note 1, at 478 n.15. 
52. See, e.g., Indus. Union Dep't v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Am. Iron & 
Steel Inst. v. OSHA, 577 F.2d 825 (3d Cir. 1978). Justice Rehnquist was the lone Supreme 
Court Justice to challenge this interpretation. To support his view that the feasibility criterion 
does not provide meaningful guidance to OSHA, Justice Rehnquist stated in his dissent in 
ATMI that "there is nothing in the words of § 6(b)(5), or their legislative history, to suggest 
why they should be [limited to mean 'technological and economic feasibility']. One wonders 
why the 'requirement' of S 6(b)(5) could not include considerations of administrative or even 
political feasibility." 452 U.S. 490, 546. For additional information on feasibility under OSHA 
between 1970-1978, see generally Berger & Riskin, supra note 49. 
53. 499 F.2d 467, 477-78 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
54. Id. at 475. 
55. Id. at 478. 
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which force some individual employers out of business would never-
theless be economically feasible as long as the industry as a whole 
would survive. 56 
Under Hodgson, then, the determination of a standard's economic 
feasibility focused solely on the standard's financial effects on the 
regulated industry. The Hodgson method of determining economic 
feasibility did not require the justification of a standard's financial 
costs by a comparison to the standard's health benefits. The court 
therefore ruled out any form of cost-benefit analysis as a require-
ment for the determination of a standard's economic feasibility. The 
Hodgson ruling subsequently became the generally accepted inter-
pretation of economic feasibility among the circuit courts. 57 
Consistent with this approach towards economic feasibility, the 
circuit courts took a view of technological feasibility which similarly 
placed minimal limits on the Secretary's broad power to regulate. 
56. As the court explained in Hodgson: 
Standards may be economically feasible even though, from the standpoint of 
employers, they are financially burdensome and affect profit margins adversely. Nor 
does the concept of economic feasibility necessarily guarantee the continued ex-
istence of individual employers. It would appear to be consistent with the purposes of 
the Act to envisage the economic demise of an employer who has lagged behind the 
rest of the industry in protecting the health and safety of employees and is conse-
quently financially unable to comply with new standards as quickly as other 
employers. As the effect becomes more widespread within an industry, the problem 
of economic feasibility becomes more pressing. 
499 F.2d at 478. 
57. The term "feasibility" has also been used by OSHA within its standards as a limitation 
on an employer's ability to choose between alternative methods of achieving a given health or 
safety goal. The appropriateness of the method of achieving a given health or safety objective 
is at issue in these cases rather than the appropriateness of the objective itself. Here, 
therefore, courts have construed the term "feasibility" leniently with respect to employers, 
and imposed on OSHA the requirement of justifying by cost-benefit analysis its decision that 
an employer has unjustifiably foregone a feasible and preferred method of achieving a 
specified health or safety goal. RMI Co. v. Sec'y of Labor, 594 F.2d 566, 572 (6th Cir. 1979). 
See Turner Co. v. Sec'y of Labor, 561 F.2d 82, 86 (7th Cir. 1977) (remand for failure to con-
sistently apply cost-benefit analysis). "It is entirely rational to give little consideration to cost 
in defining the extent to which workers are to be protected, but to make cost a significant fac-
tor in choosing among alternative means of providing that protection. That the term 'feasibili-
ty' has developed two meanings depending on its context is unfortunate .... " Regulating Tox-
ic Substances, supra note 49, at 125 n.63. For a fuller discussion of the two meanings of 
feasibility under OSHA, see id. at 124-26 n.63. 
An example of the confusion generated by the concept of economic feasibility appears in the 
RMI court's incorrect characterization of the opinions from the Third and District of Columbia 
Circuits as standing for the proposition that the Secretary must perform a cost-benefit 
analysis when promulgating a toxic substance regulation. RMI, 594 F .2d 566, 571-72. The RMI 
court failed to realize that while these cases held that economic costs should be considered, 
they did not hold that the appropriateness of health benefits should at any time be judged by a 
comparison to financial costs. See infra note 159. 
378 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 10:365 
The circuit courts interpreted technological feasibility to mean 
technological achievability, and resolved doubts over that 
achievability in favor of OSHA's findings that particular regulated 
industries possessed sufficient technology to enable them to comply 
with the OSHA standards.68 This view is exemplified in Society of 
Plastics Industry, Inc. v. OSHA 69 in which OSHA's section 6(bX5) 
permanent standard for vinyl chloride was challenged. In that case, 
the vinyl chloride industry had denied its technological ability to 
achieve both the permissible exposure level and the engineering con-
trol60 requirements of the OSHA standard. The Society of Plastics 
court, following Hodgson's lead, decided that where "the ultimate 
facts ... in dispute are 'on the frontiers of scientific knowledge' ... 
[u]nder the command of [the Act], it remains the duty of [OSHA] to 
protect the workingman, and to act even in circumstances where ex-
isting methodology or research is deficient."61 In this highly uncer-
tain area, the court felt that possible engineering changes would pro-
vide a degree of improvement impossible to predict until the changes 
were actually implemented.62 Therefore, the court rejected the in-
dustrial petitioners' contention that the standards were not 
technologically achievable, stating that the petitioners "simply 
need[ed] more faith in their own technological potentialities."6s 
Following the Society of Plastics holding, several courts have since 
allowed OSHA to place a large technological burden on industry by 
holding that if the necessary technology does not presently exist but 
"looms on the horizon," then the Secretary is not justified in dismiss-
ing a proposed standard which includes such technology. 64 Relying 
58. See, e.g., Soc. of Plastics Ind. v. OSHA, 509 F.2d 1301, 1309-10(2d Cir.1975); AFL·cio 
v. Brennan, 530 F.2d 109, 121 (3d Cir. 1975); Am. Iron & Steel Inst. v. OSHA, 577 F.2d 825, 
838 (3d Cir. 1978). 
59. 509 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1975). 
60. Engineering controls, along with work-practice controls, are known as source controls. 
Berger & Riskin, supra note 49, at 290 n.16. Their purpose is to prevent hazardous substances 
from reaching the employee. Engineering controls focus on controlling technology to produce 
lower amounts of a hazardous substance, while work-practice controls focus on containing the 
hazardous substance manually by requiring, for instance, more frequent sweeping. OSHA may 
also require personal protective equipment, such as respirators or earplugs, which focuses on 
isolating the worker from the hazardous substances in the worker's immediate environment. 
Id. 
61. 509 F.2d 1301, 1308. 
62. Id. at 1309. 
63.Id. 
64. AFL-CIO v. Brennan, 530 F.2d 109, 121 (3d Cir. 1975); Am. Iron & Steel Inst. v. OSHA, 
577 F.2d 825, 838 (3d Cir. 1978). But see Indus. Union Dep't v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 478 
(D.C. Cir. 1974) ("Congress does not appear to have intended to protect employees by putting 
their employers out of business ... by requiring protective devices unavailable under existing 
technology ... ") (emphasis added). See also NRDC v. EPA, 489 F.2d 390, 401 (5th Cir. 1974) 
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on the Act's general overriding concern to protect the worker, as 
well as on specific forward-looking language in section 6(bX5) 
itself,65 the circuit courts held that OSHA must consider not only ex-
isting technological capabilities but also imminent advances in the 
art.66 These courts therefore have classified the Act as a technology-
forcing statute.67 
By construing technological feasibility quite broadly, the circuit 
courts imposed a direct requirement upon OSHA to set toxic 
substance standards as stringent as technologically achievable by the 
regulated industry. The courts did not make the Act's mandate quite 
as clear, however, with respect to the economic feasibility of OSHA's 
toxic substance regulations. The industry ruination threshold had 
been set by the courts as the limit '"<m the magnitude of expenditures 
that OSHA could compel of an industry. While OSHA agreed with 
the circuit courts' general conclusion that Congress intended worker 
health to be heavily favored over the economic burdens of com-
pliance,68 the agency did not consider it to be its duty to promulgate 
standards that would push industries to their financiallimits. 69 In-
stead, the agency viewed the industry ruination threshold simply as 
an outer limit. OSHA retained the position that it would engage in in-
tegrative cost-benefit analysis in appropriate cases to assess the 
economic feasibility of a standard. 70 
(construing Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970); Chrysler Corp. v. Dep't of Transp., 472 F.2d 
659,674 (6th Cir. 1972)(construing Automobile Safety Act of 1966). The American Iron court, 
while upholding this basic interpretation of technological feasibility, struck down a provision in 
OSHA's coke oven emissions standard that required each employer unable to meet the permis-
sible exposure level with existing technology to research and develop new technology on its 
own. 577 F.2d 825,838. 
65. In Am. Iron & Steel Inst. v. OSHA, the court noted that section 6(b)(5) of the Act grants 
authority to the Secretary to promulgate toxic substance standards "based upon research, 
demonstrations, experiments, and other information as may be appropriate." 577 F.2d 825, 
838 (3d Cir. 1978), citing 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5). 
66. AFL-CIO v. Brennan, 530 F.2d 109, 122 (3d Cir. 1975). 
67. Id. at 121; United Steelworkers of Am. v. Marshall, 647 F.2d 1189, 1264 (D.C. Cir. 
1980). OSHA is not the only agency that has been given a technology-forcing mandate by Con-
gress. Examples of other federal statutes using technology-forcing schemes include the Na-
tional Traffic & Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966,15 U.S.C. §§ 1381, 1391-1409, 1421-1425; 
23 U.S.C. § 313 note (1966), see Pac. Legal Found. v. Dep't of Transp., 593 F.2d 1338, 1344 
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 830 (1979), and the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, 42 
U.S.C. §§ 7401-7402 (1970), see NRDC v. EPA, 489 F.2d 390, 401 (5th Cir. 1974). 
68. See 43 Fed. Reg. 27,378 (1978). 
69. In its cotton dust standard, OSHA stated that it had "no desire to be punitive or to im-
pose on industry all that it could afford; OSHA's goal is to protect worker health and to deter-
mine the technological and economic feasibility of the measures required to effect that pur-
pose." 43 Fed. Reg. 27,379 (1978). 
70. In promulgating its standard for coke oven emissions, OSHA stated that although it con-
sidered a monetized cost-benefit analysis impossible to perform, it nevertheless had carefully 
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In keeping with its perceived mandate to promulgate feasible toxic 
substance standards, OSHA in 1977 proposed a generic approach to 
the regulation of occupational carcinogens under section 6(b )(5).71 
Because no "safe" level of exposure to occupational carcinogens was 
yet determinable, the adopted method required the Secretary to set 
the permissible exposure level as close as feasible to the only known 
safe level, 0 parts per million (ppm).72 The Secretary's approach was 
to require elimination of all risk, limited only by the constraints of 
economic and technological achievability in the industry. The method 
therefore did not require any estimation of the risks at different ex-
posure levels.73 Neither were these risks necessarily evaluated in 
light of the cost of eliminating them. While this generic approach 
was not formally promulgated and adopted by OSHA until 1980,74 
OSHA had applied the concept in regulatory procedures prior to that 
time. In decisions of the Second, Third, and District of Columbia Cir-
cuits, the approach was upheld as a valid exercise of OSHA's authori-
ty to regulate toxic substances under section 6(b )(5).76 
2. Application Under the Section 3(8) Reasonably Necessary Re-
quirement 
In 1978 the Fifth Circuit split with the Second, Third, and District 
of Columbia Circuits by interpreting sections 3(8) and 6(b)(5) of the 
Act as requiring OSHA to use cost-benefit analysis to justify its toxic 
substance standards. In American Petroleum Institute v. OSHA, 76 
the Fifth Circuit reviewed the final OSHA standard for reducing the 
permissible exposure level (PEL) to benzene.77 The new standard 
considered and affirmed that "th[e] substantial costs [we]re justified in light of the hazards." 
41 Fed. Reg. 46,751 (1976). OSHA reaffirmed its use of an integrative cost-benefit 
methodology in its cotton dust standard, adding that "a systematic evaluation of costs and 
benefits is ... to be encouraged within the limits of the estimation techniques." 43 Fed. Reg. 
27,378-27,379 (1978). 
71. 42 Fed. Reg. 54,148 (1977). 
72.Id. 
73. Id. at 54,167. On OSHA's generic approach to the regulation of occupational car-
cinogens see Baird, Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Institute: 
Limiting OSHA's A utkority to Regulate Workplace Carcinogens Under the Occupational Safe-
ty and Health Act, 9 B. C. ENVT'L AFF. L. REV. 623, 638-43 (1981). 
74. OSHA's generic carcinogen policy became effective on April 21, 1980. 45 Fed. Reg. 
5,002 (1980). 
75. Soc. of Plastics Ind., Inc. v. OSHA, 509 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 
992 (1975); Synthetic Organic Chern. Mfg. Ass'n v. Brennan, 503 F.2d 1155 (3d Cir. 1974) em. 
denied, 420 U.S. 973 (1975); Indus. Union Dep't v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
76. 581 F.2d 493 (5th Cir. 1978). 
77. This standard appears at 43 Fed. Reg. 5918-5963 (1978). Benzene is a chemical used 
chiefly as an intermediate in the production of other organic chemicals. It is also used in 
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lowered the PEL from 10 parts per million (ppm) to 1 ppm based on 
recent evidence linking benzene exposure to an increase in work-
related cancer cases. The court held that, under section 3(8) of the 
Act, a standard is not "reasonably necessary or appropriate to pro-
vide safe or healthful employment" unless it is justified by a cost-
benefit analysis. 78 Rather than a strictly monetized form of cost-
benefit analysis, however, the court envisioned an integrative exer-
cise, as it stated: "Although the agency does not have to conduct an 
elaborate cost-benefit analysis,... it does have to determine 
whether the benefits expected from the standard bear a reasonable 
relationship to the costs imposed by the standard."79 
The government had argued that, even if section 3(8)'s reasonably 
necessary language imposed a requirement of cost-benefit analysis, 
the section was superseded by section 6(bX5),s specific directive to 
set the lowest possible PEL, limited only by feasibility.80 Feasibility 
under section 6(b X5), the government argued, depends only on the 
financial impact of the regulation on the industry, not on an evalua-
tion of the regulation's costs against its benefits. The court rejected 
this argument, holding that section 3(8) sets the requirements for all 
OSHA standards, including section 6(bX5) toxic substance stand-
ards.81 
As a corollary to its main holding, the court held that under section 
3(8) the Secretary must also provide an estimate of the expected 
manufacturing products such as motor fuels, detergents, pesticides, and paint. 43 Fed. Reg. 
5918 (1978). The principal harm from benzene comes from inhalation of its vapor. [d. at 5920. 
OSHA estimated in 1978 that almost 1.5 million workers were exposed to low levels of 
benzene, with over half of this group consisting of service station employees. Because the 
benzene standard is inapplicable to the sale of gasoline after its discharge from bulk terminals, 
however, service station employees are excluded from its protection. [d. at 5935; see Indus. 
Union Dep't v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 616 n.6 (1980). Health experts have linked 
benzene exposure at high concentration levels to a significantly increased risk of leukemia. 43 
Fed. Reg. 5925 (1978). Exposure to benzene can also lead to various types of malignant 
diseases and serious blood disorders. [d. at 5921. 
78. 581 F.2d 493, 503 (5th Cir. 1978). 
79. [d. 
80. [d. at 502. 
81. The court viewed section 6(b)(5) as indeed consonant with section 3(8), as it stated: 
[Section 6(b)(5)] does not give OSHA the unbridled discretion to adopt standards 
designed to create absolutely risk-free workplaces. To the contrary, that section re-
quires standards to be feasible, and it contains a number of pragmatic limitations in 
the form of specific kinds of information OSHA must consider in enacting [toxic 
substance] standards .... Those include 'the best available evidence,' 'research, 
demonstrations, experiments, and such other information as may be appropriate,' 
'the latest available scientific data in the field,' and 'experience gained under this and 
other health and safety laws.' 
581 F.2d at 502. 
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health benefits of a new standard.82 In this case, however, the 
Secretary had found only that the health benefits of the benzene 
standard were "likely" to be "appreciable."8s Because the Secretary 
had neither adequately estimated the health benefits of the proposed 
standard, nor compared those benefits to the economic costs im-
posed upon the industry, the court set aside the 1 ppm standard for 
benzene.84 The Fifth Circuit in American Petroleum Institute v. 
OSHA therefore broke new ground by explicitly holding that, under 
sections 3(8) and 6(b)(5), OSHA's toxic substance standards must be 
justified on a cost-benefit basis. In light of this novel holding, OSHA 
and the union challengers appealed the case to the Supreme Court. 
III. SUPREME COURT REVIEW OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 
IN OSHA REGULATIONS 
A. Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum 
Institute: The Supreme Court Creates the Significant Risk 
Requirement and Avoids the Feasibility Issue 
By granting certiorari to review the Fifth Circuit's decision in 
American Petroleum Institute v. OSHA, the United States Supreme 
Court agreed for the first time to review a toxic substance standard 
promulgated by OSHA. Under the new name of Industrial Union 
Department v. American Petroleum Institute,85 the Fifth Circuit's 
decision was upheld by the Supreme Court;86 yet, the Court did so 
without reaching the issues of feasibility and cost-benefit analysis. 
Instead, a plurality87 of the Court found that OSHA's standard for 
benzene must be set aside for failure to meet a threshold test. The 
plurality found that before OSHA may regulate a toxic substance at 
all, the Secretary must show that a significant risk of health impair-
ment presently exists and that the risk can be eliminated or lessened 
by a change in industry practices. 88 
82. [d. at 503. 
83. [d.; see 43 Fed. Reg. 5941 (1978). 
84. [d. at 505. 
85. 448 U.S. 607 (1980). 
86. [d. at 662. 
87. The plurality consisted of Justice Stevens, who authored the plurality opinion, Justice 
Stewart, Chief Justice Burger, and Justice Powell. Justice Powell concurred that a threshold 
test of significant risk must be met, but would have held that a cost-benefit analysis was re-
quired as well. See infra text and notes at notes 339-40. Justice Rehnquist concurred in the judgment, but argued that the section 6(b)(5) feasibility requirement should be invalidated as 
an unacceptable delegation by Congress of legislative power to OSHA. See infra note 157. 
Justices Marshall, Brennan, White, and Blackmun dissented. 
88. 448 U.S. 607, 641-42. 
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The Industrial Union plurality reached this conclusion through a 
construction of section 3(8) of the Act. Writing for the plurality, 
Justice Stevens reasoned that for a standard to be "reasonably 
necessary ... to provide safe or healthful employment"89 under sec-
tion 3(8), OSHA must show that the workplace to be regulated is not 
presently safe.90 Justice Stevens then distinguished the term "safe" 
from "risk-free." He observed that there are many activities that we 
engage in daily, such as breathing city air, which entail some risk of 
injury, but which few people would consider unsafe.91 The plurality 
therefore defined an unsafe workplace as one that presents a signifi-
cant risk of health impairment.92 Thus, before OSHA may regulate a 
toxic substance at all, it must satisfy the requirement of section 3(8) 
by showing the existence of a signific:ant risk. 93 
The plurality then turned its attention to the union petitioner's 
claim that the general requirements of section 3(8), however con-
strued, do not override the specific directives set forth in section 
6(b)(5).94 Justice Stevens rejected the union's claim, noting that sec-
tion 6(b)(5) toxic substance standards constitute a subgroup of all 
OSHA standards and, therefore, are incorporated by reference into 
section 3(8).96 He found no reason why the requirements of section 
3(8) should not apply to section 6(b)(5) standards, regardless of any 
separate and additional requirements - the feasibility requirement 
in particular - imposed by the latter section. 
The plurality next examined whether OSHA had met its burden of 
proof that the present standard for benzene of 10 ppm presented a 
significant risk of health impairment. Noting that OSHA's sole find-
ing related to this requirement was that the benefits of lowering the 
PEL from 10 to 1 ppm were "likely" to be "appreciable,"96 the 
plurality found that OSHA had failed to carry its burden of showing 
a significant risk. Sufficient evidence did not exist in the record on 
89. 29 U.S.C. § 652(8) (1976). 
90. 448 U.S. 607, 642. 
91. Id. 
92. Id. at 641-52. 
93. Moreover, the plurality held that the significant risk requirement applies not just to sec-
tion 6(b)(5) toxic substance standards, but to all permanent standards promulgated by OSHA. 
This conclusion follows because the plurality created the significant risk requirement under 
section 3(8), which provides the general definition for all occupational safety and health stand-
ards promulgated under the Act. Id. at 642-43. 
94. Brief for Petitioner at 27-33, Indus. Union Dep't v. Am. Petroleum Inst., No. 78-911 
(filed July 1979). 
95. 448 U.S. 607, 642. 
96. 43 Fed. Reg. 5941 (1978). 
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this point.97 Because it disposed of the case on this threshold issue, 
the plurality found no need to address the issue of cost-benefit 
analysis under either the feasibility requirement of section 6(b)(5) or 
the reasonably necessary requirement of section 3(8). 
The Supreme Court's refusal to decide the issue of cost-benefit 
analysis under the Act, however, was short lived. The Court 
ultimately decided the issue one year later in American Textile 
Manufacturers Institute v. Donovan, on review of the D.C. Circuit 
Court's opinion upholding OSHA's permanent standard for cotton 
dust.98 Because of the importance of the cotton dust case, the follow-
ing section supplies the factual background to the controversy before 
discussing the Supreme Court's opinion and its implications in detail. 
B. American Textile Manufacturers Institute v. Donovan: 
The Supreme Court Confronts the Cost-Benefit Issue 
1. Health Hazards and Regulatory History of Cotton Dust 
OSHA's cotton dust standard,99 issued in 1978, was promulgated 
to protect workers from byssinosis, a progressive respiratory 
disease caused primarily by the inhalation of cotton dust. loo 
Byssinosis, known as brown lung disease in its more severe forms, 
has been categorized into four grades. lOl The symptoms of the 
disease in its least serious form include shortness of breath, 
coughing, and tightness in the chest. lo2 Byssinosis in its most acute 
form is an irreversible and disabling chronic obstructive pulmonary 
disease, clinically similar to chronic bronchitis or emphysema. loa 
97. 448 u.s. 607, 653·58. 
98. AFL-CIO v. Marshall, 617 F.2d 636 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
99. 29 C.F.R. S 1910.1043 (1981). 
100. Cotton dust is defined as: 
dust present in the air during the handling or processing of cotton which may contain 
a mixture of many substances including ground-up plant matter, fiber, bacteria, 
fungi, soil, pesticides, non-cotton plant matter and other contaminants which may 
have accumulated with the cotton during the growing, harvesting and subsequent 
processing or storage periods. Any dust present during the handling and processing 
of cotton through the weaving or knitting of fabrics, and dust present in other opera-
tions or manufacturing processes using new or waste fibers or cotton fiber by-
products from textile mills are considered cotton dust. 
29 C.F.R. S 1910.1043(b) (1981) (Cotton Dust Standard). 
101. 41 Fed. Reg. 56,500-56,501 (1976). Workers sometimes contract a severe grade of the 
disease without ever experiencing the milder grades. ATMI, 452 U.S. 490, 498 n.10. 
102. 43 Fed. Reg. 27,352 (1978). 
103. Id. The initial symptoms of byssinosis are characterized by the "Monday morning" syn-
drome, in which the worker experiences breathlessness and tightness in the chest shortly after 
returning to work after a weekend away from cotton dust. The symptoms initially subside dur-
ing the work week, but later extend to other workdays until the ailment eventually has become 
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In developing its standard under section 6(b )(5), OSHA compiled 
data estimating that, as of 1971, 250,000 to 800,000 workers were 
exposed daily to the risks of cotton dust.lo4 In addition, the reported 
incidence of byssinosis has been as high as 30 percent of the work 
force in the cotton industries. lo5 One estimate indicated that, as of 
1978, approximately 8 percent of all employed and retired cotton mill 
workers, or about 35,000 people, suffered a disabling form of 
byssinosis.lo6 The risk of byssinosis among workers in the cotton in-
dustry is, therefore, quite substantial. 
The high incidence of byssinosis among cotton workers has been 
known for centuries. lo7 Although other governments had recognized 
and warned of the disease earlier,lo8 the United States did not 
recognize byssinosis as an occupational hazard until the 1960's. The 
first call for action against byssinosis came in 1966, when the 
American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists 
(ACGIH) recommended a value for cotton dust of 1000 micrograms-
per-cubic-meter (ug/m3) as a permissible exposure level (PEL).lo9 
This standard was not enacted until 1968 when the Secretary of 
Labor adopted the 1000 ug/m3 limit pursuant to the Walsh-Healy 
Act. llo 
When the Occupational Safety and Health Act was passed in 1970, 
section 6(a) required OSHA immediately to adopt the 1000 ug/m3 
PEL as an interim "established federal standard" for cotton dust. 111 
Not long after passage of the Act, revision of the 1000 ug/m3 PEL 
began. In 1974, following a lowering of the recommended PEL to 
continuous and permanent. While the acute symptoms of exposure to cotton dust are reversi-
ble, the long-term consequences are not. Bouhuys, Byssinosis in the United States, New 
England Journal of Medicine, July 27, 1967, at 170, 174; Nader, The Cotton Mill Killer, The 
Nation, March 15, 1971, at 335. Many studies have shown that the disease occurs among cot-
ton workers irrespective of other environmental factors such as air pollution, climate, and 
cigarette smoking. Bouhuys, supra note 103, at 171. 
104. OSHA relied on Nader, supra note 103 (estimating 250,000 textile workers exposed), 
and the statement of Sidney M. Wolfe and Peter Greene, Public Citizen's Health Research 
Group, in AFL-CIO v. Marshall, 617 F.2d 636 (D.C. Cir. 1979), Joint Appendix to Record 3137 
(estimating 800,000 cotton workers exposed). 
105. Nader, supra note 103, at 335. 
106. 43 Fed. Reg. 27,353 (1978). This study assumed 200,000 currently employed workers 
and 235,000 retired workers. 
107. 41 Fed. Reg. 56,500 (1976). See AFL-CIO v. Marshall, 617 F.2d 636,644 n.11 (D.C. 
Cir. 1979). 
108. England first promulgated workplace regulations to reduce the incidence of byssinosis 
in 1942. 43 Fed. Reg. 27,351 (1978). 
109. Id. 
110. 34 Fed. Reg. 7953 (1969). See supra note 30. 
111. 29 U.S.C. § 655(a) (1976). See supra note 30. 
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200 ug/ms by the ACGIH,112 the National Institute for Occupational 
Safety and Health (NIOSH)l1S recommended to OSHA that it pro-
pose a similar 200 ug/ms standard for cotton dust.114 OSHA then 
published an Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,115 re-
questing comments from interested parties on this revised standard. 
In late 1976, OSHA published its proposed new toxic substance 
standard of 200 ug/ms for all segments of the cotton industry.u6 
Mter a ninety-day period for written comments, OSHA conducted a 
series of hearings which engendered widespread participation by 
representatives of both industry and labor, as well as experts from 
the fields of science, medicine, economics, and industrial hygiene.u7 
In June of 1978, OSHA issued its final cotton dust standard. us The 
final standard, which was ultimately contested in ATMI, set a PEL 
of 200 ug/ms over an eight-hour period only for the yarn manufactur-
ing segment of the cotton industry. The standards for other 
segments of the industry were less severe: 750 ug/ms for slashing 
and weaving operations in the textile industry; 500 ug/ms for all 
other processes in the cotton industry.u9 The standard specified as 
methods of achieving the new exposure limit the use of both 
engineering controls such as special ventilation systems, and work-
practice controls such as particular floor sweeping procedures.12o A 
four-year compliance period was set by the standard, with employers 
112. 43 Fed. Reg. 27,351 (1978). The ACGIH's revised recommendation was based on new 
data compiled by the British Occupational Hygiene Society, together with the fact that the 
ACGIH had revised its definition of exposure limit to encompass measurement of respirable 
dust rather than total dust. Id. 
113. See supra note 31. 
114. 41 Fed. Reg. 56,500 (1976). NIOSH's recommendation was pursuant to SS 669(a)(3) 
and 671(d)(2) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. SS 669(a)(3), 671(d)(2) (1976). 
115. 39 Fed. Reg. 44,769 (1974). 
116. 41 Fed. Reg. 56,498 (1976). 
117. 43 Fed. Reg. 27,351 (1978). 
118. 29 C.F.R. S 1910.1043 (1981). 
119. 43 Fed. Reg. 27,362 (1978). With respect to slashing and weaving operations, OSHA 
had concluded that the PEL could be raised from the proposed 200 ug/mS level to 750 ug/mS 
because the dose-response curves used to estimate the risk indicated that the 750 ug/mS level 
would provide these workers with an environment as safe as that experienced by their co-
workers in other textile operations at a 200 uglmB level. 43 Fed. Reg. 27,360 (1978). With 
respect to the processes in the nontextile segments of the cotton industry, OSHA stated first 
that due to a change in measurement techniques, the newly established 500 ug/mSlevel would 
be roughly equivalent to the existing 1000 uglms limit. In addition, the agency found that it 
could not make the standard more stringent because of doubts over technological feasibility at 
levels below 500 ug/mS as well as indications that the 500 ug/mS level provided a reasonably 
protective and justified level of safety in those segments of the cotton industry. Id. at 27,36l. 
See id. at 27,365 for a general explanation of the various processes in the cotton industry. 
120. 43 Fed. Reg. 27,363-27,364 (1978). 
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required to provide respirators to their employees in the interim. 121 
In setting the new PEL, the Secretary noted that, similar to most 
occupational carcinogens, no "safe" level of exposure to cotton dust 
could be determined.122 The Secretary, however, had rejected the 
more stringent standard of 100 ug/m3 advocated by the various 
unions.123 Due to the average background concentration of cotton 
dust in cotton-producing states,124 the unions' proposal would have 
required many factories to filter the outside air entering through 
their ventilation systems, a situation the Secretary found to be not 
within the technological capabilities of the industry either at that 
time or in the near future. 126 
2. Supreme Court Review of the Cotton Dust Standard 
a. Cost-Benefit Analysis Under Section 6(b)(5) 
Upon its promulgation, the cotton dust standard was immediately 
challenged by a coalition of industry groups under the Act's provi-
sion for pre-enforcement judicial review in the circuit courts of ap-
peals.126 The industry challenged the cotton dust standard under 
both sections 3(8) and 6(b )(5) of the Act, claiming that the standard 
was neither reasonably necessary to protect workers, nor 
technologically or economically feasible. InAFL-CIO v. Marshall, 127 
the District of Columbia Circuit upheld the standard in all major 
respects.128 In doing so, the court rejected the Fifth Circuit's ap-
121. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1043(e)(2) (1981). 
122. 43 Fed. Reg. 27,358 (1978). 
123. [d. at 27,359-27,360. 
124. The average concentration of cotton dust in the air in these urban and suburban areas 
is 58 to 180 ug/m3. [d. at 27,359. 
125. [d. at 27,359-27,360. 
126. 29 U.S.C. § 655(f) provides for judicial review of standards promulgated, modified or 
revoked by the Secretary. 
Any person who may be adversely affected by a standard issued under this section 
may at any time prior to the sixtieth day after such standard is promulgated file a 
petition challenging the validity of such standard with the United States court of ap-
peals for the circuit wherein such person resides or has his principal place of business, 
for a judicial review of such standard. A copy of the petition shall be forthwith 
transmitted by the clerk of the court to the Secretary. The filing of such petition shall 
not, unless otherwise ordered by the court, operate as a stay of the standard. 
[d. The standard was also challenged by union groups claiming that the four-year implementa-
tion period was unnecessarily lengthy. This claim was consolidated with the industry's 
challenge and ultimately disposed of by the circuit court. AFL-CIO v. Marshall, 617 F.2d 636, 
673 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
127. 617 F.2d 636 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
128. The court remanded the standard for further consideration only with respect to its ap-
plication to the cottonseed oil industry, holding that OSHA had not shown economic feasibility 
for that industry. OSHA's figures had shown that approximately 52 percent of that industry's 
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proach in American Petroleum Institute v. OSHA, which had re-
quired OSHA to perform a cost-benefit analysis in promulgating tox-
ic substance standards to satisfy the dual requirements of sections 
3(8) and 6(bX5).129 
On writ of certiorari, the Supreme Court agreed to review the cir-
cuit court's decision in AFL-CIO v. Marshall. Under the new name 
of American Textile Manufacturers Institute v. Donovan (ATMI),130 
the case put the issue of cost-benefit analysis squarely before the 
Court. As described earlier, the Industrial Union Court never 
reached the cost-benefit issue, setting aside OSHA's benzene stand-
ard for lack of a showing of significant risk of health impairment as 
required by section 3(8).131 The threshold test of significant risk, 
however, was not an issue in ATMI. The Secretary had made find-
ings that the risk among cotton industry workers of contracting 
byssinosis was significant and that the new standard for cotton dust 
would greatly reduce this risk.132 The industry groups, for good 
reason, had not challenged these findings. The task for the ATMI 
Court, therefore, was to rule on the industrial petitioners' contention 
that section 6(b)(5)'s feasibility language necessarily implies a re-
quirement for some form of cost-benefit analysis,133 an issue which 
the Industrial Union Court had been unwilling to reach. 
In a 5-3 decision,134 the Supreme Court in ATMI settled the cost-
benefit issue by holding that OSHA need not and in fact may not use 
cost-benefit analysis under section 6(b)(5) as a criterion for determin-
ing worker exposure limits to toxic substances.135 The majority opin-
ion, written by Justice Brennan, arrived at this conclusion through a 
two-step analysis. First, the majority determined that section 6(b X5) 
production capacity would have been forced to shut down if the standard were enforced. Id. at 
669-73. 
129. Id. at 662-66. See supra text and notes at notes 76-84. 
130. 452 U.S. 490 (1981). The change in name is partially explained by the change in Labor 
Secretaries, from Ray Marshall to Raymond Donovan, that occurred at the inception of the 
Reagan Administration. 
131. See supra text and notes at notes 85-97. 
132. 43 Fed. Reg. 27,354, 27,358 (1978). 
133. The other issues addressed by the ATMI Court were (1) whether substantial evidence 
in the record supported OSHA's determination that the final cotton dust standard was 
economically feasible, and (2) whether OSHA had the authority to include a medical removal 
provision in the standard. See infra note 138. 
134. The majority consisted of Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens. 
Justice Stewart filed a dissenting opinion, see infra note 172, and Justice Rehnquist filed a 
separate dissent in which Chief Justice Burger joined, see infra note 157. Justice Powell took 
no part in the decision of the ATMI case. 
135. 452 U.S. 490, 508-13. 
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by itself precludes the use of cost-benefit analysis by OSHA.13s Sec-
ond, the majority concluded that the section 3(8) reasonably 
necessary requirement imposes no additional restraint on OSHA's 
standard-setting power under section 6(b)(5).137 Given this construc-
tion of the Act, the Court then affirmed in most respects the district 
court's upholding of the cotton dust standard.13S 
In interpreting section 6(b )(5), the Court focused first on Congress' 
troublesome use of the word "feasible." Justice Brennan noted that 
the dictionary meaning of the word feasible is "capable of being 
done."139 Thus, the Court interpreted "feasible" to mean 
"achievable," a construction in harmony with the previous decisions 
of the Second, Third, and District of Columbia Circuits. 140 The Court 
then agreed with the lower court's finding that Congress itselfhad 
performed the cost-benefit analysis for toxic substances,14l "by plac-
ing the 'benefit' of worker health above all other considerations save 
those making attainment of this 'benefit' unachievable."142 Justice 
Brennan concluded that "cost-benefit analysis by OSHA is not re-
quired by the statute because feasibility analysis is" stipulated in-
stead.143 
In addition to holding that the Act does not require OSHA to per-
form a cost-benefit analysis for its toxic substance standards, the 
majority held that OSHA is in fact prohibited from engaging in its 
own cost-benefit analysis for those standards. Justice Brennan found 
that Congress, by striking its own balance in favor of worker health, 
136. Id. at 508-12. 
137. Id. at 512-13. 
138. Id. at 541. The Court affirmed the circuit court's opinion in all respects except for the 
lower court's approval of the medical transfer and wage guarantee provision of the cotton dust 
standard. OSHA had included in the standard a provision that during the four-year implemen-
tation period for source controls employees who could not wear a respirator for medical 
reasons were to be allowed by their employers to transfer to another position, if available, 
where the dust level already satisfied the standard's PEL. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1043(f)(2)(v) 
(1981). The employer also had to guarantee that the employee would not suffer a loss in wages 
or benefits. Id. The Supreme Court held that whether or not OSHA had the power to include 
such a provision, the agency had failed to show that the provision was related to the achieve-
ment of a safe and healthful workplace. 452 U.S. 490, 537-38. 
139. Id. at 508-09. 
140. See supra text and notes at notes 52-67. 
141. AFL-CIO v. Marshall, 617 F.2d 636, 663 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
142. 452 U.S. 490, 509. 
143. Id. It seems to have gone unnoticed that the term "feasible" does appear in one other 
section of the Act: § 669(e) provides that the functions of the Department of Health and 
Human Services under the Act shall, to the extent feasible, be delegated to NIOSH. 29 U.S.C. 
§ 669(e) (1976). This fact lends further support to the ATMI Court's plain meaning interpreta-
tion of the congressional use of the word "feasible." 
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preempted any cost-benefit analysis on OSHA's part. He stated flat-
ly that "Congress did not contemplate any further balancing by the 
agency for toxic material and harmful physical agents standards."144 
Justice Brennan cited numerous statements from the legislative 
history indicating that the large costs incurred by industry to 
safeguard its employees were recognized by Congress, but were 
viewed as reasonable and necessary costs of doing business.146 He 
reasoned that when Congress inserted the final version of section 
6(b)(5), it was to placate concern that the directive would be con-
strued to require an absolute level of safety which is impossible to 
achieve without shutting down industries. 146 By inserting the 
144. 452 U.S. 490, 513. See also id. at 509 ("Any standard based on a balancing of costs and 
benefits by the Secretary that strikes a different balance than that struck by Congress would 
be inconsistent with the command set forth in § 6(b)(5)"); id. at 521 ("Nowhere is there any in-
dication that Congress contemplated a different balancing by OSHA of the benefits of worker 
health and safety against the costs of achieving them"). 
145. During the floor debates, Senator Eagleton had stated that "[t]he costs that will be in-
curred by employers in meeting the standards of health and safety to be established under this 
bill are, in my view, reasonable and necessary costs of doing business." 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 
OFTHE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT at 1150-51 (1976), citedinATMI, 452 U.S. 490, 
521 (emphasis added by Court) [hereinafter cited as 1 LEGIS. HIST.]. See also infra text and 
notes at notes 186-92, describing further remarks in the legislative history cited by the Court 
to support its interpretation of section 6(b(5). The Court further noted that "Congress thought 
that the financial costs of health and safety problems in the workplace were as large or larger 
than the financial costs of eliminating these problems." ATMI, 452 U.S. 490, 521 (emphasis in 
original). The Senate, the Court stated, had recognized the staggering economic impact of 
work-related deaths and disabilities, citing lost wages, the siphoning off of wages to pay 
workman's compensation benefits, and a huge overall annual loss to the Grm;s National Prod-
uct. 1 LEGIS. HIST. at 142, cited in ATMI, 452 U.S. 490, 522. 
146. Justice Brennan noted that the original bills, Senate Bill s.2193 and House Bill 
H.R.16785, contained no special provisions for the regulation of toxic substances. 452 U.S. 
490,514-15. Prior to the introduction of the bill ultimately adopted, an amended bill, H.R. REP. 
No. 91-1291, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., (1970) (to accompany H.R.16785), 1 LEGIS. HIST., supra note 
145, at 834, had been introduced in the House to satisfy congressional concern with the special 
problems of toxic substances. The bill contained the initial version of section 6(b)(5), which ad-
dressed the problems of employees having regular exposure to toxic substances over an ex-
tended portion of their working lives. The new section did not contain any qualification of 
feasibility, but instead directed the Secretary to "set the standard which most adequately 
assures, on the basis of the best available professional evidence, that no employee will suffer 
any impairment of health," even from regular exposure to the hazard over his working life. 1 
LEGIS. HIST., supra note 145, at 834, cited in 452 U.S. 490, 515 (emphasis added). 
Simultaneously, Senator Javits introduced a similar amendment to the Senate bill, but was 
concerned that the language would be construed to "require absolute health and safety in all 
cases, regardless of feasibility." Id. at 515 (emphasis added by Court), citing S. REP. No. 1282, 
supra note 26, U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS at 5222. Justice Brennan felt that this concern by 
the Senator was addressed only to whether such a condition was achievable, 452 U.S. 490, 516. 
Senator Dominick had also expressed concern that this language seemed to call for "a utopia 
free from any hazards," stating that "[a]bsolute safety is an impossibility." 1 LEGIS. HIST., 
supra note 145, at 480, cited in 452 U.S. 490, 517. The Senators introduced an amended ver-
sion which ultimately was adopted as section 6(b)(5). The new section, which ap-
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feasibility requirement, Congress was insisting that the goal of 
eliminating workplace toxic substances be capable of technological 
and economic accomplishment.147 Justice Brennan concluded that 
Congress wanted OSHA to examine whether its toxic substance 
standards are technologically or economically achievable, but did not 
intend that OSHA justify these standards on the basis of a cost-
benefit analysis. 148 
To support its interpretation of section 6(b )(5), the majority took 
note of a conspicuous absence, in both the Act and its legislative 
history, of any express indication by Congress that OSHA must per-
form a cost-benefit analysis when setting a toxic substance standard. 
Justice Brennan observed that where cost-benefit analysis is in-
tended, Congress has either indicated this expressly in the 
statute,149 or has used the phrase "unreasonable risk," accompanied 
by explanation in the legislative history, to signify a balancing of 
costs and benefits. 150 The majority used the lack of either of these ex-
pressions in the Act to further support its conclusion that Congress 
intended no further cost-benefit balancing by OSHA under section 
6(b )(5).151 
Next, the majority examined the requirement under section 3(8) 
that a standard be "reasonably necessary or appropriate" to provide 
a safe or healthful workplace. 152 The industry petitioners had con-
tended that this section poses an additional restraint on OSHA, re-
quiring that the relation between the costs and the benefits of a 
regulation be a reasonable one. 153 The majority rejected this inter-
pretation, noting that it would "eviscerate" the feasibility require-
plied only to toxic substances or harmful physical agents causing material health impairment, 
contained the present directive to set the standard "which most adequately assures, to the ex-
tent feasible ... that no employee will suffer material impairment of health." 29 U.S.C. § 
655(bX5) (1976) (emphasis added). 
147. 452 U.S. 490, 514. 
148. Id. at 508-22. 
149. The Court gave as examples the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments of 
1978, 43 U.S.C. § 1347(b) (Supp. III 1979) and the Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 
1975, 42 U.S.C. § 6295(aX1XD) (1976), among others. ATMI, 452 U.S. 490, 510 n.30. 
150. Id. This language calls for a generalized balancing in the manner introduced by 
Learned Hand; see supra note 48. The Court gave as an example the Consumer Product Safety 
Act of 1972,15 U.S.C. § 2056(a) (1976). Another example is the Toxic Substances Control Act, 
15 U.S.C. § 2604(f) (1976), together with the explanation contained in S. REP. No. 698, 94th 
Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS at 4503. 
151. 452 U.S. 490, 510-12. 
152. 29 U.S.C. § 652(8) (1976). 
153." A standard that consumes enormous resources to produce a negligible reduction in risk 
is not 'reasonably necessary or appropriate to provide safe or healthful employment ... .' " 
Brief for Petitioners at 37, ATMI, No. 79-1429 (filed Nov. 20, 1980). 
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ment under section 6(b)(5).154 Justice Brennan reached this conclu-
sion by first assuming arguendo that section 3(8) requires some form 
of cost-benefit analysis.155 Using this assumption, Justice Brennan 
compared section 3(8) with section 6(b)(5). He reasoned that if a 
standard were required to meet both a cost-benefit test under sec-
tion 3(8) and a feasibility test under section 6(b )(5), the standard 
would inevitably be set at the level indicated by the cost-benefit 
analysis. According to Justice Brennan, the feasible, or achievable, 
exposure level of a toxic substance would always be as low or lower 
than the level justified by cost-benefit analysis. Therefore, to satisfy 
both criteria, OSHA would be forced to choose the less stringent 
level.156 Reasoning that this construction of the section 6(b )(5) 
feasibility requirement would effectively write that phrase out of the 
Act, the majority declined to adopt it. Instead, the majority held that 
section 6(b)(5) imposes separate and additional requirements for is-
suance of toxic substance standards. For purposes of determining 
the permissible stringency of a toxic substance standard, the ATMI 
Court held that the specific feasibility requirement of section 6(b )(5) 
supersedes the general terms of section 3(8).157 
At first glance, this holding might appear to conflict with the 
Supreme Court's holding in Industrial Union Department v. 
American Petroleum Institute. In both ATMI and Industrial Union 
the Supreme Court ruled on the question of which section of the Act, 
154. 452 U.S. 490, 513. 
155. Id. at 512. 
156. Id. at 513. The Court offered an example in which the PEL for a substance would be 
500 ug/m3 on the basis of feasibility analysis, but would only be as low as 1000 ug/m3 if the 
standard were based on cost-benefit analysis. If the statute required OSHA to meet the 
criteria of both feasibility analysis and cost-benefit analysis, OSHA would be forced to choose 
the less stringent PEL of 1000 ug/m3. Id. 
157. Id. at 512-13. Justice Rehnquist, joined by Chief Justice Burger, filed a dissent rear-
ticulating his concurring views in Industrial Union that the term "feasible" in section 6(b)(5) 
is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to an administrative agency. He con-
cluded that Congress could not decide whether to require, permit, or prohibit the Secretary 
from engaging in a cost-benefit analysis. Therefore, Congress masked this fundamental 
disagreement by including the term "feasible," thereby passing that decision on to OSHA. 452 
U.S. 490, 543-48. In Justice Rehnquist's opinion, the quintessentially legislative policy choice 
of whether to engage in cost-benefit analysis may not be delegated to the nonelected officials 
of OSHA. Moreover, Justice Rehnquist read the ATMI majority opinion to be in agreement 
with his own view that the term "feasible" permits the Secretary to engage in a cost-benefit 
analysis.Id. at 544. It is difficult to see how Justice Rehnquist could so characterize the majori-
ty's interpretation of section 6(b)(5), in light of the majority's strongly worded statements that 
the Secretary is prohibited from using cost-benefit analysis. See supra text and note at note 
144. For views on the invocation of the delegation doctrine by Justice Rehnquist, see The 
Supreme Court, 1979 Term, 94 HARV. L. REV. 242, 245-46 (1980); The Supreme Court, 1980 
Term, 95 HARV. L. REV. 319, 325 (1981). 
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3(8) or 6(b X5), would govern in the event of a conflict between the 
two. The Court, however, supplied opposing answers to this ques-
tion. In Industrial Union, the plurality held that the general provi-
sions of section 3(8) require a showing of significant risk and that 
toxic substance standards under section 6(b )(5) are subject to this re-
quirement as are all OSHA standards. The plurality in effect held 
that section 3(8) governs section 6(b )(5), at least for purposes of 
determining OSHA's threshold ability to regulate. Conversely, the 
Court in ATMI held that in setting the level of exposure to a toxic 
substance, the requirements of section 6(b )(5) supersede those of sec-
tion 3(8). Thus, these holdings appear contradictory. 
Upon closer examination, however, the holdings in Industrial 
Union and ATMI are reconcilable. In ATMI, the Court did not ad-
dress the threshold showing of significant risk, which both parties 
agreed had been satisfied. The holding in Industrial Union that this 
threshold showing is required by an incorporation of section 3(8) into 
section 6(b)(5), therefore, is still intact. The ATMI Court's holding 
that the section 3(8) requirement is not incorporated into the 
standard-setting procedure for a section 6(b )(5) toxic substance ap-
plies only to the issue of whether a cost-benefit analysis is required 
after the threshold showing of significant risk has been met.158 
Therefore, the two opinions govern different aspects of OSHA's pro-
cedure for setting toxic substances standards and do not conflict 
with each other. 
b. Economic Feasibility of the Cotton Dust Standard 
Under Section 6(b)(5) 
Mter discussing the relationship between sections 3(8) and 6(b )(5), 
the Court turned to a discussion of the economic feasibility of the cot-
ton dust standard. Having established that the standard for 
economic feasibility is one of achievability on an industry-wide 
level,159 the Court turned first to an examination of whether OSHA's 
158. The Court noted that "the mere fact that a § 6(bX5) standard is 'feasible' does not mean 
that § 3(8)'s 'reasonably necessary or appropriate' language might not impose additional 
restraints on OSHA. For example, all § 6(bX5) standards must be addressed to 'significant 
risks' of material health impairment." The Court, therefore, expressly left open the question 
whether section 3(8) by itself might require a cost-benefit analysis for standards promulgated 
under provisions other than section 6(bX5). ATMI, 452 U.S. 490, 513 n.32. For an examination 
of the implications of this decision, see infra text and notes at notes 179-204. 
159. The ATMI majority adopted the view first set out in Indus. Union Dep't v. Hodgson, 
499 F.2d 467, see supra text and notes at notes 53-57, that a standard is economically feasible 
unless it threatens the existence of the entire regulated industry, even though certain in-
dividual employers might be put out of business. See ATMI, 452 U.S. 490, 530-31. At this 
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estimate of the standard's financial compliance costs to the industry 
was supported by substantial evidence in the record.160 OSHA had 
solicited two separate estimates of compliance costs for the cotton 
dust standard, one by a private group, the Research Triangle In-
stitute (RTI), and one by the industry itself.161 After deciding that 
both studies overestimated compliance costs, OSHA decided to rely 
mostly on the industry's estimate, which OSHA considered to be the 
less inaccurate of the twO. 162 Both studies, however, had estimated 
compliance costs for a standard that was less stringent than the one 
ultimately adopted by OSHA. The industry, therefore, attacked 
OSHA's estimate as wholly unrelated to the PEL's in the final stand-
ard.163 OSHA, on the other hand, argued that although the 
industry's estimate was based on a less stringent and therefore less 
costly standard than the one ultimately adopted, any inaccuracy 
would be offset by the industry's original overestimate of compliance 
costs. That is, although the estimate may have been greatly 
overstated with respect to the initial, more lenient standard, OSHA 
argued that the estimate was a reasonable one with respect to the 
final, more costly standard.164 
Because the Act establishes original jurisdiction in the federal 
courts of appeals to review the findings of the Secretary,165 the 
Supreme Court's review of the Secretary's estimate of the com-
point, it is useful to review the distinction between cost-benefit analysis and economic feasibili-
ty as defined by the ATMI Court. Cost-benefit analysis involves a comparison of benefits and 
costs, and a determination of whether costs are justified in light of the benefits they can 
achieve; or put another way, whether the expected benefits of an action are worth their costs. 
In contrast, the ATMI Court's definition of economic feasibility involves no such comparison of 
benefits and costs. Instead, economic feasibility focuses solely on the financial costs of an 
OSHA standard. OSHA must examine whether the financial costs of compliance with a par-
ticular standard are likely to cause a general collapse of the regulated industry. If they will, 
then the standard will be deemed infeasible, no matter how great, or for that matter how 
small, the corresponding health benefits of the standard are. Conversely, if the compliance 
costs are not likely to cause industrial collapse, then the standard will be deemed economically 
feasible, again regardless of the magnitude of the corresponding health benefits. 
160. Section 6(1) of the Act sets forth substantial evidence as the standard for judicial 
review of OSHA's determinations. 29 U.S.C. § 655(1) (1976). This test is normally meant to be 
applied to formal on-the-record rulemaking. The courts have had trouble applying the substan-
tial evidence test to OSHA's determinations generated from its informal notice-and-comment 
rulemaking procedure. See infra text and notes at notes 250-54. 
161. 43 Fed. Reg. 27,369-27,373 (1978). RTI had estimated a $2.70 billion compliance cost 
for a 200 ug/m3 PEL over all segments of the industry. The industry's estimate, however, put 
compliance cost at only $0.66 billion. Id. at 27,380. 
162. Id. at 27,373. 
163. Brief for Petitioners at 24-31, ATMI, No. 79-1429 (filed Nov. 20, 1980). 
164. Brief for the Federal Respondent at 19, ATMI, No. 79-1429 (filed Oct. 1980). 
165. 29 U.S.C. § 655(1) (1976). 
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pliance costs was limited to whether the lower court in upholding 
that estimate had "grossly misapplied" the substantial evidence 
test. 166 The lower court had found no great error in OSHA's pro-
cedure, noting that the agency "reasonably viewed the industry's 
figure as an overstated estimate for exposure levels set slightly 
higher than those in the agency's final standard." 167 More 
significantly, the lower court had also been persuaded to rule for 
OSHA on a fair play basis. The court noted that the industry had 
refused most of OSHA's requests for methodology and supporting 
data used in the industry's own cost estimate, claiming that the in-
formation was proprietary .168 This information would have enabled 
OSHA to refine the cost estimate once the agency determined that it 
was inaccurate. Because section 6(b)(5) of the Act allows the 
Secretary to set toxic substance standards on the basis of the "best 
available evidence," 169 the lower court had found that the 
Secretary's reliance on the industry's cost estimate was reasonable 
and supported by substantial evidence.17o 
The Supreme Court had little trouble in upholding the lower 
court's finding. Although the majority stated that a cost estimate 
based on the standard actually promulgated would have been 
preferable, they noted, as had the lower court, both the industry's 
refusal to supply data connected with its own cost estimate and 
OSHA's mandate to act upon the best available evidence. 171 These 
facts, along with the deferential standard of review, led the ATMI 
Court to decline to hold that OSHA's cost estimate was unsupported 
by substantial evidence.172 
Accepting OSHA's estimate of the industry's compliance costs, the 
Court then turned its attention to the agency's determination that it 
would be economically feasible for the industry as a whole to bear 
166. 452 U.S. 490, 523 (citing Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 491 (1951». 
167. 617 F.2d 636, 660 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (emphasis added). 
168. 43 Fed. Reg. 27,373 (1978), cited in Brief for Federal Respondents at 19, ATMI, No. 
79-1429 (filed Oct. 1980). 
169. 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (1976). 
170. 617 F.2d 636, 662 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
171. 452 U.S. 490, 527-28. 
172. Id. at 522-30. Justice Stewart, in dissent, would have invalidated the cotton dust stand-
ard solely because, in his opinion, OSHA's estimate of the economic costs of compliance was 
unsupported by substantial evidence. Justice Stewart rebuffed OSHA's "happy conclusion" 
that once the agency made the final standard more stringent, the industry's estimate could be 
considered no longer grossly overestimated. Because OSHA never relied upon an estimate of 
the compliance costs of the actual standard it promulgated, Justice Stewart would have re-
versed the lower court's upholding of OSHA's cost estimate as a gross misapplication of the 
substantial evidence test. Id. at 541-43. 
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these costs. While OSHA earlier had relied on the industry's 
estimate of the magnitude of the costs, OSHA relied here on RTI's 
estimate of the impact these costs would have on the cotton industry. 
RTI had determined that although some marginal employers might 
be forced to shut down, the cotton textile industry as a whole would 
not be threatened by the proposed cotton dust standard's economic 
impact.173 Furthermore, RTI had reached this conclusion using an 
estimate of compliance costs more than four times higher than the 
estimate ultimately adopted by OSHA.174 This compelling fact, com-
bined with the deferential standard of review, led to the Court's re-
fusal to hold that the lower court had grossly misapplied the substan-
tial evidence test to OSHA's finding of economic feasibility.175 Thus, 
the Supreme Court affirmed both OSHA's method of considering 
economic costs and the application of that method to the cotton dust 
standard. 176 
C. The Impact of Industrial Union and ATMI 
To regulate workplace toxic substances under section 6(b )(5), the 
Secretary must now follow the two-step process set forth in the In-
dustrial Union and ATMI decisions. First, the Secretary must show 
that the substance regulated poses a significant risk of material 
health impairment.177 If the Secretary fails to make a showing of 
significant risk, OSHA may not regulate that particular toxic 
173. 43 Fed. Reg. 27,378 (1978). 
174. Id. 
175. 452 U.S. 490, 536. 
176. The Supreme Court denied certiorari on the issue of technological feasibility of the cot-
ton dust standard, litigated in the circuit court and decided in favor of OSHA. The lower court 
followed the reasoning set out in Soc. of Plastics Ind., Inc. v. OSHA, 509 F.2d 1301, 1309 (2d 
Cir. 1975), that a standard is not technologically infeasible merely because it forces the 
development of new technology, or has been promulgated on the basis of incomplete scientific 
knowledge. AFL-CIO v. Marshall, 617 F.2d 636, 656-59 (D.C. Cir. 1979). Although the in-
dustry and OSHA disagreed over whether the standard was technologically achievable, the 
lower court upheld OSHA's finding of feasibility largely because of evidence provided by 
OSHA showing that many employers were already in compliance with the 200 ug/m8 standard 
for the spinning through warping operations. See 43 Fed. Reg. 27,362-27,367 (1978). For re-
maining operations, OSHA also had shown evidence that some mills already were in com-
pliance with the standard and that control measures existed which were capable of increasing 
compliance.ld. at 27,367-27,369. The lower court also noted that while OSHA's findings might 
be better supported by more extensive research, the additional cost and delay were enough to 
justify OSHA's decision to forego further studies. 617 F.2d 636, 657-58. Because section 
6(bX5) of the Act requires OSHA to act on the "best available evidence," the court was 
satisfied that OSHA had made an "informed" decision based on "credible" evidence. Id. at 658 
(emphasis added by court). Thus, the lower court held that OSHA's determination of 
technological feasibility was supportable by the studies and testimony it had relied upon. 
177. See supra text and notes at notes 85-95. 
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substance at all. If the Secretary can show a significant risk, then he 
must determine the level at which this risk is no longer significant 
and promulgate regulations to reduce the risk to this level. Only 
after the Secretary can make this showing of significant risk does 
the ATMI feasibility test become applicable. 
Under ATMI, the Secretary must show that the proposed section 
6(b)(5) standard is both economically and technologically feasible. 178 
The standard will be upheld as economically feasible if it will not 
cause general financial ruination of the industry, although a certain 
percentage of marginal employers may be forced out of business. 
The standard will be upheld as technologically feasible if the 
technology it requires either exists, or looms on the horizon. 
Feasibility analysis, under ATMI, does not contemplate any showing 
by OSHA that the costs of a health standard are justified by its 
related benefits. Reviewing courts will now uphold a toxic substance 
standard only if OSHA can show that both the significant risk and 
feasibility tests are satisfied. 
While the criteria set out in the Industrial Union and ATMI deci-
sions are helpful in setting the bounds of OSHA's ability to regulate, 
a number of important questions remain unanswered. One major 
question expressly left open by the Court is whether OSHA stand-
ards promulgated under provisions other than section 6(b)(5) will be 
required to undergo a cost-benefit analysis under section 3(8)'s 
reasonably necessary language standing alone. A second major ques-
tion concerns the precise limits of the significant risk and feasibility 
tests as they interact to constrain OSHA's ability to regulate toxic 
substances under section 6(b)(5). The following two sections describe 
these problems and their implications. 
1. Cost-Benefit Analysis for OSHA's Safety Standards 
The Supreme Court's holding in ATMI does not apply to all OSHA 
standards, but only to section 6(b)(5) toxic substance standards. The 
Court reached its conclusion that cost-benefit analysis is prohibited 
in the regulation of toxic substances through a consideration of the 
special directives of section 6(b )(5). OSHA promulgates standards 
for hazards other than toxic substances, however, through the re-
maining provisions of section 6(b ).179 The Supreme Court's holding 
in ATMI, therefore, was narrow in the sense that it applies only to 
178. See supra text and notes at notes 130-58. 
179. Section 6(b)(5) is the only subsection within section 6(b) to set special rules for the 
promulgation of a particular category of occupational hazard. See 29 U.S.C. S 655(b) (1976). 
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toxic substance standards and not to any of OSHA's remaining 
standards. The ATMI Court expressly left open the question of 
whether the section 3(8) reasonably necessary requirement might by 
itself require some form of cost-benefit analysis for these non-section 
6(b)(5) standards.180 That is, when OSHA regulates occupational 
hazards other than toxic substances, the question remains un-
answered whether section 3(8) imposes the requirement of a cost-
benefit justification since that section is no longer being construed in 
tandem with the feasibility requirement of section 6(b )(5). 
The importance of this issue relates chiefly to OSHA's safety 
standards, which comprise the main body of OSHA standards not 
promulgated under section 6(b )(5). A safety standard is the generally 
accepted term for a standard regulating incidences of immediate 
bodily harm by prescribing, for example, catch platforms for building 
roofers, or hand guards for mechanical power presses. In contrast, a 
health or toxic substance standard181 regulates the incidence of 
disease caused by prolonged exposure to, for example, a chemical or 
air pollutant. The ATMI Court narrowly held that Congress, by in-
serting the feasibility requirement in section 6(b )(5), showed a special 
intent to prohibit cost-benefit analysis in the promulgation of toxic 
substance standards. The Court therefore left the door open for cost-
benefit analysis to remain in the Act as a requirement for the pro-
mulgation of safety standards. An analysis of the ATMI opinion 
reveals that the Supreme Court provided conflicting signals as to 
whether it would eventually require cost-benefit analysis for safety 
standards under section 3(8)'s reasonably necessary requirement 
alone. 182 
One reason for the confusion over whether Congress and the 
courts intended cost-benefit analysis to apply to safety standards is 
180. ATMI, 452 U.S. 490, 513 n.32. 
181. This article refers to "health" and "toxic substance" standards interchangeably as any 
standards promulgated by OSHA under section 6(bX5). 
182. As noted in Regulating Toxic Substances, supra note 49 at 123 n.57, a few courts have 
extended the section 6(bX5) feasibility requirement to standards not involving toxic 
substances. See AFL-CIO v. Brennan, 530 F.2d 109,121 (3d Cir. 1975) (feasibility requirement 
expressly extended to standard for guards on mechanical power presses); RMI Co. V. Sec'y of 
Labor, 594 F.2d 566, 571 (6th Cir. 1979) (feasibility requirement implicitly extended to noise 
standard); Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc. V. OSHRC, 529 F.2d 649, 654 (8th Cir. 1976) 
(feasibility requirement expressly extended to standard for safety-toe footwear). The 
Arkansas-Best court noted that in the legislative history, the Senate Committee stated its in-
tention "that standards promulgated under section 6(b) shall representfeasible requirements." 
Id. at 654, citing S. REP. No. 1282, supra note 26, U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5183 (em-
phasis added). It is unclear whether the reference to all section 6(b) standards was inadver-
tent, since the legislative history contains repeated references to the feasibility requirement in 
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their use of the words "safety" and "health." There was no attempt 
to distinguish the two words in the Act,188 and the courts have drawn 
few sharp distinctions between the two. This general failure to 
distinguish between the two words must be kept in mind when exam-
ining Justice Brennan's seemingly conflicting statements in ATMI. 
On one hand, Justice Brennan seemed to distinguish safety stand-
ards from any connection with the feasibility requirement for toxic 
substance standards by stating that "Congress could reasonably 
have concluded that health standards should be subject to different 
criteria than safety standards because of the special problems 
presented in regulating them."184 On the other hand, Justice Bren-
nan seems to merge the two sets of standards in other parts of the 
opinion. For example, in discussing the feasibility requirement, 
Justice Brennan stated that "[n]owhere is there any indication that 
Congress contemplated a different balancing by OSHA of the 
benefits of worker health and safety against the costs of achieving 
them."185 To support this statement, Justice Brennan cited congres-
sional concern with the substantial burden on interstate commerce 
imposed by personal injuries and illnesses, and deaths and 
disabilities in the workplace. l86 These statements by Congress in-
dicate a concern to protect workers from all types of occupational 
health and safety hazards. Later in the opinion, Justice Brennan 
noted that Congress "chose to place pre-eminent value on assuring 
employees a safe and healthful working environment, limited only by 
the context of section 6(b)(5) only. See also Nat. Roofing Contractors Ass'n v. Brennan, 495 
F.2d 1294, 1304 (7th Cir. 1974) (dissenting opinion) (promulgation of safety standard should 
realize "the maximum safety of working conditions consistent with the realities of feasibility 
and enforceability"). 
183. For example, the third sentence of section 6(b)(5) speaks of health and safety protec-
tion, 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (1976) (emphasis added). In fact, the American Petroleum Institute 
has relied upon the latter sentences of section 6(b)(5) to support an argument that the feasibili-
ty limitation of § 6(b)(5) applies to all OSHA standards. See Regulating Toxic Substances, 
supra note 49, at 129 n.80. 
184. 452 U.S. 490, 512 (emphasis in original). In support of this statement Justice Brennan 
cited the following statement by the Industrial Union plurality: 
Congress recognized that there were special problems in regulating health risks as 
opposed to safety risks. In the latter case, the risks are generally immediate and ob-
vious, while in the former, the risks may not be evident until a worker has been ex-
posed for long periods of time to particular substances. It was to ensure that the 
Secretary took account of these long-term risks that Congress enacted 6(b)(5). 
Id. (citing Industrial Union, 448 U.S. 607, 649 n.54). 
185. 452 U.S. 490, 521 (emphasis added). Elsewhere, Justice Brennan confined this conclu-
sion to toxic substance standards, stating that "Congress did not contemplate any further 
balancing by the agency for toxic material and harmful physical agents standards." Id. at 513. 
The Court's inconsistent language is noted by MacCarthy, supra note 1, at 810 n.9l. 
186. 452 U.S. 490, 522. 
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the feasibility of achieving such an environment. "187 These 
statements indicate that the Court might in the future extend its pro-
hibition of cost-benefit analysis into the area of general safety stand-
ards. 
In addition, Justice Brennan gave further evidence in his opinion 
that the degree of protection of worker safety was intended to be 
equally as high as that of worker health. In support of his feasibility 
interpretation, Justice Brennan cited the Senate Committee's con-
cern that standards under section 6(b )(5) "represent feasible re-
quirements" and assure, "so far as possible, that no employee will 
suffer impaired health. "188 This language, however, is similar to that 
of section 2(b), which sets the overall policy objective for all stand-
ards promulgated by OSHA.189 Moreover, Justice Brennan sup-
ported his interpretation of section 6(b )(5) with several other 
statements made by the Act's congressional framers which were 
directed not towards section 6(b )(5) alone, but towards the entire Act 
in general. For example, Justice Brennan noted that "Congress 
viewed the costs of health and safety as a cost of doing business, "190 
quoting Senator Eagleton's comment that "[t]he costs that will be in-
curred by employers in meeting the standards of health and safety to 
be established under this bill are, in my view, reasonable and 
necessary costs of doing business."191 In fact, the capstone of the 
Court's legislative history argument rested on Senator Eagleton's 
remark that "[ w ]hether we, as individuals, are motivated by simple 
humanity or by simple economics, we can no longer permit profits to 
be dependent upon an unsafe or unhealthy worksite."192 This use of 
187. [d. at 540 (emphasis added). 
188. [d. at 516 (citing 1 LEGIS. HIST., supra note 145, at 147 (emphasis added by Court». 
189. See 29 U.S.C. § 651(b) (1976). 
190. 452 U.S. 490, 520. 
191. [d. at 521 (first emphasis added by author; second emphasis added by Court). Indeed, 
Justice Brennan concluded that "Congress understood that the Act [not just section 6(b)(5)] 
would create substantial costs for employers, yet intended to impose such costs when 
necessary to create a safe and healthful working environment." [d. at 519-20 (emphasis 
added). "Congress was concerned that the Act might be thought to require achievement of ab-
solute safety, an impossible standard, and therefore insisted that health and safety goals be 
capable of economic and technological accomplishment." [d. at 514 (emphasis added). 
192. [d. at 522 (emphasis added). The Court also cited other remarks by Congressmen 
which, while not explicitly mentioning both health and safety, nevertheless were directed 
towards OSHA standards in general rather than toxic substance standards in particular. For 
example, the Court cited the following remark by Congressman Dent: 
Although I am very much disturbed over adding new costs to the operation of our pro-
duction facilities because of the threats from abroad, I would say there is a greater 
concern and that must be for the production men who do the producing - the men 
who work in the service industries and the men and women in this country who daily 
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congressional authority indicates the Court's implicit realization that 
Congress was equally concerned with protecting workers from both 
health and safety hazards. 
The reliance by the ATMI Court on these statements from the 
legislative history points out the inconsistency of the Court's opin-
ion. Justice Brennan's strong statement distinguishing health stand-
ards from safety standards193 is undercut by his use of congressional 
statements regarding the Act in general to support his interpreta-
tion of section 6(b )(5) in particular. If the Court actually considered 
the Act's safety standards as utterly distinct from the health stand-
ards of section 6(b)(5), then the Court would not have used congres-
sional authority as it did. The opinion's inconsistency is inexplicable 
even if the Court meant that, while Congress intended to achieve the 
same high level of reduction of both health and safety hazards, the 
special problems of toxic substances require special methods to 
determine that level. If so, the Court still offered little support for 
the contention that Congress may have intended the basic policy 
distinction of requiring cost-benefit justification for safety standards 
but not for health standards. If that were the case, then the level of 
reduction would be greater for health hazards than for safety 
hazards. As noted in the Court's opinion, however, Congress seems 
not to have intended this. 
A comparison of section 6(b)(5) with section 2(b), which sets the 
overall policy objective of the Act, supports this conclusion regard-
ing congressional intent. Based on the similarity in the language of 
the two sections, one can make the argument that section 6(b)(5) 
does not direct OSHA to provide a greater degree of protection 
against health hazards than against safety hazards. Section 6(b)(5) 
directs the Secretary to set the toxic substance standard which most 
adequately assures, to the extent feasible, that no employee will suf-
fer material impairment of health. Similarly, section 2(b) dictates 
that the overall objective of the Act is to assure so far as possible that 
every worker is provided safe and healthful working conditions. The 
language of the two provisions is synonymous. "No" employee shall 
suffer "material" impairment of health seems equivalent to "every" 
go out and keep the economy moving and make it safe for all of us to live and to work 
and to be able to prosper in it. 
1 LEGIS. HIST., supra note 145, at 1030-31, cited in ATMI, 452 U.S. 490, 521 n.39. In addition, 
the Court quoted Senator Yarborough's statement that "[w]e know the costs would be put into 
consumer goods but that is the price we should pay for the 80 million workers in America." 1 
LEGIS. HIST., supra note 145, at 444, cited in ATMI, 452 U.S. 490, 520. 
193. See supra text at note 184. 
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worker shall be assured' "safe and healthful" working conditions, 
particularly in light of the Supreme Court's holding that "safe" is 
not "risk-free."194 In addition, the phrase "so far as possible" has 
the same meaning as the term "feasible," given the ATMI Court's 
construction of "feasible" to mean "achievable."195 Because section 
2(b) applies to all OSHA standards, the Court's argument that Con-
gress intended to prohibit cost-benefit analysis for OSHA's health 
standards would seem to apply to safety standards as well.196 
Other factors also indicate that Congress did not intend the 
reasonably necessary requirement of section 3(8) to signal by itself a 
cost-benefit analysis for safety standards. First, as noted by the 
ATMI Court with respect to the feasibility controversy, when Con-
gress wants a cost-benefit analysis to be performed, Congress has 
said so, either expressly or by using the phrase "unreasonable risk" 
as a signal.197 Neither cost-benefit analysis nor unreasonable risk, 
however, is mentioned in the Act or its legislative history. Second, a 
generally accepted approach to statutory interpretation indicates 
that language from an Act's definitional section, here section 3(8), 
should not be used to impose substantive limitations on an agency's 
regulatory power conferred in other sections of the Act. Thus, 
language in the definitional sections of other statutes similar to the 
reasonably necessary language in section 3(8) of the Act has been 
read to require only that actions taken under the power conferring 
provisions of these statutes bear a reasonable relation to the 
statutory purposes.198 Both these elements of the Act's structure 
weigh against the imposition of cost-benefit analysis to OSHA's safe-
ty standards as well as its health standards. 
On the other hand, several commentators have concluded that the 
power granted OSHA to regulate toxic substances is far broader 
than the power granted OSHA to regulate safety hazards.199 This 
194. See supra text and notes at notes 91-92. 
195. See supra text and notes at notes 139-5l. 
196. Indeed, the government had relied upon section 2(b) as substantive authority for 
OSHA's inclusion of the medical transfer and income guarantee provision in the cotton dust 
standard. Brief for the Federal Respondent at 58, ATMI, No. 79-1429 (filed Oct. 1980). 
197. See supra text and notes at notes 149-50. 
198. Mourning v. Family Pub. Service, Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 369 (1973) (reviewing Federal 
Reserve Board regulation under the Truth-in-Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1604 (1970»; Thorpe v. 
Housing Auth'y of City of Durham, 393 U.S. 268, 280-81 (1969) (construing the United States 
Housing Act of 1937,42 U.S.C. § 1408 (1964 Ed., Supp. III». 
199. See Regulating Toxic Substances, supra note 49, at 128 n.80; McGarity, Substantive 
and Procedural Discretion in Administrative Resolution of Science Policy Questions: 
Regulating Carcinogens in EPA and OSHA, 67 GEO. L.J. 729, 786 (1979); Berger & Riskin, 
supra note 49, at 294. 
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view supports the ATMI Court's argument that Congress sought to 
provide maximum protection for worker health and, therefore, pro-
hibited the use of cost-benefit analysis in determining toxic 
substance exposure levels. It also implies, however, that because 
Congress evidenced a different intent with respect to the Act's safe-
ty standards, the prohibition against cost-benefit analysis cannot 
automatically be extended to those standards. Perhaps the best 
argument supporting this view is that by inserting a special subsec-
tion for toxic substances, section 6(bX5), into the general standard 
setting provision of the Act and by declaring feasibility to be the only 
limit on OSHA's duty to reduce all risk from these hazards, Congress 
manifested a desire to provide the Act's maximum protection only to 
workers exposed to toxic hazards. Workers exposed to safety 
hazards arguably would sometimes receive a lower degree of protec-
tion through reasonably necessary standards determined by 
weighing the costs of such safety standards against their benefits. 
Indeed, the federal government itself noted that Congress granted 
OSHA a broader power to regulate toxic substances than to regulate 
safety hazards. In discussing the origin of section 6(b X5), the govern-
ment stated: "The nature of the compromise is readily understood: 
proponents of regulation obtained a sweeping statute concerning 
toxic substances, while opponents confined the strongest section of 
the statute to this particular hazard."20o Under this view, Congress 
could reasonably have intended that OSHA consider financial costs 
in a different manner when regulating safety hazards than when 
regulating health hazards. As further support for this theory, com-
mentators point to several reasons why cost-benefit analysis is a 
more valid criterion for setting safety standards than for setting 
health standards. Among them are the lack of such problems as 
latency period and proof of causation, as well as the greater 
availability of statistics on the number of accidents caused by safety 
hazards.201 Thus, it is conceivable that cost-benefit analysis could be 
prohibited for health standards, but remain an appropriate criterion 
for setting safety standards. 
The argument that workers exposed to health hazards are meant 
to receive special protection under the Act, however, is unfounded as 
an interpretation of congressional intent. A more valid conclusion 
200. Brieffor Federal Parties at 37, Indus. Union Dep't v. Am. Petroleum Inst., No. 78-911 
(filed July 1979). 
201. Regulating Toxic Substances, supra note 49, at 129. Furthermore, respecting OSHA in 
particular, this casenote cites the special congressional concern evidenced for workers exposed 
to hazardous substances, and the fact that OSHA's safety standards may be more easily 
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drawn from the Act's special section on toxic substances is that Con-
gress wanted OSHA to take account of these long-term risks which 
might otherwise be somewhat neglected, not that it intended a 
greater degree of protection for workers in this area. This conclusion 
is borne out by the language of section 6(b)(5). The provision directs 
the Secretary to assure, to the extent feasible, that no employee will 
suffer material impairment of health from exposure to a toxic 
hazard, "even if such employee has regular exposure to the hazard 
... for the period of his working life."202 The Supreme Court plurali-
ty in Industrial Union adhered to this interpretation of the origins of 
section 6(b)(5), as it stated: 
The reason that Congress drafted a special section for [toxic] 
substances was not ... because it thought that there was a need 
for special protection in these areas. Rather, it was because Con-
gress recognized that there were special problems in regulating 
health risks as opposed to safety risks .... It was to ensure that 
the Secretary took account of these long-term risks that Con-
gress enacted § 6(b)(5).203 
Remarks in the legislative history further support this interpreta-
tion.204 
To summarize, the issue of whether the Act precludes cost-benefit 
analysis for OSHA's general safety standards as well as for OSHA's 
toxic substance standards is still unclear. Although the ATMI Court 
expressly left this question open, several factors in the Supreme 
Court's opinion suggest that the Court in the future would not 
distinguish between the two types of standards in its conclusion that 
Congress prohibited OSHA from using cost-benefit analysis. 
Whether this conclusion would be correct depends upon two ques-
tions: first, whether Congress intended that OSHA distinguish be-
criticized than its health standards for being unnecessary, overly prolific, and needlessly de-
tailed.Id. 
202. 29 U.S.C. S 655(b)(5) (1976) (emphasis added). 
203. 448 U.S. 607, 649 n.54. The four dissenting Justices in Industrial Union, however, 
held the opposite view of section 6(b)(5). See id. at 711 n.28 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
204. Senator Dominick explained that Congress' intention in adopting section 6(b)(5) was to 
require the Secretary 
to use his best efforts to promulgate the best available standards, and in so doing, ... 
he should take into account that anyone working in toxic agents and physical agents 
which might be harmful may be subjected to such conditions for the rest of his work-
ing life, so that we can get at something which might not be toxic now, if he works in 
it a short time, but if he works in it the rest of his life might be very dangerous; and 
we want to make sure that such things are taken into consideration in establishing 
standards. 
1 LEGIS. RIST., supra note 145, at 502-03, quoted inATMI, 452 U.S. 490, 518 (emphasis added). 
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tween health standards and safety standards when considering the 
extent to which financial costs should be considered in the standard-
setting process; and second, in defining that extent, whether Con-
gress intended to prohibit cost-benefit analysis in the setting of 
health standards and, therefore, by extrapolation, in the setting of 
safety standards as well. This article will examine the latter question 
in a later section. With respect to the first question, however, an ex-
amination in this section of congressional intent has indicated that to 
the extent that OSHA may consider financial costs at all, the 
agency's procedures should be no different when setting safety 
standards than when setting health standards. 
2. Other Issues Remaining After ATMI 
In addition to the unresolved issue of whether cost-benefit analysis 
applies to safety standards, a number of other important issues re-
main after the Industrial Union and ATMI decisions. The Supreme 
Court's opinions leave unresolved the role of cost-effectiveness 
analysis; the proper application of the feasibility and significant risk 
tests; and the significance of different types of cost-benefit analysis. 
The Court, then, did not provide OSHA with a comprehensive set of 
guidelines on the proper role of cost considerations in OSHA's stand-
ard setting procedures. 
First, the ATMI Court left available the use of cost-effectiveness 
analysis to evaluate OSHA's toxic substance standards. Cost-
effectiveness analysis, as distinguished from cost-benefit analysis, is 
a method of deciding between alternative regulations which involve 
either the same costs or the same benefits. In the context of occupa-
tional health, if two different types of controls for workplace health 
hazards involve the same cost, then the one providing the greater 
degree of health benefits is the more cost-effective. Similarly, if two 
different types of controls provide the same benefit, then the one 
which costs less to implement is the more cost-effective. Cost-
effectiveness analysis, therefore, involves a comparison of alter-
native means of achieving a given societal goal. In contrast, cost-
benefit analysis attempts to evaluate the worth of the societal goal 
itself. 205 
205. To illustrate, if Method A would achieve a health benefit of two lives saved per year at 
a cost of $1 million and Method B would achieve the same health benefit of 2 lives saved per 
year at a cost of $2 million, then Method A would be more cost-effective. Neither method, 
however, is necessarily justifiable under a cost-benefit analysis, as that would depend on 
whether the value of saving two lives per year is "worth" $1 million, $2 million, or more. Cost-
benefit analysis, therefore, involves a comparison of costs and benefits which works best when 
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In a footnote to the ATMI decision, Justice Brennan stated that if 
the same reduction in health risk could be achieved using two dif-
ferent methods, then the "reasonably necessary or appropriate" 
limitation of section 3(8) might come into playas a restriction on 
OSHA to choose the less costly method.206 Thus, a claim that an 
OSHA toxic substance standard is not cost-effective may in the 
future be the most viable way to challenge the standard. Because 
cost-effectiveness analysis does not involve the difficult value 
judgments inherent in a cost-benefit analysis, future courts should be 
responsive to a cost-effectiveness argument. While courts should not 
allow cost-effectiveness challenges to burden unduly OSHA's ad-
ministrative procedures, courts should view these claims as properly 
brought under the pragmatic policies of the Act. If this analysis is 
correct, the courts could refuse to uphold an economically feasible 
standard because it is not cost-effective. 
An additional problem remaining after ATMI concerns the precise 
meaning of economic feasibility. The ATMI Court held that a toxic 
substance standard should be judged economically feasible if the af-
fected industry will survive as a whole, although a certain percent-
age of its employers might be forced out of business.207 Yet, the 
Court gave no indication of what percentage of an industry's 
employers may be shut down before the industry as a whole will be 
deemed financially crippled. Future courts, therefore, are left on 
their own to determine the precise limits of the industry ruination 
threshold.208 
In addition, a question arises regarding those health or safety 
hazards which are too small to be considered significant, but, never-
the two - both costs and benefits - are quantified in common units. In contrast, there is no 
need to reduce costs and benefits to common units in cost-effectiveness analysis, because the 
goal to be achieved or the money to be spent is already fixed. See E. STOKEY & R. ZECKHAUSER, 
supra note 44, at 153-55; Baram, supra note 1, at 478. 
206. 452 U.S. 490, 514 n.32. 
207. See supra note 159. 
208. That the economic feasibility formula may be inefficient as a cost constraint is il-
lustrated by the controversy surrounding OSHA's permanent standard for lead. The lead 
standard was held economically feasible by the courts with respect to the battery manufactur-
ing industry despite the possibility that 200 small producers would be forced out of business. 
OSHA found that competition would survive through the remaining 30 firms that controlled 
90 percent of the market. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Marshall, 647 F.2d 1189, 1291-93 
(1980). Furthermore, the A TMI feasibility limitation on OSHA's regulatory power failed to ac-
count for mounting concern that, in rare situations, OSHA should be allowed to cause a de fac-
to prohibition of the occupation itself. See also AFL-CIO v. Brennan, 530 F.2d 109, 121 (3d 
Cir. 1975) ("We do not question that there are industrial hazards so great and of such little 
social utility that the Secretary would be justified in concluding that their total prohibition is 
proper if there is no technologically feasible method of eliminating the operational hazard"). 
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theless, pose some threat to workplace health and safety which could 
be either reduced or eliminated very inexpensively. Under In-
dustrial Union, OSHA has no duty to regulate these hazards 
because they do not present a significant risk. Applying this rule 
where hazards are inexpensive to reduce, however, seems incompati-
ble with the Act's objective of protecting worker safety and health 
"so far as possible."209 To refine the significant risk requirement to a 
point more in line with the Act's objectives, however, might imply 
that the significance of a risk should turn on its cost of removal - a 
cost-benefit analysis. Commentators have generally agreed, 
however, that the Industrial Union plurality had no such cost-
benefit test in mind in its definition of significant risk. 210 Therefore, 
there remains a category of occupational hazards which should be 
eliminated, but which, according to the Industrial Union plurality, 
Congress has directed OSHA not to regulate.211 
A further problem is that by prohibiting OSHA's use of cost-
benefit analysis in the setting of toxic substance standards, the 
Supreme Court failed to distinguish between the different forms of 
cost-benefit analysis.212 In doing so, the Court overlooked what this 
article suggests has been an inherent role for the broad, integrative 
209. 29 U.S.C. § 651(b) (1976). 
210. The Supreme Court, 1979 Term, 94 HARV. L. REV. 242, 246 (1980). See also Significant 
RiskRequirement, supra note 47; Baird, supra note 73; Note, Avoiding the Use of Cost-Benefit 
Analysis in the Context of Occupational Safety and Health; The Requirement of Significant 
Risk; Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Institute, 22 B.C.L. 
REV. 1149 (1981). But see infra text and notes at notes 335-36. The Supreme Court,.1979 Term, 
supra this note, suggests that the Court may have intended OSHA to specify a certain level of 
harm as significant (e.g., one-in-ten thousand) and then examine whether it is "more likely 
than not" that the risk in the workplace to be regulated exceeds that level. Id. at 246. Another 
commentator, on the other hand, suggests that OSHA must in each case determine what level 
of risk is de minimus and support its assessment of whether workplace risk exceeds that level 
using quantified data. Significant Risk Requirement, supra note 47, at 555-56. 
211. In a related problem it remains unclear whether the significance of a risk is determined 
by its magnitude with respect to an individual worker, or by the percentage of workers harmed 
over the entire industry. The Industrial Union plurality focused on the overall percentage of 
workers harmed as the dispositive factor. 448 U.S. 607, 654-55 (1980). Justice Stevens found 
no need to discuss the magnitude of harm to the individual worker since the case involved 
cancer-induced deaths. One might speculate that the plurality found the requirement of a 
threshold degree of harm to the individual worker to be implicit in section 6(b )(5)' s directive to 
assure that "no [individual] employee will suffer material impairment of health." Justice Mar-
shall, however, has pointed out that section 6(b)(5) addresses "material impairment," not 
material risk of impairment; if the latter were true, the Secretary would have no ability to 
regulate substances which pose only a small risk to any individual worker, but which never-
theless will result in the death of numerous members of the worker pool. 
212. While the ATMI majority noted the difference in opinion over the meaning of "cost-
benefit analysis," the Court nevertheless failed to adopt definitively one interpretation over 
the other. Addressing the problem in a single footnote, the majority stated uncertainly that 
---------
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form of cost-benefit analysis in judicial review of agency decisions. A 
recognition of this role may have enabled the Court to formulate a 
construction of OSHA rulemaking procedures more in line with con-
gressional goals than the procedures actually settled upon in ATMI. 
The article now turns to a discussion of this inherent role for cost-
benefit analysis and its implications for OSHA rulemaking. 
IV. COST -BENEFIT ANALYSIS AFTERATMI: 
THE SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TEST 
A. Introduction 
The recent controversy over the use of cost-benefit analysis in 
regulatory decisionmaking can be explained partially by a disagree-
ment over the meaning of the term "cost-benefit analysis."213 One 
commentator has taken the position, exemplifying the view of other 
critics, that the use of cost-benefit analysis is invalid in the area of 
health and environmental decisionmaking because this technique is a 
purely monetized exercise; it places lives on the same scale as 
dollars, leaving high officials "twiddling with the weights to see 
which is heavier."214 These opponents, however, have not recognized 
the possible existence of a broader, nonmonetized, administrative 
cost-benefit analysis less susceptible to such criticism. Under this in-
tegrative type of cost-benefit analysis, all of the positive and 
negative aspects of a decision, whether monetizable or not, can be 
conceptually weighed by the decisionmaker in order to reach a ra-
tional decision. The decision to use cost-benefit analysis in regulatory 
decisionmaking may depend on which type - monetized or in-
tegrative - is considered. 
Certain commentators have suggested that consideration of in-
tegrative cost-benefit analysis is trivial, because such an analysis is 
part of every action we take in our daily lives.215 It applies equally, 
they point out, to every rational decision "of a man to marry or to 
commit suicide, of a firm to produce or to collude, [or] of a govern-
ment to tax or to engage in war."216 They claim, therefore, that 
"[w]hether petitioners' or respondent's characterization is correct, we will sometimes refer to 
petitioner's proposed exercise as 'cost-benefit analysis.' " ATMI, 452 U.S. 490, 506 n.26. 
213. See supra text and notes at notes 42-51 for a discussion of the varying views on the 
meaning of the term "cost-benefit analysis." 
214. Interview with Howard D. Samuels, President, Indus. Union Dep't, AFL-CIO, Sierra 
Club Magazine, Jan./Feb. 1982, at 146. 
215. Steiner, The Theory of Marginal Public Expenditure Choices, in BENEFIT-COST & 
POLICY ANALYSIS 325 (R. Zeckhauser, A. Harberger, eds. 1975); Kasper, supra note 1, at 1014. 
216. Steiner, supra note 215, at 335. 
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there is no point in discussing whether an integrative cost-benefit 
analysis should be used in making environmental decisions, because 
it is used and will continue to be used.217 
It may not be accurate, however, to extend this conclusion 
concerning the rational individual to the decisions of governmental 
agencies. Unlike the private actor, the governmental decisionmaker 
is not committing his own resources to achieve his own benefits.218 
Instead, the governmental decisionmaker uses cost-benefit analysis 
to assess how public resources can best be apportioned to provide 
public benefits, without full knowledge of the extent of the cost-
benefit tradeoff desired by the public.219 In the area of regulatory 
decisionmaking, the government regulator must decide the extent 
that costs should be imposed on one segment of the public in order to 
provide benefits to a different segment, again without full 
knowledge of the overall mix desired by the public in general. 220 Ra-
tional individualistic behavior, therefore, may not be assumed of the 
governmental decisionmaker who imposes a particular cost-benefit 
tradeoff on members of the public. 
Integrative cost-benefit analysis appears not to be rendered invalid 
as a decisionmaking tool merely because it involves a partially sub-
jective decision. As argued by some economists, even where an agen-
cy's decision is subjective, cost-benefit analysis can still be a useful 
tool for organized, rational decisionmaking.221 Formal cost-benefit 
analysis works most effectively where a method such as market pric-
ing is available to measure costs and benefits in a single unit.222 
Health and environmental decisionmaking, however, often involves 
intangible costs and benefits which are real and important to society, 
but are unaccounted for in the market economy.223 An integrative 
217. Kasper, supra note 1, at 1013-15; Steiner, supra note 215, at 335-37. 
218. See Green, supra note 46, at 904. 
219. [d. 
220. [d. at 905. 
221. See supra text and notes at-notes 50-51. 
222. See Baram, supra note 1, at 483. 
223. L. HINES, ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES, POPULATION, POLLUTION AND ECONOMICS 117 (1973). 
To illustrate why market forces would npt reflect public values as to acceptable risk, consider 
the case of toxic substances in the workplace. Market prices do not reflect true public benefit-
cost choice because the costs and benefits go to different recipients; that is, employees bear 
the health burdens, while employers, stockholders, and consumers enjoy the benefits of lower 
prices which come from not having to spend money on workplace health controls. See Baram, 
supra note 1, at 487. Baram gives other examples of improper distribution of costs and 
benefits. For instance, harmful exposure to radiation from a nuclear power plant would occur 
in the plant environs, while most of the benefits from the energy would be distributed over a 
broader geographic region. [d. at 488, n_54. Baram concludes that "[clost-benefit analysis 
practitioners often obscure the distributional effects on specific population sectors in reaching 
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cost-benefit analysis, although subjective, may represent a signifi-
cant advance over a method which ignores some of these factors 
altogether.224 This form of cost-benefit analysis falls between a fully 
monetized cost-benefit analysis and no cost-benefit analysis at all, 
and may be the most appropriate means of assessing the unquan-
tifiable factors involved in environmental decisionmaking. 226 
The remainder of this article examines the relationship between 
the integrative form of cost-benefit analysis and policy decisions 
made by OSHA. The article concludes that both Congress and the 
courts have recognized that an integrative cost-benefit analysis is re-
quired of all policymaking agencies such as OSHA. The argument 
notes that the judicial role in reviewing many agency decisions, in-
cluding those of OSHA, is to ensure that these decisions are based on 
substantial evidence in the record as a whole. The Supreme Court 
has interpreted this requirement to mean that a reviewing court 
must examine whether the agency's decision was rational. In turn, 
the Court has held that a rational agency decision must be based on a 
balancing of all of the evidence, both supportive of and contrary to 
the decision. Integrative cost-benefit analysis, then, apparently 
should be imposed by the courts upon agencies as an inherently 
necessary method of rational decisionmaking. If such a cost-benefit 
analysis is not utilized by an agency, its decision will not be deemed 
"rational" and should be struck down by a reviewing court because it 
is not supported by substantial evidence. 
The following section first briefly explains the Supreme Court's in-
terpretation of the substantial evidence test and the impact of that 
interpretation on the decisions of OSHA and other agencies. Both 
Industrial Union and ATMI are then reexamined in light of this con-
'societally optimal' decisions." ld. "Constitutional guarantees of due process, equal protection, 
property rights, and representative government should carry greater weight in solving the 
distributional problem than assumptions about fairness developed by economists and 
analysts." ld. at 488. 
224. NAS REPORT, supra note 50, cited in Baram, supra note 1, at 484 n.38. 
225. This form of cost-benefit analysis has been variously termed "economic impact" 
analysis, see Roberts and Kossek, Implementation of Economic Impact Analysis: The Lessons 
of OSHA, 83 W. VA. L. REV. 449 (1981), or "cost-sensitive" decisionmaking, see Rodgers, 
supra note 1, at 206-10. Rodgers identifies the various degrees to which different health and 
environmental statutes require a consideration of costs. He identifies the cost-sensitive model 
as being more cost-conscious than the cost-oblivious or cost-effective models, but less cost-
conscious than the formal cost-benefit analysis model. Rodgers, writing before ATMI, iden-
tified the OSHA feasibility requirement as a cost-sensitive model. ld. at 206. He places this ap-
proach, however, at the extreme end of the cost-sensitive spectrum because of the Act's man-
date to require all controls possible to reduce a specified health risk without causing industry 
ruination. ld. at 208-09. 
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struction of the substantial evidence test. The contours of the signifi-
cant risk and feasibility tests may be construed by OSHA and the 
courts as combining to prohibit any comparison of costs and benefits 
in the context of toxic substance regulation. The article concludes, 
therefore, by examining this apparent prohibition against cost-
benefit analysis in light of the integrative cost-benefit model under 
the substantial evidence test to determine whether any form of cost-
benefit analysis remains valid under the OSHA statute. 
B. The Role of Cost-Benefit Analysis Inherent in Substantial 
Evidence Review of Agency Decisionmaking 
1. Development of the Substantial Evidence Test 
Judicial review of formal226 administrative decisionmaking has 
long been governed by the substantial evidence test. The Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act of 1946227 requires a reviewing court to 
invalidate an agency's action that is "unsupported by substantial 
evidence."228 In making these determinations, "the court shall 
review the whole record or those parts of it cited by a party."229 The 
first basic interpretation of the substantial evidence standard of 
review was provided by the Supreme Court in Consolidated Edison 
Co. v. NLRB.230 There, the Court stated that "[s]ubstantial evidence 
is more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a 
226. See infra text and notes at notes 250-54 for a discussion of the difference between for-
mal and informal agency rulemaking, and for a discussion of the arbitrary and capricious 
standard applied to informal agency rulemaking. 
227. 5 U.S.C. SS 551-559, 701-706 (1976). While the Administrative Procedure Act does not 
apply to OSHA rulemaking, see infra text and notes at notes 250-54, the development of the 
substantial evidence test under that Act is informative in understanding the test as it is ap-
plied to OSHA. 
228. 5 U.S.C. S 706(2)(E). On the spectrum of standards for judicial review of findings of 
fact, substantial evidence falls at least nominally between the clearly erroneous test, which 
gives the court broad and intrusive powers, and the arbitrary and capricious test, which is 
highly deferential. K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES S 29.00, at 646-47 (1976); 
Note, OSHA's Rulemaking Authority Under the Occupational Safety and Health Act: Marshall 
v. American Petroleum Institute, 12 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 229, 238-39 (1981). In recent years, 
however, this clear delineation between the tests has been blurred by the courts. K. DAVIS, 
supra this note, at 646-54. The Supreme Court's decision in Citizens to Preserve Overton 
Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971), which seemed to equate the clearly erroneous and ar-
bitrary and capricious tests, played a major role in generating this confusion, K. DAVIS, supra 
this note, at 648. Disagreement has also been widespread over whether the substantial 
evidence test is more rigorous than the arbitrary and capricious standard, or whether the two 
tests are actually equivalent. Id. at 649-52. See infra note 253. 
229. 5 U.S.C. S 706 (1976). 
230. 305 U.S. 197 (1938). 
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reasonable mind ought to accept as adequate to support a 
conclusion.' '231 
Initially, it was unclear whether this meant that an agency need 
only present something in the evidence to support its finding, ignor-
ing countervailing evidence in the record,232 or whether the agency's 
determination would be viewed in light of all the evidence in the 
record.233 In 1951, the Supreme Court settled this question in 
Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB. 234 In Universal Camera, Justice 
Frankfurter, writing for the majority, stated that "[t]he substantiali-
ty of evidence must take into account whatever in the record fairly 
detracts from its weight."23s The substantial evidence test, 
therefore, requires a balancing by the court or agency. The review-
ing court will examine the agency's conclusion to ensure it was a 
reasonable one in light of all the evidence, both supportive of and 
contrary to the conclusion. 
Although Universal Camera was viewed as a broadening of the 
scope of judicial review, 236 the Court in that case recognized that the 
judicial role is not to determine whether the agency has made the 
proper decision, but only that it has made a reasonable one. Where 
lack of expertise or other uncertainty would allow two conflicting 
conclusions to be reasonably drawn from the same record, the court 
"may [not] displace the Board's choice between ... [the two], even 
though the court would justifiably have made a different choice had 
the matter been before it de novo."237 To ensure that an agency's 
decision is reasonable, however, the reviewing court must find that 
the agency considered as relevant to its decision all the evidence sub-
mitted into the record. 
2. Application of the Substantial Evidence Test 
to OSHA Determinations 
Under section 6(f) of the Act, substantial evidence is set out as the 
231. [d. at 229. 
232. The case most cited for this proposition is NLRB v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 309 
U.S. 206 (1940). See Stason, "Substantial E'lJidAmce" in Administrative Law, 89 U. P A. L. REV. 
1026, 1049-50 (1941). 
233. See, e.g., NLRB v. Thompson Products, Inc., 97 F.2d 13, 15 (6th Cir. 1938). 
234. 340 U.S. 474 (1951). 
235. [d. at 488. 
236. See Gooding v. Willard, 209 F.2d 913, 916 (2d Cir. 1954) ("[J]udicial review has been 
extended by the Administrative Procedure Act to embrace adequate exploration of the record 
as a whole ... "). On the scope of the substantial evidence test as a broadening of judicial 
review, see Jaffe, Judicial Review: "Substantial Evidence on the Whole Record," 64 HARV. L. 
REv. 1233 (1951). Jaffe suggests that, after Universal Camera, the reviewing judge must 
simply determine whether, under the record, an agency's finding is a fair one. [d. at 1239. 
237. 340 U.S. 474, 488. 
1982] COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 413 
standard for judicial review of OSHA's determinations.238 The ap-
plication of this test to OSHA decisions has proved problematic. The 
sources of this difficulty are threefold: the first problem concerns the 
element of legislative-like policymaking present in OSHA's 
regulatory procedures; the second problem concerns the informal 
nature of OSHA's rulemaking procedures; and the final problem con-
cerns the frequent lack of definitive scientific data available to sup-
port OSHA's determinations. The article now turns to a brief con-
sideration of these problems before discussing the judicial applica-
tion of cost-benefit analysis under the substantial evidence test. 
a. Policy Issues Versus Fact Issues 
In section 2(b) of the Act, Congress set for OSHA the basic policy 
objective of achieving "so far as possible" a safe and healthful 
workplace.239 Congress necessarily had to delegate a certain amount 
of discretionary authority to OSHA to formulate regulatory pro-
cedures that would best achieve this goal. For instance, OSHA is 
obliged to make an essentially legislative determination of what ex-
posure level to toxic substances is "safe."240 The Secretary's policy 
judgment in this case concerns what industry can achieve in an effort 
to best protect its employees.241 This type of prediction is based 
primarily on legislative judgment, analogous to a congressman's 
decision to vote for or against a particular bill.242 OSHA's determina-
tions, therefore, are not confined to factual findings, but often in-
volve a combination of factual findings and legislative-like policy 
decisions.243 
Courts have almost uniformly held that the substantial evidence 
test, originally designed for application to an agency's factual find-
ings, applies as well to OSHA's policy decisions. 244 Because these 
238. 29 U.S.C. § 655(f) (1976). 
239. 29 U.S.C. § 651(b) (1976). 
240. See Indus. Union Dep't v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 474-76 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
241. Am. Iron & Steel, Inst. v. OSHA, 577 F.2d 825, 833 (3d Cir. 1978). 
242. Indus. Union Dep't v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 474 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
243. As courts have recognized, however, there are many agencies other than OSHA, par-
ticularly in environmentally-related fields, that do perform tasks involving both fact resolution 
and legislative-like policy decisionmaking. See, e.g., Lead Ind. Ass'n v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130, 
1146 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Mobil Oil Corp. v. FPC, 483 F.2d 1238, 1257 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
244. Courts have been concerned with the threshold issue of whether, as a matter of 
statutory interpretation, Congress intended the substantial evidence test to apply at all to 
OSHA's policy determinations. Under the Act, substantial evidence is the standard for judicial 
review of the Secretary's "determinations." 29 U.S.C. § 655(f) (1976). The question has arisen 
whether the Secretary's policy decisions fall into this category, since the substantial evidence 
test was designed for application to factual determinations and is easiest to apply to them. 
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policy decisions are of necessity partially subjective, however, a 
court cannot review them solely on the basis of empirically verifiable 
facts as is usually the case under the substantial evidence test. 
Recognizing that the application of the substantial evidence test to 
OSHA's policy decisions is an "undertaking of different 
dimensions,"245 the courts understandably have grappled with for-
mulating standards for the test's application in such circumstances. 
Paralleling the development of the substantial evidence test in other 
areas of the law, reviewing courts have concluded that for OSHA's 
policy decisions to be upheld they must be deemed reasonable in light 
of all the evidence in the record.246 While the courts have articulated 
Most court have answered that the substantial evidence test was indeed intended by Congress 
to encompass the Secretary's policy decisions. Texas Indep. Ginners Ass'n v. Marshall, 630 
F.2d 398, 404 (5th Cir. 1980); AFL-CIO v. Marshall, 617 F.2d 636, 648 n.43 (D.C. Cir. 1979); 
Indus. Union Dep't v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 475 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Synthetic Organic Chern. 
Mfrs. Ass'n v. Brennan, 503 F.2d 1155, 1158-60 (3d Cir. 1974); Assoc. Ind. of N.Y. State v. 
United States Dep't of Labor, 487 F.2d 342, 348 (2d Cir. 1973); contra, Am. Iron & Steel Inst. 
v. OSHA, 577 F.2d 825, 831 (3d Cir. 1978). Although the American Iron court alone held that 
the substantial evidence test is applicable only to the Secretary's factual determinations, the 
court nonetheless agreed with the other circuit courts that the standard for review of OSHA's 
policy decisions would be a reasonableness under the record approach. 577 F.2d 825, 833-35. 
In Associated Industries, the court reasoned that the word "determination" is used 
throughout section 6 to include policy decisions, particularly in the promulgation of standards. 
For example, under section 6(b)(1), the first step in the promulgation of a standard is that the 
Secretary "determine" that the standard "should" be promulgated. These policy decisions, 
therefore, qualify as "determinations" which are to be reviewed under the substantial 
evidence test. 487 F.2d 342, 348 & n.5. Similarly, in Synthetic Organic, the court observed 
that 
[t]he last sentence of § 6(f) cannot be read in a vacuum .... [It) must be read together 
with the requirement in § 6(e) that the Secretary 'include a statement of the reasons 
for such action, which shall be published in the Federal Register.' He is not directed 
to file findings of fact. His reasons for action may include policy determinations as 
well as factual findings. The requirement that he state reasons strongly suggests that 
those reasons, whether policy judgments or factual findings, may be subjected to 
judicial review. 
503 F.2d 1155, 1159-60. 
245. Indus. Union Dep't v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 475 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
246. Courts in general have used the terms "reasonable" or "rational" to describe the 
standard to which an agency's policy decisions will be held under the substantial evidence test. 
See K. DAVIS, supra note 228, § 29.01-3; B. SCHWARTZ, Administrative Law § 211 (1976). As 
the Supreme Court stated: "[w)e inquire into the soundness of the reasoning by which the 
[agency) reaches its conclusions only to ascertain that the latter are rationally supported. 
United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Steel Corp., 406 U.S. 742, 749 (1972). 
Other courts have framed this same requirement in other words. See Greater Boston TV 
Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 852 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971) ("an agency 
changing its course must supply a reasoned analysis indicating that prior policies and stand-
ards are being deliberately changed, not casually ignored ... ") (emphasis added); EDF v. 
Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584, 598 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (court's role is to ensure that the agency has 
provided "a framework for principled decision-making"). 
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this standard in various manners, the standard usually has involved 
"scrutiny"247 of OSHA's decisions using a "reasonableness under 
the record" approach.248 As expressed in Industrial Union Depart-
247. Texas lndep. Ginners Ass'n v. Marshall, 630 F.2d 398, 404 (5th Cir. 1980); Am. 
Petroleum lnst. v. OSHA, 581 F.2d 493, 497 (5th Cir. 1978); Indus. Union Dep't v. Hodgson, 
499 F.2d 467, 476 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
248. AFL-CIO v. Marshall, 617 F.2d 636, 650 (D.C. Cir. 1979) ("[o]ur role ... is to ensure 
that the regulations resulted from a process of reasoned decisionmaking consistent with the 
agency's mandate from Congress"); Florida Peach Growers Ass'n v. United States Dep't of 
Labor, 489 F.2d 120, 129 (5th Cir. 1971). Similarly, the court in Am. Petroleum lnst. v. OSHA 
stated that OSHA's policy judgment must be related to the substantially supported factual 
premises in a fashion to ensure that "the Secretary carried out his essentially legislative task 
in a manner reasonable under the state of the record before him." 581 F.2d 493, 497 (5th Cir. 
1978). The standard adopted by the American Petroleum court involved a two-fold test of con-
sistency with statutory language and purpose, and reasonableness under the record. Id'. 
The American Petroleum and Florida Peach courts adopted the reasonableness standard as 
a ramification of the substantial evidence test. The court in Texas lndep. Ginners Ass'n v. Mar-
shall, 630 F.2d 398 (5th Cir. 1980), however, stated that while the substantial evidence test is 
clearly applicable to OSHA's policy decisions, the reasonableness requirement stems from the 
arbitrary and capricious test as set out in the APA. Id. at 404-05. This follows because the ar-
bitrary and capricious test applies to all agency rulemaking, whether formal or informal, 5 
U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), even when the substantial evidence test also applies, see infra note 252. 
The Texas Ginners opinion therefore illustrates that while judicial confusion may still exist 
concerning the differences between the substantial evidence test and the arbitrary and 
capricious test, ultimately the use of either test will result in a determination of 
reasonableness under the record. The Texas Ginners court ultimately adopted a three-step 
standard of review to determine the reasonableness of an agency's decision: 
(a) whether enough facts are available and have been investigated to render ra-
tional the making of a policy judgment; 
(b) whether the factual premises underlying that policy judgment are 'supported by 
substantial evidence,' although there may be other conflicting evidence, in the 
record considered as a whole; and 
(c) whether the policy judgment is reasonably related to those substantially sup-
ported factual premises so that 'the Secretary carried out his essentially 
legislative task in a manner reasonable under the state of the record.' 
630 F.2d at 405. 
Finally, the court in Synthetic Organic Chern. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Brennan, 503 F.2d 1155 (3d 
Cir. 1974), articulated a somewhat different version of the reasonableness standard by adopt-
ing a five-step standard of review: 
(1) determining whether the Secretary's notice of proposed rulemaking ade-
quately informed interested persons of the action taken; 
(2) determining whether the Secretary's promulgation adequately sets forth reasons 
for his action; 
(3) determining whether the statement of reasons reflects consideration of factors 
relevant under the statute; 
(4) determining whether presently available alternatives were at least considered; 
and 
(5) if the Secretary's determination is based in whole or in part on factual matters 
subject to evidentiary development, whether substantial evidence in the record as 
a whole supports the determination. 
503 F.2d at 1160. This five-step standard of review was adopted in Am. Iron & Steel lnst. v. 
OSHA, 577 F.2d 825, 830-31 (3d Cir. 1978). 
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ment, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, the court's ultimate role is "to see 
whether the agency, given an essentially legislative task to perform, 
has carried it out in a manner calculated to negate the dangers of ar-
bitrariness and irrationality."249 
b. Informal Rulemaking Procedures 
In addition to the inherent difficulty in applying the substantial 
evidence test to OSHA's determinations because of their policy 
nature, courts have encountered two other basic problems in apply-
ing the test. The first problem involves the nature of OSHA's 
rulemaking procedures. In the Administrative Procedure Act (AP A), 
which governs judicial review of most agency decisionmaking, Con-
gress formulated the substantial evidence test as the standard of 
review only for agency decisions that have resulted from formal, 
adversarial hearings that have generated a full record.250 For agency 
findings resulting from informal procedures, such as OSHA's notice 
and comment rulemaking,251 Congress through the AP A mandated a 
different standard of judicial review: such a finding will be upheld 
unless it is found "arbitrary or capricious."252 Rulemaking under 
OSHA, however, is not governed by the AP A. Instead, the pro-
cedures OSHA must follow are contained in the Act itself. The perti-
249. 499 F.2d 467 (quoting Auto. Parts & Accessories Ass'n v. Boyd, 407 F.2d 330, 338 
(D.C. Cir. 1968». 
250. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (1976). See Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 141 (1973). A formal hear-
ing includes "the right to submit rebuttal evidence, and to conduct such cross-examination as 
may be required for a full and true disclosure of the facts." Wirtz v. Baldor Elec. Co., 337 F.2d 
518, 527 (D.C. Cir. 1964). Thus, a factually complete record will be generated. In contrast, the 
record from an informal proceeding "generally is a compendium of letters, studies, reports 
and statements, untested by the adversary process. Reflecting the legislative nature of infor-
mal rulemaking, the record often does not even display the full range of considerations before 
the agency when the decision was made." AFL-CIO v. Marshall, 617 F.2d 636,649 n.49 (D.C. 
Cir. 1979). It "ordinarily will contain more generalized than specific information, may not con-
tain information tested by cross-examination and will frequently contain much conclusory in-
formation based on data gathered by the interested parties." City of Chicago v. FPC, 458 F.2d 
731, 744 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1074 (1972). The City ojChicago court noted 
that "[t]he final report of the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure in-
dicated that judicial review should take into account the nature of the evidence that it was 
practical to obtain on the issue under consideration." Id. at 744 n.62 (citing Administrative 
Procedure in Government Agencies, S. Doc. No.8, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 119 (1941». "In large 
part, however, the procedural requirements which relevant statutes impose as a precedent to 
agency action reflect these practicalities." 458 F.2d 731, 745 n.62. 
251. See supra note 31 (describing OSHA's notice and comment rulemaking procedure). 
252. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1976). Under this test, the court may strike down an agency find-
ing only if it is "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance 
with law." Id. An agency finding must meet the arbitrary or capricious standard, along with 
other criteria of legality and constitutionality, even where the substantial evidence test ap-
plies. AFL-CIO v. Marshall, 617 F.2d 636,649 n.45 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
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nent provisions of the Act deviate from the normal AP A procedure 
by setting up a somewhat anomalous hybrid system which forces the 
courts to apply a formal standard of review, the substantial evidence 
test, to an informal rulemaking procedure.263 The record generated 
from this informal procedure has not been tested by the adversarial 
process and, in OSHA's case, is often massive and unwieldy. Courts, 
therefore, have been troubled by the task of basing a meaningful 
substantial evidence review on this type of record, which is not easily 
suited to close judicial scrutiny. 264 
c. Scientific Uncertainty 
A final problem courts face in applying the substantial evidence 
test to OSHA's policy decisions is that the scientific community is 
253. The disagreement over how the substantial evidence and arbitrary or capricious tests 
differ, if at all, therefore has real applicability to OSHA. Courts reviewing OSHA's standards 
have held that the substantial evidence test does provide for more rigorous judicial scrutiny 
than the arbitrary and capricious test. AFL-CIO v. Marshall, 617 F.2d 636, 649 (D.C. Cir. 
1979); Texas Indep. Ginners Ass'n v. Marshall, 630 F.2d 398, 405 n.24 (5th Cir. 1980); The 
AFL-CIO court, however, noted that whiIe Congress expressly required this more rigorous 
standard of review, it nevertheless delegated to OSHA "unusually broad discretionary 
authority to regulate against possible harms." 617 F.2d 636, 649. As pointed out by Professor 
Davis, Judge Friendly in Assoc. Ind. of N.Y. v. United States Dep't of Labor, 487 F.2d 342 (2d 
Cir. 1973) took a different view, finding that the two standards are basically the same, 
although one cannot be sure. K. DAVIS, supra note 228, at 650. Judge Friendly observed that 
"[w)hile we still have a feeling that there may be cases where an adjudicative determina-
tion not supported by substantial evidence . . . would not be regarded as arbitrary or 
capricious, ... in the review of rules of general applicability made after notice and comment 
rule making, the two criteria do tend to converge." 481 F.2d 342, 350. Finally, the Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Act is not the only statute in which Congress has used the substantial 
evidence test for judicial review of informal agency rulemaking. Other statutes which provide 
for this system include the Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2618(cX1XBXi) (1976), 
the Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act of 1974, 15 U.S.C. § 57a (eX3XA) (1976), and 
the Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2060(c) (1976). 
254. See, e.g., AFL-CIO v. Marshall, 617 F.2d 636, 649 n.49, (D.C. Cir. 1979); Fla. Peach 
Growers Ass'n v. United States Dep't of Labor, 489 F.2d 120, 129 (5th Cir. 1974). The defi-
ciencies of an informal record when subjected to the substantial evidence standard of review 
were highlighted by the court in Mobil Oil Corp. v. FPC, 483 F.2d 1238 (D.C. Cir. 1973), as 
follows: 
Informal comments simply cannot create a record that satisfies the substantial 
evidence test. Even if controverting information is submitted in the form of com-
ments by adverse parties, the procedure employed cannot be relied upon as adequate. 
A 'whole record,' as that phrase is used in this context, does not consist merely of the 
raw data introduced by the parties. It includes the process of testing and illumination 
ordinarily associated with adversary, adjudicative procedures. Without this critical 
element, informal comments, even by adverse parties, are two halves that do not 
make a whole. 
483 F.2d at 1260 (emphasis in original). 
Despite the anomaly of the Act's hybrid system, the legislative history makes clear that Con-
gress deliberately adopted it through a legislative compromise. House conferees acceded to 
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uncertain as to the specific risks associated with many workplace 
health hazards. For example, much scientific disagreement still ex-
ists over whether exposure to certain chemicals at various levels 
causes cancer. This uncertainty creates the problem of forcing 
OSHA to base its policy inferences on facts which are in themselves 
highly uncertain and debatable.266 
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia faced this dif-
ficulty in Industrial Union Department v. Hodgson,266 a labor 
challenge to OSHA's standard for asbestos dust. The Hodgson court 
noted that, although OSHA was obliged to make a policy decision 
concerning a safe exposure level for asbestos dust, sufficient data 
was not yet available delineating the precise health effects at various 
levels of exposure to this hazard. 267 In such a case, the court noted 
that OSHA must regulate hazards "on the frontiers of scientific 
knowledge."268 The court observed that in such instances the agen-
cy's findings cannot be based solely on empirically verifiable facts 
and, therefore, are not subject to the same type of verification by 
reference to the record as are certain factual questions.269 The court 
the Senate's desire for administrative convenience and flexibility by accepting the informal 
rulemaking procedure, but nevertheless inserted the substantial evidence test to protect 
employers from the burdens of a massive federal bureaucracy. See S. REP. No. 1282, supra 
note 26, U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS at 5232. See also Fla. Peach Growers Ass'n V. United 
States Dep't of Labor, 489 F.2d 120, 127-29 (5th Cir. 1974). McGarity, supra note 199, notes 
that while a legislative compromise is the most plausible explanation, the argument is under-
cut by one statement by the House managers revealing the apparent opinion that the "ar-
bitrary and capricious" test is more stringent than the "substantial evidence" test. Id. at 792 
n.327. See also Assoc. Ind. of N.Y. V. United States Dep't of Labor, 487 F.2d 342, 348-49 (2d 
Cir. 1973). The Associated Industries court, however, found ample other evidence to support 
the conclusion that the substantial evidence standard was adopted as part of a legislative com-
promise. Id. at 349. 
The hybrid procedure adopted by Congress irked Judge McGowan, author of the opinion in 
Indus. Union Dep't V. Hodgson, who felt that the "new form of uneasy partnership" between 
agency and court, created by the delegation of legislative power to the agency, was only ex-
acerbated by such an illogical procedure. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 469. Judge McGowan stated 
that this "posed serious problems for a reviewing court," id., but that the duty remained "to 
decide the case before us in accordance with our statutory mandate, however dimly the ra-
tionale, if any, underlying it can be perceived." Id. at 470. 
255. See, e.g., Indus. Union Dep't V. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 474-75 (D.C. Cir. 1974); 
Regulating Toxic Substances, supra note 49, at 132-34. 
256. 499 F.2d 467 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
257. Id. at 475. 
258. Id. at 474. 
259. Id. at 475. The Hodgson court then defined the court's role in this situation: 
What we are entitled to at all events is a careful identification by the Secretary, when 
his proposed standards are challenged, of the reasons why he chooses to follow one 
course rather than another. Where that choice purports to be based on the existence 
of certain determinable facts, the Secretary must, in form as well as substance, find 
those facts from evidence in the record. By the same token, when the Secretary is 
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reasoned that nevertheless, Congress did not intend OSHA to have 
its hands tied while awaiting more precise scientific data. For that 
reason, the court concluded, Congress inserted in section 6(b)(5) the 
provision that the Secretary shall set standards on the basis of the 
"best available evidence."26o 
Because of the range of problems involved in applying the substan-
tial evidence test to OSHA's policy decisions, reviewing courts have 
described this task as anywhere from an "intriguing problem"261 to 
obliged to make policy judgments where no factual certainties exist or where facts 
alone do not provide the answer, he should so state and go on to identify the con-
siderations he found persuasive. 
[d. at 475-76. This statement was adopted in T.exas lndep. Ginners Ass'n v. Marshall, 630 F.2d 
398, 405 n.26 (5th Cir. 1980); AFL-CIO v. Marshall, 617 F.2d 636, 649 n.48 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
Accord, Synthetic Organic Chern. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Brennan, 503 F.2d 1155, 1157 (3d Cir. 1974); 
Assoc. Ind. of N.Y. v. United States Dep't of Labor, 487 F.2d 342, 353 (2d Cir. 1974). The 
Texas Ginners court noted that Congress recognized these inherent problems by including sec-
tion 6(e), 29 U.S.C. § 655(e), which requires the Secretary to state the reasons for prom-
ulgating any standard. 630 F.2d 398, 405 n.26. 
In noting the technically complex nature of OSHA's rulemaking proceedings, the Marshall 
court relied on a statement in Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 426 
U.S. 941 (1976), that: 
[w)here a statute is precautionary in nature, the evidence difficult to come by, uncer-
tain, or conflicting because it is on the frontiers of scientific knowledge, the regula-
tions designed to protect the public health, and the decision that of an expert ad-
ministrator, we will not demand rigorous step-by-step proof of cause and effect. Such 
proof may be impossible to obtain if the precautionary purpose of the statute is to be 
served .... The Administrator may apply his expertise to draw conclusion from 
suspected, but not completely substantiated, relationships between facts, from trends 
among facts ... from probative preliminary data not yet certifiable as 'fact,' and the 
like. 
[d. at 28, cited in AFL-CIO v. Marshall, 617 F.2d 636, 651 n.64. 
The Marshall court also noted that when applying the substantial evidence test to a 
numerical standard, the court considers "whether the agency's numbers are within a 'zone of 
reasonableness,' not whether its numbers are precisely right." AFL-CIO v. Marshall, 617 F .2d 
636, 651 n.66, (quoting Hercules, Inc. v. EPA, 598 F.2d 91, 107 (D.C. Cir. 1978». Finally, 
Judge Bazelon has explained that where agency decisions are technically complex, the judicial 
role is to "scrutinize and monitor the decisionmaking process to make sure that it is thorough, 
complete and rational; that all relevant information has been considered; and that insofar as 
possible, those who will be affected by a decision have had an opportunity to participate in it." 
Bazelon, Coping with Technology Through the Legal Process, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 817, 823 
(1977). 
260. 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (1976). See AFL-CIO v. Marshall, 617 F.2d 636, 651 (D.C. Cir. 
1979) ("[OSHA) may have to fill gaps in knowledge with policy considerations. Congress 
recognized this problem by authorizing the agency to promulgate rules on the basis of the 'best 
available evidence' "). The court noted that "[OSHA's) mandate requires it to protect workers' 
health even before the resolution of all medical and scientific uncertainties about the particular 
health risk." [d. at 654 (citing H.R. REP. No. 1291, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1970) (OSHA not to 
be "paralyzed" by debate». See also Soc. of Plastics Ind. v. OSHA, 509 F.2d 1301, 1308 (2d 
Cir. 1975). 
261. Synthetic Organic Chern. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Brennan, 503 F.2d 1155, 1158 (3d Cir. 1974). 
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almost an impossibility.262 Despite these problems, however, the 
courts have uniformly applied the substantial evidence test.263 If the 
decision is found to be reasonable in light of all of the evidence in the 
record, the courts will uphold the agency's choice. The courts' actual 
application of this standard, however, has often resulted in the im-
position of cost-benefit analysis as a decisionmaking criterion, 
regardless of the actual standards by which the agency decision was 
made. The discussion now turns to an examination of particular 
cases that illustrate this point. 
C. Substantial Evidence Review: Judicial Recognition That Cost-
Benefit Analysis is Inherent in Rational Agency Decisionmaking 
1. Introduction 
The following sections illustrate the manner in which reviewing 
courts have required agency policy decisions to be based on in-
tegrative cost-benefit analyses in order to be upheld on the basis of 
substantial evidence. The examination focuses first on cases of 
general agency policymaking involving agencies other than OSHA 
that are charged with determining either what is "essential" or 
"reasonable" with respect to the public interest. The discussion then 
turns to the OSHA cases decided in the circuit courts before the 
Supreme Court issued its initial decision construing the Occupational 
Safety and Health Act in Industrial Union. 
It should be noted that, unlike monetized cost-benefit analysis, in-
tegrative cost-benefit analysis appears to be flexible with respect to 
the weight given to the various factors used in the analysis. This flex-
ibility appears to be an advantage of integrative cost-benefit 
analysis. As described below, courts that have required integrative 
cost-benefit analyses have looked to the agency's enabling statute to 
determine how to weigh the various factors involved. For example, 
due to Congress' expressed intent to make worker health and safety 
the paramount concern under the Occupational Safety and Health 
Act, actual financial costs of OSHA's standards should be given 
some, but only very little, weight in applying the substantial 
evidence test. In a contrasting example, where a court must decide 
whether transportation rates set by an agency are "just and 
reasonable" with respect to certain segments of the public, financial 
costs should be weighed much more heavily under the substantial 
262. Soc. of Plastics Indus. v. OSHA, 509 F.2d 1301, 1304 (2d Cir. 1975). 
263. See supra note 244. 
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evidence test. Thus, integrative cost-benefit analysis enables the 
agency and the courts to effectuate more closely the congressional 
purpose behind a statute. 
2. The Use of Integrative Cost-Benefit Analysis 
in General Agency Decisionmaking 
A sampling of cases involving judicial review of agency rulings in 
the context of general agency decisionmaking indicates that courts 
have required and will continue to require agency policy decisions to 
be informed by the use of integrative cost-benefit analyses. The 
three cases described below are presented as representative of any 
of a number of cases that have imposed such a requirement. In 
analyzing these decisions, it is useful to note that, while in some 
cases the court itself has performed the cost-benefit value judgment, 
in others the court has remanded the case to the agency for such an 
analysis. 
In Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Federal Maritime Com-
mission,264 the cost-benefit issue involved a Federal Maritime Com-
mission determination of just and reasonable rates under the Ship-
ping Act of 1916.265 This issue arose out of a somewhat complicated 
fact pattern. The Pacific Maritime Association (PMA), a nonprofit 
corporation of common and contract carriers, ocean terminal 
operators, and stevedore contractors, was created for the purpose of 
negotiating and administering contracts with labor unions on behalf 
of its members.266 In 1957, PMA desired to introduce greater 
mechanization into the shipping industry, but feared that this would 
cause strikes or slowdowns by longshoremen during the transforma-
tion period.267 As a result of negotiations with the Longshoremen's 
Union, PMA set up a fund to assure the Union that its workers would 
share in the financial benefits of the new work-saving devices. The 
fund, to be collected from PMA's members over a six-year period, 
was to be used to cushion the effects of automation upon the dis-
placed longshoremen.268 Apparently PMA's members tacitly agreed 
to pass on the cost of the assessment to the carriers and shippers 
who used the members' services.269 
264. 371 F.2d 747 (D.C. Cir. 1966), rev'd, 390 u.s. 261 (1968). 
265. 46 U.S.C. § 815 (1961). 
266. 390 u.s 281, 263 (1968). 
267. 371 F.2d 747, 749. 
268. Id. 
269. Id. at 756. 
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PMA decided to assess its members on the basis of tonnage carried 
or handled.270 There were two possible bases upon which to calculate 
tonnage - by weight, or by measurement.271 Whether a tonnage 
declaration was to be by either weight or measurement depended on 
how that particular cargo was customarily manifested.272 There was 
no customary manifesting method, however, in the auto industry; 
PMA, therefore, decided to assess that industry on the basis of 
measurement only, regardless of which way a particular automobile 
cargo was actually manifested.273 
This system worked to the great disadvantage of Volkswagen. On 
a measurement basis, Volkswagen's cargo calculated out to almost 
ten times the tonnage, and, therefore, ten times the cost, that it 
would have constituted on a weight basis.274 Volkswagen claimed 
that this was a discriminatory burden275 and the company therefore 
refused to pay Marine Terminal Corporation, its contractual ocean 
terminal operator and PMA member, which was to collect the 
charges from Volkswagen and pass them on to the PMA fund. 
Specifically, Volkswagen claimed that the assessment was an "un-
just and unreasonable" practice in violation of section 17 of the Ship-
ping Act of 1916.276 After a hearing requested by Volkswagen, the 
Federal Maritime Commission upheld the assessment as within the 
bounds of the Act.277 The Commission determined that Volkswagen 
would be accruing substantial benefits from the system of greater 
mechanization; therefore, the assessment method was not an unjust 
or unreasonable practice.278 In the Commission's view, the benefits 
270. [d. at 749. 
271. [d. PMA assessed tonnage at 2000 pounds per ton by weight, and at 40 cubic feet per 
ton by measurement. [d. 
272. [d. at 750. "Manifesting" refers to how the cargo is invoiced or otherwise listed. 
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1375 (Unabridged ed. 1976). 
273. 371 F.2d 747, 750. 
274. [d. A Volkswagen automobile equalled 8.7 tons by measurement, which would cost the 
company $2.35 per vehicle; in contrast, each automobile equalled 0.9 tons by weight, which 
would cost the company $0.25 per vehicle. 
275. [d. 
276. 46 U.S.C. § 816 (1976), which reads: 
[d. 
Every such carrier and every other person subject to this chapter shall establish, 
observe and enforce just and reasonable regulations and practices relating to or con· 
nected with the receiving, handling, storing, or delivering of property. Whenever the 
Commission finds that any such regulation or practice is unjust or unreasonable it 
may determine, prescribe, and order enforced just and reasonable regulations or 
practices. 
277. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Marine Terminals Corp., 9 F.M.C. 77 (1965). 
278. [d. at 82·84. 
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and burdens to Volkswagen need not have been directly related.279 
The Commission's ruling that the assessment was reasonable was 
upheld on appeal as supported by substantial evidence in the 
record.280 
On writ of certiorari, a majority of the Supreme Court reversed 
the lower court's decision.281 The Court found that the proper deter-
mination of just and reasonable rates under section 17 required a 
cost-benefit analysis to determine whether the correlation of the 
benefits to the charges imposed was reasonable.282 A construction of 
the phrase "just and reasonable rates" as requiring an inquiry only 
into whether the petitioner received substantial benefits was, in the 
Court's view, a "tortured" interpretation of the statute.283 The 
Court noted that a relatively -large charge in relation to the 
company's overall costs was being imposed on Volkswagen.284 Fur-
thermore, the benefits that Volkswagen was to receive were 
relatively small compared to those to be received by other shippers. 
Because the unloading of autos was already highly mechanized, the 
auto shippers stood to gain from the funding agreement only the 
benefits of a stable labor situation.285 Noting these sizable inequities 
in Volkswagen's position, the Court remanded the case with a direc-
tion that a determination of just and reasonable rates required a 
finding, "in a word, [of] whether the charge levied is reasonably 
related to the service rendered."286 The Court's rejection of the 
substantial benefits construction and substitution of a cost-benefit 
justification parallels the development of substantial evidence review 
in the courts from requiring merely some justification in the 
evidence to requiring a weighing of both the positive and negative 
evidence.287 
Furthermore, it does not appear that the Court contemplated the 
use of a monetized cost-benefit analysis on remand; rather, the Court 
held that the Commission need only find a reasonable relation of 
costs and benefits, or, in other words, employ an integrative form of 
cost-benefit analysis. It· should be noted, however, that in 
Volkswagenwerk, the public policy interests were of an economic 
279. Id. at 84. 
280. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Fed. Maritime Comm'n, 371 F.2d 747 (1966). 
281. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Fed. Maritime Comm'n, 390 U.S. 261 (1968). 
282. Id. at 282. 
283. Id. 
284. Id. at 281. 
285. Id. at 281, 266 n.8. 
286. Id. at 282. 
287. See supra text and notes at notes 226·37. 
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nature. Presumably an integrative cost-benefit analysis in this situa-
tion will consider the financial costs of the regulation as a relatively 
important factor. Volkswagenwerk is to be contrasted with cases 
reviewing policy issues where, as with OSHA, health or other per-
sonal interests are at stake. In those cases, the financial costs of 
regulations may be given very little value by courts or agencies in 
their examination of integrative cost-benefit analyses under the 
substantial evidence test. The integrative type of cost-benefit 
analysis, then, provides an agency or court with the flexibility 
necessary to tune its analysis to conform with statutorily expressed 
policies. 
Another case which illustrates judicial use of a nonmonetized cost-
benefit analysis to review an agency's decision that an action is 
reasonable is Dodson v. National Transportation Safety Board. 288 In 
Dodson, the Federal Aviation Authority denied an air medical cer-
tificate to a prospective pilot because of the applicant's heart condi-
tion. The FAA has discretion to limit the issuance of air medical cer-
tificates to the extent necessary to "assure safety" in air 
commerce.289 The district court, in applying the substantial evidence 
test to review the FAA's decision, invoked the tort law concept of 
unreasonable risk to signal a generalized cost-benefit balancing. The 
court held that the plaintiff was subject to an unreasonable risk of 
heart attack and, therefore, presented a substantial risk to air safe-
ty.290 The FAA's decision to deny the certificate was subsequently 
upheld by the court as supported by substantial evidence.291 
The Dodson court's decision entailed the tacit use of a cost-benefit 
analysis. The court reasoned that, given the large probability that 
the applicant would suffer a heart attack, the overall weighing of 
costs and benefits militated against the issuance of a license. In Dod-
son, no quantification of costs or benefits was either required or 
possible; the ultimate decision of the FAA rested on its own subjec-
tive judgment. The import of Dodson lies in its example of a review-
ing court relying on a cost-benefit standard, through the vehicle of 
288. 644 F.2d 647 (7th Cir. 1981). 
289. The Federal Aviation Act provides that the Administrator of the FAA shall issue a cer-
tificate after determining that the applicant is properly qualified and physically fit, with such 
limitations as are necessary to assure safety in air commerce. 49 U.S.C. § 1422(b) (1976). 
290. 644 F.2d 647, 650. 
291. Experts for both sides had agreed that the petitioner was subject to an increased 
likelihood of heart attack due to partially blocked arteries. The court found that this was 
enough to show an unreasonable risk of heart attack and, therefore, to support the lower 
court's finding by substantial evidence. [d. 
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unreasonable risk, as a criterion for reviewing an agency's decision 
under the substantial evidence test. 
Finally, International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus292 provides a 
further illustration of this concept. In International Harvester, the 
Ford, General Motors, and Chrysler Corporations sought review of 
an Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) order denying their 
petitions for one-year suspensions of the 1975 deadline for auto emis-
sions standards set by the Clean Air Act. The EPA was empowered 
under the Clean Air Act to grant a suspension if the agency deter-
mined that it was "essential to the public interest or the public health 
and welfare of the United States."293 The automakers, in seeking a 
suspension, had claimed that presently existing technology was not 
capable of meeting emissions standards by the mandated compliance 
date.294 The EPA Administrator had found that the automakers' 
evidence did not establish such technological infeasibility295 and, con-
sequently, had denied the automakers' applications.296 
On review, the court of appeals explained that its task was to 
determine whether the EPA Administrator's conclusion rested on a 
"reasoned basis."297 The court did not elaborate on the standard of 
review it was applying, and the case appears technically to have been 
decided under the arbitrary and capricious standard rather than the 
substantial evidence standard. Although this section deals with the 
application of the substantial evidence test, a description of the In-
ternational Harvester case is pertinent here for several reasons. 
First, as described below, it is an excellent example of a judicially 
recognized requirement of cost-benefit analysis. In addition, this 
case illustrates that in the area of agency policy decisions, the con-
cept of a cost-benefit requirement is pervasive regardless of the label 
given to the standard of review. Indeed, as some commentators have 
observed, the substantial evidence and arbitrary and capricious 
standards tend to merge towards virtual identity in these types of 
cases.298 The International Harvester case, moreover, closely 
resembles a substantial evidence case because of its employment of 
what has become known as hybrid rulemaking, in which a court will 
order a greater development of the record than ordinarily required 
292. 478 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
293. 4 U.S.C. § 1857f-l (b)(5)(c) (1976). 
294. 478 F.2d 615,624-25. 
295. [d. at 626. 
296. [d. at 622. 
297. [d. at 627. 
298. See supra note 253. 
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in order to facilitate its reviewing task. Because the court focused on 
the reasoned basis of the Administrator's decision keyed to all rele-
vant evidence in the record, this case illustrates the pervasiveness of 
judicially imposed cost-benefit analyses regardless of the technical 
label applied to the standard of review. 
On the merits, the court held that both the Administrator's deci-
sion and the court's own review of the reasonableness of that deci-
sion must be based on an integrative cost-benefit analysis. The court 
stated: 
This case inevitably presents, to the court as to the Ad-
ministrator, the need for a perspective on the suspension that is 
informed by an analysis which balances the costs of a 'wrong 
decision' on feasibility against the gains of a correct one. These 
costs include the risks of grave maladjustments for the 
technological leader from the eleventh-hour grant of a suspen-
sion, and the impact on jobs and the economy from a decision 
which is only partially accurate, allowing companies to produce 
cars but at a significantly reduced level of output. Against this 
must be weighed the environmental savings from denial of 
suspension.299 
Thus, the court brought into the analysis a broad range of economic, 
environmental, and social costs and benefits. 
In reviewing the EPA determination, the court focused its atten-
tion on the issue of technological feasibility - a crucial factor in the 
EPA decision. Recognizing that the EPA prediction of technological 
feasibility was highly uncertain, the court first performed its own 
cost-benefit analysis based on the assumption that the EPA predic-
tion was wrong.300 In the court's opinion, if compliance were riot 
feasible, then the costs of denying the suspension would far outweigh 
the benefits. That is, the court found that the economic costs to socie-
ty in terms of the stability of the auto industry could be "grave."301 
On the other hand, the court found that the environmental benefits 
to society of denying the suspension were likely to be small.302 As a 
299. 478 F.2d 615, 641 (emphasis added). 
300. Id. at 633, 637-41. 
301. Id. at 633. 
302. Id. at 633-36. The court was also concerned that a denial of the suspension would ac-
tually cause a net increase in automobile pollution. A National Academy of Sciences report had 
indicated several performance costs for automobiles employing pollution control devices raised 
the pr:.ice of new cars. The court theorized that consumers might respond by delaying the pur-
chase of new cars, thereby prolonging their use of older cars with less efficient pollution con-
trol devices. The resulting mix of cars in use would cause a net increase in emissions. I d. at 634 
(citing COMM. ON MOTOR VEHICLE EMISSIONS, NAT'L ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, SEMI-ANNUAL 
REPORT TO THE ENVT'L PROTECTION AGENCY, January 1, 1972, at 29). 
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result, the net costs303 of this scenario appeared to the court to be 
quite high. 
Next, the court proceeded from the assumption that the EPA 
prediction of technological feasibility was a correct one. It recog-
nized that this would lead to a more uncertain cost-benefit choice, 
because the economic costs to society of denying the suspension 
would no longer be large. Those costs would not so clearly outweigh 
or be outweighed by the modest health benefits. Considering both 
these scenarios, the court then balanced the net costs to society of a 
wrong prediction by the EPA against the net benefits of a correct 
prediction.804 On balance, the court apparently found that the costs 
of a wrong prediction on technological feasibility outweighed the 
benefits of a correct one. Considering this together with a perceived 
signal in the statute to err on the side of delaying the compliance 
date,805 the court decided not to uphold the EPA denial of the 
suspension. 
The automaker's request to grant the suspension, however, was 
also denied by the International Harvester court. Instead, the court 
remanded the case to the agency for the statutorily required deter-
mination regarding the public interest and good faith.806 The court 
first directed the EPA to improve the record by considering new 
technical data the agency had gathered subsequent to its decision 
and by allowing parties the opportunity for cross-examination on this 
new matter.807 Thereafter, the court expected the EPA to make the 
required public interest and good faith determinations by relying on 
a cost-benefit analysis. 
The type of cost-benefit analysis required by the court in Interna-
tional Harvester was not a formal, monetized cost-benefit analysis; 
instead, the court employed one of an integrative nature, taking the 
full range of monetizable and nonmonetizable costs and benefits into 
account. In addition to environmental or ecological costs, the court 
found that even "the symholic compromise with the goal of a clean 
environment" was a real cost of granting a suspension and must be 
accounted for in the agency's decision. 80S International Harvester, 
therefore, is a good example of judicial recognition that an agency's 
303. The term "net costs" refers to total costs minus total benefits. 
304. 478 F.2d 615, 641. See McGarity, supra note 199, at 799 n.377 (arguing that this is a 
decision for the legislature to make). 
305. 478 F.2d 615, 648-49. 
306. [d. at 650. 
307. [d. at 649. 
308. 478 F.2d 615, 641. 
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decision may be upheld as "reasoned" under all the evidence only if 
it is based on an integrative weighing of all social, economic, and en-
vironmental costs. 
These cases serve to illustrate that through the substantial 
evidence test courts have required cost-benefit analyses in the con-
text of several different types of agency policy decisions as an in-
herent part of the decisionmaking process. The weight to be given to 
various factors in the balancing process, however, presumably must 
be determined by reference to the congressional objectives ex-
pressed in the relevant agency's enabling statute. 309 Importantly, 
this form of cost-benefit analysis has been imposed regardless of the 
lack of an express congressional mandate to use such a criterion. The 
discussion now turns to a sampling of cases reviewing OSHA stand-
ards to illustrate this concept in the context of OSHA rulemaking. 
309. The concept of courts requiring agencies to perform broad, integrative cost-benefit 
analyses, with determination of weights for the various factors to be made by reference to the 
enabling statutes, is a well-established one. It is illustrated particularly well in cases involving 
statutes that expressly require the protection of both economic and environmental interests. 
For example, Scenic Hudson Preservation Conf. V. FPC, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), is a case 
involving express judicial direction to an agency to balance economic costs against en-
vironmental interests. In Scenic Hudson, Consolidated Edison Company desired to build a 
pumped storage hydroelectric facility on the Hudson River north of New York City. Section 
10(a) of the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 803(a) (1976), required that a license for the 
project be granted only to a project that, in the Federal Power Commission's judgment, "will 
be best adapted to a plan for improving or developing a waterway ... for the use or benefit of 
interstate or foreign commerce, for the improvement and utilization of water-power develop-
ment, and for other beneficial public uses, including recreational purposes." [d. The phrase 
"recreational purposes" had been held to encompass the conservation of natural resources and 
the maintenance of natural beauty. Namekagon Hydro. CO. V. FPC, 216 F.2d 509, 511-12 (7th 
Cir. 1954). The statute thus expressly required the Commission to consider economic interests 
and nonmonetizable environmental interests. The Scenic Hudson court found that the Com-
mission's duty was to weigh each factor properly. 354 F.2d 608, 614. A proper weighing 
necessitated a consideration of all benefits, costs, and alternatives. [d. at 620. In granting the 
license, however, the Commission had ignored an alternative plan for providing extra power 
by constructing gas turbines in New York City. The gas turbine plan obviated the need for the 
hydroelectric project; therefore, environmental harm, involving degradation of scenery from 
the use of above-ground transmission lines, and injury to fish, would be eliminated. In addition, 
from an economic standpoint, the plan seemed to be equal to or better than the hydroelectric 
project. The court held that the Commission had a duty to examine the costs and benefits of 
this plan against those of the hydroelectric project. 354 F.2d at 622-25. In addition, given the 
economic efficiency of the hydroelectric plant itself, the court found that the Commission at 
least should have considered incurring the extra expense of using underground transmission 
lines. "We find no indication that the Commission seriously weighed the aesthetic advantages 
of underground transmission lines against the economic disadvantages." [d. at 623 (emphasis 
added). ffitimately, the case was remanded by the court with the admonition that the Commis-
sion keep "in mind that, in our affluent society, the [economic] cost of a project is only one of 
several factors to be considered." [d. at 624. 
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3. Substantial Evidence Review of OSHA Cases: The Requirement 
of Cost-Benefit Analysis 
In Associated Industries of New York State, Inc. v. United States 
Dept. of Labor, 310 the OSHA standard under review had established 
a minimum number of lavatories for industrial buildings which was 
in excess of the number required by New York as well as all other 
state health codes.311 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in 
Associated Industries struck down the section 6(b) standard as un-
supported by substantial evidence.312 Specifically, the court found 
that the industry's opposition to the standard was substantially 
justified by the standard's large financial costs313 and that OSHA 
had presented no evidence justifying such large costS.314 Where 
OSHA proposed a standard more stringent than that required by 
any state, the court assumed that OSHA must justify the large costs 
imposed by the standard by comparing them to the benefits the 
standard would provide. 
A logical inference from the Associated Industries holding is that, 
to survive review under the substantial evidence test, an OSHA 
standard must be based on a broad cost-benefit balancing that in-
cludes financial costs as one relevant factor. While the court did not 
expressly articulate its imposition of integrative cost-benefit 
analysis, this conclusion is inevitable from the decision. The court, in 
fact, apparently did not view the requirement of cost-benefit analysis 
as a radical one; to the contrary, the court seemed to find this re-
quirement to be implicit in a substantial evidence review. 
The degree of cost-benefit justification that the Associated In-
dustries court would have required, however, is not clear from the 
opinion. The court held only that the government had "the burden of 
offering some reasoned explanation"315 and, therefore, struck down 
the standard because the government had failed to provide any 
evidence at all to justify the standard's stringent requirements.316 
One might speculate that, given the paramount concern for worker 
health expressed in the Act, OSHA need only have shown a minimal 
justification for the standard's stringency to enable the standard to 
withstand substantial evidence review. Regardless of the cost-
310. 487 F.2d 342 (2d Cir. 1973). 
311. [d. at 351. 
312. [d. at 354. 
313. [d. 
314. [d. at 352-53. 
315. [d. at 354 (emphasis in original). 
316. [d. at 352-53. 
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benefit justification that would have satisfied the court had that 
question been reached, however, the significance of Associated In-
dustries lies in the court's invalidation of an OSHA standard under 
the substantial evidence test on the basis of a comparison between its 
health benefits and the large financial costs it imposed on an in-
dustry. 
United Parcel Service ojOhio v. OSHRC517 (UPS) is a further ex-
ample of a court implicitly relying on an integrative cost-benefit 
analysis to review the reasonableness of an OSHA determination. In 
UPS, the company sought review of an Occupational Safety and 
Health Review Commission518 order charging a violation of an 
OSHA general safety standard for protective footwear. 519 The 
standard, promulgated under section 6(b), required employers to 
adopt the use of protective equipment wherever occupational 
hazards were reasonably foreseeable. 520 
The Review Commission Order had cited the petitioner for not re-
quiring steel-toed safety shoes for its package handlers, effectively 
ordering all package handlers to be provided with safety shoes at the 
employer's expense.521 The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit 
reversed the Commission, holding that it was unreasonable and an 
abuse of discretion to impose such a requirement.522 The court based 
its holding on a broad consideration of the relevant costs and 
benefits, as it stated: 
[I]n view of the nature of petitioner's business, the small sizes of 
the vast majority of parcels handled, the extremely low in-
cidence of injuries resulting from falling parcels, and the high 
rate of turnover among the affected employees, we think it 
unreasonable and an abuse of discretion to require that all of the 
317. 570 F.2d 806 (8th Cir. 1978). 
318. Congress established the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission 
(OSHRC) under section 12 of the Act as an independent three-member body outside the Labor 
Department to which both employers and employees could appeal the decisions of OSHA. See 
29 U.S.C. § 661 (1976). 
319. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.132(a) (1981). 
320. The standard called for employers to adopt the use of protective gear wherever re-
quired by the "hazards of processes or environment." Id. Courts have interpreted this phrase 
to mean that employers must provide the gear where workplace hazards are reasonably 
foreseeable. See Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc. v. OSHRC, 529 F.2d 649, 655 (8th Cir. 
1976). 
321. Although the regulation required the employer to furnish the footwear only where the 
employee did not do so himself, the court observed that, due to the high turnover rate among 
employees, most would choose not to provide their own footwear. The court found that the 
cost of the program, therefore, would fall almost entirely on the shoulders of the company. 570 
F.2d 806,812. 
322. Id. 
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unloaders and sorters be equipped, either at their expense or at 
the expense of petitioner, with steel-toed safety shoes.323 
431 
Thus, even though the overriding concern in the Act is for worker 
safety, the UPS court determined through its own integrative cost-
benefit analysis that the costs imposed by this safety standard, as ap-
plied to UPS, were not justified in light of the expected small in-
crease in worker safety. 
The case of Florida Peach Growers Association v. United States 
Dept. of Labor324 provides a final illustration of judicial recognition 
of an integrative cost-benefit comparison as a criterion for reviewing 
the reasonableness of an OSHA standard. In Florida Peach, an 
organization of fruit growers challenged an OSHA emergency tem-
porary standard for pesticides promulgated under section 6(c) of the 
Act. 325 The standard did not prohibit the use of any pesticides, but in-
stead was designed to protect farmworkers by designating the 
period during which they were prohibited from entering a sprayed 
area.326 
First, in determining the scope of review, the Fifth Circuit Court 
of Appeals observed that substantial evidence review of an emergen-
cy temporary standard,327 similar to that of an OSHA permanent 
standard promulgated under section 6(b), entails an examination of 
"whether the Secretary carried out his essentially legislative task in 
a manner reasonable under the state of the record before him."328 
The court then held that "[t]he promulgation of any standard will de-
pend upon a balance between the protection afforded by the require-
ment and the effect upon economic and market conditions in the in-
dustry."329 Thus, an integrative cost-benefit analysis emerged as the 
implicit basis for determining whether the Secretary acted 
reasonably. 
The emergency temporary standard was struck down by the court 
because the health benefits afforded by the standard did not justify 
the financial burden placed upon the industry. 330 In striking this 
balance, however, the court observed that Congress itself had nar-
323. [d. 
324. 489 F.2d 120 (5th Cir. 1974). 
325. See supra note 31 (describing OSHA emergency temporary standards). 
326. 489 F.2d 120, 122. 
327. The court reasoned that because section 6(±) refers to "a standard issued under this 
section," section 6(c) emergency temporary standards must be included within its scope, and 
are therefore subject to the substantial evidence test. [d. at 128. 
328. [d. at 129. 
329. [d. at 130. 
330. [d. at 129-32. 
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rowed the scope of the permissible cost-benefit analysis by declaring 
that only grave dangers would justify the issuance of an emergency 
temporary standard.331 Relying on that statutory signal, the court 
stated that in general OSHA may issue an emergency temporary 
standard only when conditions pose an immediate threat of a perma-
nent, rather than a curable, nature. 332 Here, because OSHA could 
not show the existence of a grave danger to the farmworkers' health, 
the court struck down the standard as unsupported by substantial 
evidence. 
To summarize the thrust of these cases, under the substantial 
evidence standard of review courts have recognized that their task in 
ensuring the reasonableness of an agency's policy decision is to ex-
amine whether the decision was based upon a weighing of all factors 
relevant to the decision. An examination of cases both within and 
outside the context of OSHA has revealed a consensus by courts that 
an integrative cost-benefit analysis is essential to rational agency 
decisionmaking, regardless of the lack of an express congressional 
mandate to use such an analysis. It is important to note that each of 
the OSHA cases described above found a requirement of cost-benefit 
analysis not by referring to section 3(8) or section 6(b )(5) of the Act, 
but by recognizing that cost-benefit analysis is inherent under the 
Act's mandate to review on the basis of substantial evidence. This ar-
ticle now turns to an examination of the implications of this judicial 
approach as it applies to the Supreme Court's opinions in Industrial 
Union Department v. American Petroleum Institute and American 
Textile Manufacturers Institute v. Donovan. 
D. Reexamination of Industrial Union: Is Cost-Benefit Analysis 
Required in the Determination of Significant Risk? 
In Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. American 
Petroleum Institute, the Supreme Court plurality held that OSHA's 
threshold finding of significant risk must involve both a finding that 
331. [d. at 130. 
332. [d. at 132. In light of the magnitude of the health impairment to the farmworkers, the 
court's construction that only permanent illnesses could be considered "grave" seems ill-
conceived. Studies of the occasional outbreaks of organophosphate poisoning among the farm-
workers had revealed symptoms of "nausea, excessive salivation and perspiration, blurred vi-
sion, abdominal cramps, vomiting, and diarrhea, in approximately that sequence." [d. at 131. 
The list of outbreaks in the record contained one instance where 94 workers were affected, 
with a number of workers requiring one or two days of hospitalization. [d. at 131, n.18. The 
court nevertheless found that these dangers were not grave, relying on its findings that a 
relatively small number of farmworkers were affected, and that these occurrences had been 
ongoing for a period of several years without any deaths being conclusively attributable to 
pesticide exposure. [d. at 131. 
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the existing level of health risk is significant and that the health risk 
will be eliminated or lessened by OSHA's new regulation. 333 One 
basic factor that is not expressed clearly in the plurality opinion is 
whether a risk may be deemed significant solely on the basis of the 
magnitude of the health impairment it creates, or only by a com-
parison between the magnitude of the health impairment and its at-
tendant costs of removal. While most commentators334 have con-
cluded that the plurality in Industrial Union had the former inter-
pretation in mind, at least one court335 and one commentator336 ap-
parently have come to the opposite conclusion. Thus, whether cost-
benefit analysis should be used to ascertain the significance of any 
risk is undetermined. 
The former interpretation, that the significance of a risk turns 
solely on the magnitude of harm, does not fully comport with the 
Act's stated objective of maximizing workplace health and safety 
protection. To understand why, one must first consider health or 
safety risks which are too small to be considered significant, but 
which are nevertheless very inexpensive either to eliminate or 
reduce. 337 Under the magnitude of risk interpretation, OSHA would 
have no authority to regulate these hazards at all, because of the 
lack of a significant risk. Such a result seems incompatible, however, 
with congressional intent to protect worker safety and health "so far 
as possible."33B 
Conversely, the regulation of risks which do exist at a magnitude 
considered to be significant also may be incompatible with congres-
sional purposes. If OSHA is required to regulate these hazards as 
stringently as economically feasible, as is now required by ATMI, the 
result could be counterproductive to the goal of maximizing 
333. 448 U.S. 607, 642 (1980). See supra text and notes at notes 85-97. 
334. See supra commentators listed at note 210. 
335. In Mueller v. Jeffrey Mfg. Co., 494 F. Supp. 275 (E.D. Pa. 1980), the court, in discuss-
ing an employer's duty regarding a hole in a floor which an employee had fallen through, held 
that the employer "had a duty to keep the workplace safe and free from unreasonable danger 
and unnecessary risk." Id. at 278 (emphasis added), citing Industrial Union. This decision 
shows that courts may read the significant risk requirement of Industrial Union as a signal to 
perform a tort law based balancing of costs and benefits. 
336. See Roberts & Kossek, supra note 225, at 469 ("By requiring hazards to be 'significant' 
and giving the example of the possible acceptability of the one-in-one billion risk as opposed to 
the one-in-one thousand risk, the Court is saying that regulation must make some economic 
sense"). 
337. See MacCarthy, supra note 1, at 812 n.98 ("The idea that risks with no benefits and 
easily avoidable risks should be eliminated regardless of their size is a staple of the risk assess-
ment literature"). 
338. 29 U.S.C. § 651(b) (1976). 
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workplace health and safety, in that it would cause a misallocation of 
resources. Justice Powell made this argument in his concurring opin-
ion in Industrial Union. SS9 Justice Powell hypothesized a situation in 
which OSHA is forced to cause the depletion of an industry's 
resources in an effort to reduce a single risk by some speculative 
amount, even though other significant risks would remain 
unregulated. Given that society has a limited amount of resources to 
spend on workplace health and safety, Justice Powell argued that in-
terpreting the Act to prohibit OSHA from any consideration of how 
those resources might be most productively spent runs counter to 
the Act's objectives. S40 
Alternatively, if the courts were to compel OSHA to give at least 
some consideration to financial costs, the agency would be able to 
rectify these problems. First, OSHA would be able to regulate, in 
economically appropriate situations, risks which are now considered 
insignificant. Second, the agency would be able to promulgate 
regulations that take into account considerations of how industrial 
resources can best be allocated to maximize worker safety and 
health. Thus, some accounting of the costs of regulation could actual-
ly foster the goals articulated in the Act. 
The Industrial Union plurality struck down OSHA's benzene 
standard ostensibly because of the agency's failure to amass enough 
evidence to satisfy the significant risk test. S41 A close examination of 
the opinion, however, reveals that the plurality was in fact swayed 
by considerations of cost to the industry. The plurality called the 
benzene standard "an expensive way of providing some additional 
protection for a relatively small number of employees."s42 Thus, 
relativity, or a balance, was central to the Court's concern.S4S Fur-
339. 448 u.s. 607, 664-71. 
340_ Justice Powell observed that OSHA's use of this procedure would be "self-defeating," 
by forcing OSHA to "regulate in a manner inconsistent with the important health and safety 
purposes of the [Act]." Id. at 669-70. A standard setting process which ignores economic con-
siderations completely, in Justice Powell's opinion, "would result in a serious misallocation of 
resources and a lower effective level of safety than could be achieved under standards set with 
reference to the comparative benefits available at a lower cost." Id. at 670. The ATMI majori-
ty disposed of this concern by reference to section 6(g) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 655(g), which 
directs the Secretary to select the gravest risks for earliest regulation. Am. Textile Mfr. Inst. 
v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 509 n.29 (1981). Justice Powell, however, disagreed that section 
6(g) would solve the problem of resource misallocation. 448 U.S. 607, 670. 
341. See supra text and notes at notes 96-97. 
342. 448 U.S. 607, 628 (emphasis added). 
343. See also id. at 630 ("Although OSHA did not quantify the benefits to each category of 
worker in terms of decreased exposure to benzene, it appears from the economic impact study 
done at OSHA's direction that those benefits may be relatively small") (emphasis added). 
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ther language by the plurality indicated its concern that the benzene 
standard did not make economic sense: the plurality noted that the 
industry's data, although disputed, indicated that the standard 
would prevent at most only two deaths every six years; yet, the 
standard would require expenditures of one-half billion dollars over 
that period.844 The Court, therefore, did not advocate regulation 
solely on the basis of the magnitude of the harm, but took into ac-
count both the benefits and costs of the proposed benzene standard. 
One commentator, noting these signals in the plurality's opinion, 
concluded that the Supreme Court deliberately created the section 
3(8) significant risk requirement to camouflage its own application of 
cost-benefit analysis. It was this commentator's opinion that the 
Court did not want to go on rec~rd ~s favoring cost-benefit analysis 
for fear of unfavorable public opinion.845 One can, however, take a 
less cynical view of the matter. Under substantial evidence review as 
outlined above, the Court may have expected some balancing by 
OSHA of the costs of the benzene standard to industry against its 
predicted health benefits.846 The Court may have found inescapable 
the conclusion that OSHA's benzene standard could not survive 
substantial evidence review as a reasonable decision unless it had 
been formulated upon a consideration of financial costs as one factor 
relevant to the decision. The Court, therefore, implied that the 
significance of a risk turns on, among other factors, its financial 
costs of removal. 
This viewpoint implied by the plurality was adopted expressly by 
Justice Powell in his concurring opinion in Industrial Union. Justice 
Powell felt that under the Act, OSHA should be required to show 
that "the economic effects of its standard bear a reasonable relation-
ship to the expected benefits."847 By focusing on the reasonable rela-
tionship standard between costs and benefits, Justice Powell was 
calling for an integrative cost-benefit analysis. He further concluded 
344. Id. at 628-29, 653-54. In addition, the plurality was concerned that the huge expense of 
the standard would provide benefits for only 35,000 employees, in terms of reducing their ex-
posure to benzene. Id. at 629. Justice Stevens noted that "the Government's theory would give 
OSHA power to impose enormous costs that might produce little, if any, discernible benefit." 
Id. at 645. 
345. Note, The Billion Dollar Benzene Blunder: Supreme Court Scrutinizes OSHA Stand-
ards in Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Institute, 16 TULSA 
L.J. 252, 283 (1980). 
346. Indeed, Justice Stevens alluded to this concept during oral argument in theATMI case. 
In reference to section 6(g) of the Act, which requires the Secretary to set priorities for 
establishing section 6(b) standards, Justice Stevens had remarked that a weighing of costs and 
benefits is inherent in the decisionmaking process. See 49 U.S.L.W. 3524 (1981). 
347. 448 U.S. 607, 667. 
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that a health standard which satisfies this type of cost-benefit 
analysis automatically satisfies a showing of significant risk, because 
the significance of a risk depends in part on its financial costs of 
removal: 
OSHA found - at least generally - that the hazards of benzene 
exposure at currently permissible levels are serious enough to 
justify an expenditure of hundreds of millions of dollars. For me, 
that finding necessarily subsumes the conclusion that the health 
risk is 'significant.' If OSHA's conclusion is supported by 
substantial evidence, the threshold requirement discussed in the 
plurality opinion would be satisfied. 348 
In Justice Powell's opinion, therefore, the test of significant risk is 
inextricably linked with a cost-benefit analysis. 
Examining the parameters of his postUlated cost-benefit analysis 
requirement, Justice Powell then analyzed OSHA's finding that the 
costs of the new benzene standard were justified in light of its "ap-
preciable" health benefits.349 On one hand, Justice Powell rejected 
the appeals court's conclusion that the Act requires quantification of 
risk in every case.350 Instead, he found that the directive of section 
6(b)(5) to regulate on the basis of the "best available evidence" im-
plies that OSHA's hands are not to be tied when the risk cannot be 
reasonably quantified by any known method.351 On the other hand, 
even assuming that OSHA's virtually nonexistent quantification was 
acceptable under the section 6(b)(5) best available evidence provi-
sion, Justice Powell rejected OSHA's conclusion that the standard in 
question satisfied a cost-benefit test. In his opinion, OSHA had not 
adequately documented in the record its method of performing the 
cost-benefit analysis, including a showing that the agency had 
weighed all relevant considerations.352 
In calling for an integrative cost-benefit analysis, Justice Powell 
apparently realized that under the substantial evidence standard 
OSHA must consider all relevant factors, including the factor of 
financial costs, as a fundamental requirement of rational decision-
making. Moreover, Justice Powell was correct in calling for only a 
"reasonable relationship" between costs and benefits,353 focusing his 
concern on only those health standards requiring expenditures 
348. Id. at 666. 
349. 43 Fed. Reg. 5941 (1978). 
350. 448 U.S. 607, 666. 
351. Id. 
352. Id. at 670-71. 
353. Id. at 667. 
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"wholly disproportionate" to the expected health benefits.354 This 
formulation accurately reflects the primary concern for worker 
health and safety expressed by Congress in the Act. Overall, Justice 
Powell's interpretation of the Act, therefore, would create a 
rulemaking scheme which is more in line with achieving the Act's ob-
jectives than the plurality's confusing procedure appears to be. 
The Supreme Court's subsequent decision in American Textile 
Manufacturers Institute v. Donovan took corrective steps towards 
providing greater consistency between OSHA's rulemaking pro-
cedures and the goals of the Act. Nevertheless, as described below, 
by overlooking the role of integrative cost-benefit analysis under the 
substantial evidence test and Justice Powell's outline of its relevance 
to OSHA rulemaking, the Court unfortunately failed to establish an 
optimal system for achieving those objectives. 
E. Reexamination of ATMI: What Remains of Cost-Benefit 
Analysis in the Occupational Safety and Health Act? 
In American Textile Manufacturers Institute v. Donovan, the 
Supreme Court construed section 6(b)(5)'s directive that no 
employee suffer impairment of health, coupled with its limitation 
that standards be feasible, to be a specific congressional directive 
precluding the use of cost-benefit analysis by OSHA in setting ex-
posure levels for toxic substances.355 While the effect of this con-
struction on OSHA's rulemaking procedures may be a salutary one, 
the Court did not provide an optimal construction of section 6(b )(5) in 
terms of establishing rulemaking procedures in line with the goals of 
the Act. Evidence of Congress' intent to place primary concern on 
worker health, Congress' failure to use its usual methods of pro-
viding for cost-benefit analysis,356 and the ordinary meaning of the 
354. Id. 
355. See supra text and notes at notes 135-57. 
356. It has been argued that this observation is valid with respect to only monetized cost-
benefit analysis: "Legally, it can be argued that the Act does not require strict cost-benefit 
analysis. When Congress wanted strict cost-benefit analysis, it knew how to clearly put the re-
quirement into its enactments. Yet the legislative history is replete with concern about costs 
and the Act requires certain economic calculations." Roberts & Kossek, supra note 225, at 469 
(emphasis added). In addition, one other commentator has noted that the use of congressional 
silence to signal a presumption against the use of cost-benefit analysis only will obtain where, 
as with OSHA, a strong congressional objective running contrary to the use of cost-benefit 
analysis appears in the agency's enabling statute. Diver, Policymaking Paradigms in Ad-
ministrative Law, 95 HARV. L. REV. 393, 428 (1981). Therefore, although future courts may 
use the ATMI construction of the term "feaSible" to clarify analogous terms in other statutes, 
see The Supreme Court, 1980 Term, 95 HARV. L. REV. 319, 325-26 (1981), courts should bear in 
mind that this construction of the term "feasible" may be confined to the narrow context of 
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word "feasible" all lend support to a conclusion that financial costs 
of OSHA's health standards should be given very little weight under 
the Act. The ATMI Court, however, overshot the mark by inter-
preting these factors to signal the preclusion of any comparison be-
tween the costs and benefits of proposed health standards.357 
If the Court in ATMI intended an outright ban on strict monetized 
cost-benefit analysis, then the Court was correct. The problems 
associated with monetized cost-benefit analysis as applied to deci-
sionmaking in the health and environmental sphere militate against 
its application by OSHA. The Court, however, should have recog-
nized the fundamental role for an integrative type of cost-benefit 
analysis that implicitly is required under the substantial evidence 
test. To the extent that this form of cost-benefit analysis can be ap-
plied consistently with the ATMI opinion, it should be recognized in 
the future. 
Future courts reviewing OSHA health standards, however, un-
doubtedly will construe the ATMI holding literally; that is, courts 
will no longer allow OSHA to consider a comparison between finan-
cial costs and health benefits at all in either the determination of 
significant risk, or in the setting of exposure levels to toxic 
substances. Instead, OSHA now will be required to impose a reduc-
tion of toxic substance levels to the maximum extent economically or 
technologically achievable by industry. In the process, OSHA may 
even find its proposed health standards challenged by employee 
unions, on the grounds that a standard is not strict enough because 
the regulated industry has room to absorb further compliance costs 
before being pushed to the brink of economic destruction. 
The ATMI holding also does not resolve the present confusion over 
the precise meaning of "significant risk," the first prong of the test 
of OSHA's regulatory capability. Substantial evidence review, along 
with the Industrial Union opinion itself, suggests that inherent in a 
rational determination of significant risk is a comparison of the risk 
with its associated economic costs of removal. Yet, after ATMI, 
OSHA can no longer consider economic costs in comparison to health 
benefits when determining the significance of a risk. Accepting the 
Industrial Union plurality's example that a one-in-one billion risk of 
death is not significant,358 the question remains as to how OSHA is 
OSHA, because of the strong statutory objectives that the term is tied to in the context of the 
Act. 
357. For a conclusion that the ATMI Court's construction of section 6(b)(5) was correct, see 
The Supreme Court, 1980 Term, 95 HARV. L. REV. 319, 324 (1981). 
358. 448 U.S. 607, 655. 
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to determine that such a risk is insignificant if not on the basis that it 
makes no economic sense to reduce it.369 Furthermore, the possibili-
ty exists that the agency may rely on a cost-benefit analysis in its 
determination of significant risk without stating so. Such a pro-
cedure is detrimental to a system of responsible agency decisionmak-
ing. OSHA should be held accountable with respect to each factor it 
has considered relevant to its health and safety determinations.36o 
To reconcile the holdings of Industrial Union and ATMI, it is 
reasonable to conclude that the Act does not prohibit all comparisons 
of costs and benefits in setting the level of toxic substance standards. 
Under this proposed interpretation, OSHA would first be required to 
consider financial costs in its determination of significant risk. This 
consideration would be part of an integrative, rather than a mone-
tized, cost-benefit analysis; financial costs, therefore, would be only 
one of several monetizable and nonmonetizable factors under con-
sideration. OSHA would be required to show only a reasonable rela-
tionship between all costs and benefits, in the manner endorsed by 
Justice Powell.361 Because the cost-benefit analysis would be of an in-
tegrative type, no mathematically precise showing of net benefit 
levels would be required; the agency would be held only to a con-
sideration of costs. Furthermore, to comport with the overall 
policies of the Act, reviewing courts would affirm the low priority to 
be given financial costs in the balancing process by invalidating only 
toxic substance regulations that impose financial costs wholly 
disproportionate to expected health benefits, as suggested by Justice 
Powell. 362 Such a system would satisfy the fundamental require-
ments of the substantial evidence test. In addition, this system would 
placate Justice Powell's concerns over a misallocation of societal 
resources by allowing OSHA to take that factor into consideration. 
The second prong of this proposed procedure would entail the im-
plementation by OSHA of the ATMI feasibility test. As with the 
significant risk test, the feasibility test would be adjusted to allow 
359. See Roberts & Kossek, supra note 225, at 469. 
360. Justice Powell voiced this concern in his Industrial Union concurrence: "No rational 
system of regulation can permit its administrators to make policy judgments without explain· 
ing how their decisions effectuate the purposes of the governing law .... " 448 U.S. 607, 670. 
Baram, supra note 1 at 486, similarly states that "responsible decisionmaking demands that 
implicit valuations be acknowledged and addressed explicitly." Baram also argues that the use 
of cost-benefit analysis should not be by unaccountable analysis at all, but should be by Con-
gress or other publicly accountable officials in order to ensure that it is responsibly employed. 
Id. at 525. 
361. See supra text and notes at notes 347-54. 
362. See supra text and note at note 354. 
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OSHA to give some, though minimal, consideration to a standard's 
economic costs. An OSHA procedure which incorporates an in-
tegrative cost-benefit analysis would both comply with the essential 
holdings of Industrial Union and ATMI, and promote the successful 
achievement of the Act's overall goals. 
The ATMI decision also complicates the question of whether 
OSHA need engage in cost-benefit analysis to justify its safety stand-
ards. Because OSHA's safety standards are not subject to the 
feasibility requirement of section 6(b )(5), it will remain possible in the 
future for industries to claim that cost-benefit analysis is required 
either under section 3(8) alone, or as inherent in the Act's directives 
to the agency under the substantial evidence test. 363 It seems valid to 
conclude that Congress made few distinctions between safety and 
health in its quest to protect the worker, despite its application of the 
phrase "to the extent feasible" to health standards only.364 The in-
tegrative cost-benefit system proposed above for health standards, 
therefore, should also be applied to safety standards. OSHA should 
be allowed to consider, on a low priority basis, the financial costs of 
safety standards in the determination of significant risk, as well as in 
the determination of the scope of the standard itself. 
It makes sense to hold OSHA only minimally accountable for a con-
sideration of financial costs. Under this system, courts would 
generally defer to the agency's expertise in weighing the factors 
relevant to an integrative cost-benefit analysis. Courts would, 
however, be able to vacate OSHA regulations that are extremely un-
justified economically. In the future, therefore, courts should 
distinguish between the monetized and integrative forms of cost-
benefit analysis and require OSHA's determinations for both health 
and safety regulations to be premised on integrative cost-benefit 
analyses as part of the agency's mandate to make rational policy 
decisions. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The question whether cost-benefit analysis should play a role in 
OSHA's regulatory procedures has been a difficult one for the 
courts. Congress designed the Occupational Safety and Health Act 
363. Even without reference to section 3(8), OSHA may find its safety standards struck 
down for lack of a cost-benefit justification under the substantial evidence test. See supra text 
and notes at no~es 310-16 (discussing Assoc. Ind. of N.Y. v. United States Dep't of Labor, 487 
F.2d 342 (2d Clr. 1973». 
364. See supra text and notes at notes 179-204. 
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of 1970 to protect workers as much as possible against workplace 
health and safety hazards. Nevertheless, the Act's framers realized 
that, because of technological and economic constraints, workplaces 
cannot be made risk-free. While the Act itself does not call for cost-
benefit analysis, many people have cited the Act as imposing on 
OSHA the requirement of balancing the economic costs of regula-
tions against the expected health and safety benefits to workers. 
These proponents of cost-benefit analysis have pointed to pragmatic 
language in the Act contained in both the section 3(8) reasonably 
necessary requirement and the section 6(bX5) feasibility require-
ment. Adding to the confusion over whether cost-benefit analysis is 
appropriate under OSHA has been a disagreement over the meaning 
of the term itself. While some observers contend that cost-benefit 
analysis applies only to a fully monetized exercise, others emphasize 
the value of comparing costs and benefits even when there are no 
market prices available to monetize, for instance, relevant health or 
environmental interests. Thus, the confusion over the application of 
cost-benefit analysis to OSHA regulations has been considerable. 
Recently, the Supreme Court rendered two decisions bearing on 
the role of cost-benefit analysis under OSHA. In Industrial Union 
Department, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Institute, the Court 
held that, under the requirements of section 3(8), OSHA may not 
regulate a particular health or safety hazard at all unless the hazard 
presents a significant risk of harm. In addition, for the limited 
category of toxic substance standards, the Court in American Tex-
tile Manufacturers Institute v. Donovan held that OSHA's standards 
must eliminate all risk of material health impairment within the 
limits of economic and technological feasibility, which precludes the 
use of cost-benefit analysis. 
Despite the Supreme Court's recent pronouncements, several 
questions remain unanswered in this area. One major question is 
whether cost-benefit analysis is an appropriate criterion for setting 
safety standards under the Act. The ATMI Court expressly left this 
question open. A broad reading of the ATMI opinion, however, sug-
gests that courts in the future may interpret the Act so as to 
preclude cost-benefit analysis for safety standards as well as for 
health standards. An analysis of congressional intent reveals that 
future courts would be correct in making no differentiation between 
health and safety standards when determining the extent to which 
OSHA may consider financial costs in its standard setting process. 
In addition, the question remains unanswered as to how OSHA, or 
the courts, can determine that a risk is not significant. Although the 
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Industrial Union plurality did not expressly call for a consideration 
of economic costs in the determination of significant risk, the plurali-
ty's language indicated that such a consideration would be ap-
propriate. This construction of the significant risk requirement 
aligns more closely with the Act's objectives than would a construc-
tion focusing only on the magnitude of the risk itself. As such, under 
the Act no health or safety risk should be deemed insignificant unless 
it is too expensive to reduce. Future courts, however, undoubtedly 
will read the ATMI opinion as prohibiting any type of cost-benefit 
analysis under OSHA, even as applied to the determination of the 
significant risk threshold. 
To provide a more cohesive reading of the two Supreme Court 
opinions, this article has investigated the overall role that economic 
and social costs have played, and may play in the future, in the pro-
mulgation of health and safety standards. An analysis of opinions 
reviewing OSHA standards, as well as those reviewing the policy 
decisions of other administrative agencies, has revealed the conclu-
sion by courts that the substantial evidence test inherently con-
templates an integrative cost-benefit weighing as an essential ele-
ment of rational agency decisionmaking. Integrative cost-benefit 
analysis has been relied on by courts where full monetization of rele-
vant factors is not possible; where, as with OSHA, a government 
agency is created expressly to make policy decisions which by their 
nature cannot be exclusively based on quantifiable elements. 
Presumably, however, an integrative cost-benefit analysis under the 
substantial evidence test must be keyed to the legislative policy goals 
expressed in the agency's enabling statute. In OSHA's case, health 
and safety risks should be heavily weighted with respect to the finan-
cial costs of reducing those risks in the context of an integrative cost-
benefit analysis. 
This proposed system would provide a coherent legal framework in 
which to view both Justice Powell's expressed view and the In-
dustrial Union plurality's implied view that the Act allows cost-
benefit analyses of both health and safety standards on a limited 
basis. On one hand, courts would to a great extent defer to OSHA's 
determination of costs and benefits because of the agency's exper-
tise in the area and the Act's clear mandate to err on the side of pro-
tecting the worker. In reviewing OSHA determinations of signifi-
cant risk and feasibility, however, courts would allow, or in ap-
propriate cases require, the agency to consider the financial costs of 
standards against the related benefits. This action would be ap-
propriate in cases where a reduction of risk to the maximum extent 
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achievable by industry would be extremely detrimental in an 
economIC sense. 
Economic realities demand that the financial costs of OSHA's 
regulations be somehow accounted for by OSHA and reviewable by 
the courts, if only to provide a check on those regulations which, as 
described by the Industrial Union plurality, are extremely un-
justified economically. The approach of substantial evidence review 
outlined above reveals that, on a limited basis, OSHA should account 
for financial costs by using integrative rather than monetized cost-
benefit analysis in its determinations. Such a procedure would en-
sure OSHA's faithful adherence to the balanced legislative objective 
of providing maximum worker health and safety protection within 
the bounds of economic reality. 
